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Abstract 
This dissertation investigated the formation, projection, and reception of 
strategic narratives with the purpose of exploring and explaining how and in what ways 
soft power can be enacted via strategic narratives. Specifically, utilizing Miskimmon et 
al.’s (2014) concept of strategic narratives, this dissertation analyzed strategic narratives 
of Russia to answer the research questions of this exploratory study. The dissertation 
consisted of three empirical studies. The first study executed a qualitative analysis of 
the foundational foreign policy documents of Russia to identify the potentially 
embedded strategic narratives that can be used for projection. The second study 
conducted a content analysis of Russia's public diplomacy materials to understand what 
strategic narratives, identified at the level of narrative formation, were embedded in the 
media materials of two major Russia's public diplomacy outlets: Russia Today and RIA 
Novosti (Sputnik). The third study analyzed the content of two U.S. elite newspapers, 
the New York Times and the Washington Post, to identify whether any of Russia’s 
strategic narratives reached the discursive media environment of the target state. The 
results from all three studies were then compared and analyzed further.  
At the level of narrative formation, the study identified five major strategic 
narratives that Russia could potentially use for projection onto the target publics. At the 
level of narrative projection, the study found all five narratives present in the Russian 
public diplomacy efforts, with culture and policy dominating as a soft power source. 
The level of narrative salience within a story was positively correlated with the tone of 
the narrative during the projection stage. At the level of narrative reception, the study 
also found all five narratives present within the discursive environment of the target 
xvi 
state, with policy dominating as a soft power source. Yet, the level of narrative salience 
within a story was negatively correlated with the tone of the narrative during the 
reception stage.  
These findings were further analyzed and synthesized to understand the process 
of the soft power enactment via strategic narratives. In general, the findings highlighted 
several observations. First, strategic narratives that are present at the level of narrative 
formation are also present at the level of narrative projection and narrative reception, 
although with varying degree of salience. Second, some strategic narratives at the level 
of projection and the level of reception exhibited a significant growth during the same 
period of time, indicating a time-bound need for strategic narratives. Third, strategic 
narratives’ attributes, such as narrative salience within a story and narrative tone, 
differed between stages of narrative projection and narrative reception, with narratives 
being more neutral to positive at the projection and more neutral to negative at the 
reception. Fourth, speakers of strategic narratives also differed in several ways between 
stages, with Russian government officials dominating narrative projection and non-
Russian government officials and public figures dominating narrative reception. Finally, 
sources of soft power referenced in strategic narratives at the level of narrative 
projection were referenced in a similar manner at the level of narrative reception, with 
the exception of one narrative, indicating that attributes/sources of soft power attraction 
can fluctuate and be re-framed during the transmission process.  
Overall, the dissertation suggests that strategic narratives projected via public 
diplomacy efforts can be used as tools for the enactment of soft power when strategic 
narratives emphasize different soft power sources: policies, values, and culture. This 
xvii 
argument is based on the assumption that strategic narrative can survive the 
transmission between stages of narrative formation, narrative projection, and narrative 
reception. While this assumption has been confirmed by this dissertation, it was also 
demonstrated that the ability of strategic narratives to reach the discursive environment 
of the target country does not ensure narrative reception. This observation prompted a 
conceptualization of an intermediate stage between the narrative projection and 
narrative reception – narrative diffusion. The proposed diffusion stage captures the 
previously unexplained concern of how strategic narratives can be received at the stage 
of narrative reception.   
The results of this exploratory research extend and clarify the work of Roselle et 
al. (2014) on the relationship between strategic narratives and soft power. By addressing 
the research problem, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the 
relationship between soft power and strategic narratives and provides insights into the 
discursive nature of soft power, illustrating the phenomenon using the case of Russia. 
This study also elaborated on the contributions of public relations and public diplomacy 
to the process of soft power enactment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The neoliberal view of the world as a global marketplace forced countries 
around the world to be engaged in strategic competition and country promotion, seeking 
to exert power and shape the world order (Dolea, 2015). This requires communicating 
about the policies and values in order for other countries to see the country’s goals as 
legitimate. In other words, it requires soft power (Daly, 2016; Duanmu, 2014; Nye, 
2008; Roselle et al., 2014).  
The term soft power entered political discourse in the early 1990s, when Joseph 
Nye in his influential book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power 
coined the term. Academics, journalists, and political leaders around the world now use 
it frequently to describe nations’ quest for a positive image. Numerous rankings of the 
world nations (Best Countries Index, The Good Country Index, Soft Power 30) 
demonstrate the importance of soft power’s ability to attract and persuade, justifying 
spending on soft power-related programming, including public diplomacy programs 
(Hayden, 2012). To many, public diplomacy is the tool that helps foster soft power as 
well as the instrument for exerting it (Melissen, 2005). 
The popular notions of public diplomacy, circulating in the media and 
government reports, often liken public diplomacy to related concepts of public relations, 
soft power, and even nation-branding (Dolea, 2015; Macnamara, 2012; Melissen, 2005; 
Zaharna et al., 2013). These three terms have often been used interchangeably to deal 
with the same problem of a country’s image (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2015; Dolea, 
2015; Pamment, 2014). As a result, public diplomacy became a catch-all phrase for 
 2 
describing how governments exploit communication technologies, including public 
relations, to exert soft power (Fitzpatrick, 2010).  
Both scholars and practitioners have extensively discussed public diplomacy in 
the literature. Substantial gaps exist in understandings of public diplomacy when 
viewed from the perspective of different disciplines, namely international relations and 
public relations. According to Gilboa (2008), experts and practitioners in public 
diplomacy have often ignored relevant knowledge in communication and public 
relations literature, while communication and public relations scholars and practitioners 
ignored the relevant literature in international relations and diplomatic studies.  
When public diplomacy is discussed within the domain of public relations, the 
similarities and differences between public diplomacy and public relations are 
frequently debated. In response to these debates and theoretical arguments several broad 
public relations approaches to public diplomacy have been introduced, including: 1) the 
mediated approach to public diplomacy that focuses on the country images (Buhmann 
& Ingenhoff, 2013; Kunzcik, 1997); 2) the relational approach to public diplomacy that 
emphasizes the value of relationships (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Yang, Klyueva, & Taylor, 
2012); 3) the integrated approach to public diplomacy that argues for interdisciplinary 
nature of the concept (Golan, 2013), and 4) the network and collaborative approach to 
public diplomacy that focuses on social capital and soft power potential of networks 
(Yang & Taylor, 2014; Zaharna et al., 2013). These approaches largely emphasize the 
functional level of public diplomacy and its execution, highlighting strategies and 
tactics that can be most effective for achieving foreign policy goals. As Dolea (2015) 
explained, “the dominant approach in research falls into a functionalist paradigm since 
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it is meant to identify better instruments for crafting messages and to furnish solutions 
for improving the practice in general” (p. 278). To counter this prevalence of the 
functionalist perspective, public relations scholars also advocated for critical (Dolea, 
2015) and cultural (Dutta-Bergman, 2006) examinations of public diplomacy.  
Within the international relations literature, public diplomacy is often discussed 
in relation to soft power (Melissen, 2005; Nye, 2008) and some scholars suggest a soft 
power approach to public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005; Yang et al., 2012; Yang & 
Taylor, 2014). However, such an approach has not been clearly articulated considering 
that the above-mentioned public relations approaches to public diplomacy incorporate 
soft power in one way or the other. Soft power in the discussions of these approaches 
often serves as a unifying theme, particularly in relation to the outcomes of public 
diplomacy programming. As such, soft power frequently is treated as an instrument of 
public diplomacy and as an ad-hoc measure for its effectiveness (Hayden, 2012; 
Pamment, 2014; Rugh, 2009). For example, Yang and Taylor (2014) offered a soft 
power network approach that argues that networks create soft power through its 
structure, and thus stress the notion that governments with bigger, stronger networks 
acquire the type of (soft) power that translates into influence. In their example of 
Chinese soft power in network public diplomacy, soft power is treated as an outcome of 
network public diplomacy. 
This chapter addresses the multitude of interpretations of public diplomacy and 
public relations as they relate to soft power and lays foundation for the understanding of 
how public diplomacy, public relations, and soft power are understood and used for the 
purpose of this dissertation research. It starts with an overview of the dominant 
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conceptualizations and interpretations of these concepts found in the literature. The 
discussion concludes with identifying the research problem addressed in this 
dissertation. Further, the chapter briefly outlines theoretical and methodological 
approaches and discusses the significance of the study for practice and theory 
development.  
Conceptualizations of Public Diplomacy, Public Relations, and Soft Power 
The varying definitions of public diplomacy suggest that the concept still lacks 
theoretical and conceptual clarity (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013). While the 
multidisciplinary nature of public diplomacy opened doors for different disciplines to 
claim public diplomacy and to interpret it in its specific context (Gilboa, 2008; 
Macnamara, 2012), it also created an impression that “public diplomacy theory had 
entered a phase of the postmodern eclecticism” (Pamment, 2014, p. 53).  
Although the term public diplomacy was not coined until 1965, the practice of 
public diplomacy is as old as the modern world (Bardos, 2000). Broadly defined as the 
“influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies,” 
public diplomacy is a key part of the nation-states’ survival (Association of Public 
Diplomacy Professionals, formerly USIA Alumni Association, 2016, para. 10). Yet, 
there are many more ways in which public diplomacy is being practiced, defined, and 
understood by scholars and practitioners. According to Fitzpatrick et al. (2013), public 
diplomacy does not have a generally accepted definition. Scholars working with public 
diplomacy are often focused on “establishing the variety of activities encompassed by 
public diplomacy and the actors involved in it” (Dolea, 2015, p. 277).  
 5 
Traditional descriptions of public diplomacy often emphasize government 
involvement, “direct communication with foreign peoples with the aim of affecting their 
thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone, 1985, p. 199). Another 
definition of public diplomacy describes it as “a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
policies” (Tuch, 1990, p.3).  
A common characteristic of public diplomacy highlighted in many definitions is 
the foreign publics as target audience. Waller (2007), for example, suggested that 
public diplomacy is “the art of communicating with foreign publics to influence 
international perceptions, attitudes and policies” (p. 19). Cull (2009) proposed to treat 
public diplomacy as an attempt by international actors “to manage the international 
environment through engagement with a foreign public” (p. 12). Nakamura and Weed 
(2009) argued that public diplomacy is “a term used to describe a government’s efforts 
to conduct foreign policy and promote national interests through direct outreach and 
communication with the population of a foreign country” (p. i).  
These definitions draw attention to yet another essential component of public 
diplomacy that is the effect of its activities on foreign policy goals of the advocate 
country. For example, Sharp (2005) suggested that “public diplomacy is the process by 
which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and 
extend the values of those being represented” (p. 106), and Frederick (1993) argued that 
public diplomacy is comprised of “activities, directed abroad in the fields of 
information, education, and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign 
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government, by influencing its citizens” (p. 229). Thus, public diplomacy as a 
government communication activity is expected to yield results in the form of 
advancing national interests that are expressed in foreign policy.  
Similarly, McDowell argued that two crucial elements define the uniqueness and 
purpose of public diplomacy – government intention and government participation. 
Without these crucial building blocks, “we are merely talking about the background 
noise of international communication” (McDowell, 2008, p. 8).  
Consider the following observations by McDowell (2008) as illustrated in 
Figure 1. First, when government A communicates with government B, it conducts 
diplomacy in its traditional understanding (black arrow). For example, when the U.S. 
and Russia discussed framework on Syria’s chemical weapons, most of the 
conversations happened behind closed doors (Smith-Park & Cohen, 2013).  
Figure 1. Public Diplomacy and Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, when the government A communicates with the society B with the hope 
of influencing government B, it conducts public diplomacy that arguably may have 
attributes of propaganda (international broadcasting) and therefore is not entirely 
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credible (McDowell, 2008; blue arrows). For example, created in the aftermath of 9/11 
to combat anti-American moods in the Middle East, the U.S. government funded Arab-
language international broadcaster Al-Hurra (a U.S. public diplomacy tool) still 
struggles with viewership and ratings (Dabbous & Nasser, 2009). Third, when society A 
directly communicates with society B, it contributes to the general flow of international 
communication. For example, a tour of the Russian ballet troupe in the United States is 
a commercial endeavor with a potential for cultural impact, or a professional journalists 
training is an educational endeavor with a potential for political impact (Figure 1, green 
arrows).  
According to McDowell (2008), all of these activities can happen in the absence 
of the government, but “they become public diplomacy only when they are part of an 
overall plan conceived by (or at least agreed to by) government and are directed at a 
particular goal” (p. 10). Furthermore, McDowell (2008) argued that public diplomacy 
is most successful when black, green, and blue arrows are coordinated [by the 
government] with the goal of supporting foreign policy goals. An example of such 
cooperation between state and non-state actors, government and civil society, can be the 
congressionally mandated NGOs. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the 
Asia Foundation, the East West Center at the University of Hawaii, and the Eisenhower 
Exchange Fellowship Program continue to receive government funding to perform work 
in support of U.S. foreign policy goals (Nakamura & Weed, 2009). These NGOs “seek 
to develop long-term relationships and to improve foreign populations’ understanding 
of and attitudes toward the United States” (Nakamura & Weed, 2009, p. 32).  
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Such description of public diplomacy brings a more contemporary 
understanding of public diplomacy to the forefront. What some scholars call new public 
diplomacy (Melissen, 2005), includes non-government entities and non-state actors as 
well. Public relations scholars Signitzer and Coombs (1992) were among the first to 
observe the importance of non-state actors in public diplomacy, characterizing public 
diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups 
influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly 
on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (p. 138). This has become a unifying 
theme between public relations and public diplomacy. 
As an evolving practice, public diplomacy increasingly resembles modern 
understanding of public relations, both conceptually and practically. For example, 
Szondi (2009) conceptualized public diplomacy as international public relations with 
relationship management being the central concept. He argued that many scholars and 
practitioners “dismiss or misunderstand public relations”, but “they tend to use its 
terminology and key concepts, thus reinventing the wheel” (p. 28).  
The previous research, reviews of literature and comparisons of public 
diplomacy and public relations terms demonstrated the functional and practical 
equivalency of public diplomacy and public relations (Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; L’Etang, 
1996; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006). According to Signitzer and Wamser (2006), both 
public relations and public diplomacy are strategic communication functions of the 
government. The research by Fitzpatrick et al. (2013) revealed that there is a 
“significant potential for public relations concepts and practices to inform thinking and 
practices in public diplomacy” (p. 1).  
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To summarize, public diplomacy definitions often attribute its function to 
national governments, treat publics of foreign countries as target audiences, assume the 
involvement of both state and non-state actors in public diplomacy activities, argue that 
public diplomacy activities affect foreign policy, and often see the accomplishment of 
foreign policy goals as a strategic purpose of public diplomacy. The many descriptions 
of public diplomacy frequently relate it to soft power and liken it to public relations, 
highlighting the idea that “public diplomacy is about using available means to influence 
the actions of foreign populations” with a strategic goal of accomplishing foreign policy 
objectives (Fisher, 2008, p. 130).  
For the above reasons, in this dissertation public diplomacy is defined as a 
strategic public relations function of the government with the goal of communicating 
and explaining foreign policy of a country to global publics through available means of 
influence, including but not limited to strategic planning and execution of 
informational, cultural and educational programming, as well as international 
development projects by state and non-state actors. 
While communication scholars regard public diplomacy as being in alignment 
with theories, principles and strategies of public relations, international relations 
scholars view public diplomacy more than a communication tool (Nye, 2004). In 
international relations, public diplomacy is often regarded as a major tool to promote 
soft power, which considers everything (popular culture, fashion, sports, news, Internet, 
democracy, etc.) to have an impact on foreign policy and national security as well as on 
trade, tourism and other national interests.  
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In recent years, more and more public diplomacy conceptualizations started to 
include soft power (Macnamara, 2012). Kalin (2011) defined public diplomacy as “a 
platform for the implementation of soft power” (p. 7). Williams (2009) argued that 
public diplomacy is “an integral component of what Joseph Nye termed ‘soft power’ or 
the ‘ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and values that underlie them’” 
(p. 218). Zhang (2013) simplified Nye’s notion of soft power to simply likening it to 
public diplomacy. Sun (2008) suggested that “public diplomacy as part of international 
political marketing is a method in the creation of soft power, as well as, in the 
application of soft power” (p. 165). According to Pamment (2014), public diplomacy is 
a practice of communication interventions into “foreign policy issues by actively 
utilizing soft power assets” (p. 52).  
In general, public relations, public diplomacy, and soft power are the three terms 
that often are used interchangeably to address questions associated with country image 
(Pamment, 2014). Some scholars have also thrown the concept of nation branding into 
the mix under the umbrella term of country promotion (Anholt, 2010; Dolea, 2015). As 
a result, public diplomacy frequently refers to the governments’ exploitation of 
communication tools, including public relations, to exercise soft power (Fitzpatrick, 
2010).  
The association among concepts of public diplomacy, public relations, and soft 
power has been the subject of examination (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2015; Dolea, 2015; 
Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; Pamment, 2014), and is often rationalized by the functional 
equivalency between public relations and public diplomacy (L’Etang, 2008), and the 
need for public diplomacy’s justification through soft power (Hayden, 2012). 
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Specifically, the adoption of public relations tools for public diplomacy campaign 
design included the embracing of “measurable objectives” as well as “measurement by 
objective,” bringing the issue of practicality and evaluation to the forefront of the 
discussions about public diplomacy (Pamment, 2014). For this reason, soft power 
became a convenient tool for justifying public diplomacy spending, being treated as a 
potential outcome of public diplomacy programs and as an ad-hoc measure of public 
diplomacy success (Hayden, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2013; Pamment, 2014).  
Despite the proliferation of public diplomacy approaches and recurrent debates 
about the role of soft power in public diplomacy, the understanding of soft power as it 
relates to public diplomacy and how it operates is still lacking. An extensive reading of 
the literature in international relations, public relations, and public diplomacy indicated 
that the concept of soft power is an overarching theme that provides a meaningful link 
between public diplomacy as a domain of international relations and public diplomacy 
as a domain of public relations. This presents a conceptual problem but also an 
opportunity to examine the relationship between soft power and public diplomacy 
further. The understanding of soft power from a communication perspective, 
specifically through public diplomacy as a strategic public relations function of the 
government, is the focus of this dissertation.     
Problem Statement 
Soft power is central to the understanding of international communication and 
international relations today. Many scholars and practitioners treat soft power as an 
instrument of public diplomacy – a potential tool for exerting political influence that 
stems from cultural influence and from publics’ interest in the images of nations and 
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identities that it produces (Solomon, 2014). Soft power is also often discussed as an 
instrument or an outcome of public diplomacy activities and is frequently used as a 
justification for public diplomacy spending (Hayden, 2012). It has become a measure of 
its success or failure.  
Although soft power received significant attention in the scholarly literature and 
is used as a catchphrase for politicians and journalists, nevertheless the research 
explaining how the influence of soft power takes places and how one can enact the soft 
power influence is rather limited. In addition, the discussions of leveraging soft power 
are scarce in general and lack clear suggestions for practitioners of how to achieve it. 
While the literature discusses how soft power comes to be, its sources and potential 
modi operandi, the literature does not address the question such as: when an actor wants 
to enact (project, use, or wield) its soft power, how is it accomplished? Therefore, this 
dissertation attempts to address the question of how one leverages soft power attraction 
for strategic outcomes.   
In light of the limited research on how to leverage soft power and the lack of 
clear suggestions for practitioners for how to achieve it, this dissertation strives to 
address the following research problem: how and in what way soft power influence can 
be communicated and/or enacted, specifically via strategic narratives projected through 
public diplomacy? Further, while there is a growing body of literature on strategic 
narrative in international relations (Miskimmon et al., 2014; Roselle et al., 2014; 
Zaharna, 2016), to date, there are no comprehensive studies that examine the 
development of strategic narratives from their formation to projection to reception 
specifically to examine the potential of soft power enactment.  
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This dissertation utilized the Miskimmon et al.’s (2014) concept of strategic 
narratives and proposed to think about strategic narratives as tools for the enactment of 
soft power. Specifically, this dissertation attempted to address the identified problem by 
examining the strategic narratives of Russia, developed and used in recent years, to 
explore the potential of strategic narrative to enact soft power.  
By addressing the stated research problem, this dissertation contributes to an 
overall understanding of the relationship between soft power and strategic narratives 
and provides insights about the fluid nature of soft power. In addition, using the Russian 
Federation as a case study, this dissertation helps to illustrate in what way strategic 
narratives help enact soft power. This study also elaborates on the contributions of 
public relations and public diplomacy to the process of soft power enactment. The next 
section offers context for the study of public diplomacy and soft power using the 
example of Russia as an advocate state and the United States as the target state.  
Background for the Study: Public Diplomacy, Russia, and the United States 
Traditionally, public diplomacy was used by a government against another 
government in hostile relationships to accomplish long-term results in foreign societies 
(Gilboa, 1998), and initially was a euphemism for propaganda (Signitzer & Coombs, 
1992). Public diplomacy became a substantial area of practice during the Cold War, and 
throughout the twentieth century was dominated by campaigns to garner ideological 
support (Bardos, 2000; Cull, 2009; Gilboa, 2008). Being a child of the Cold War, public 
diplomacy has been widely utilized in the battle for hearts and minds between two 
superpowers of the twentieth century – the Soviet Union and the United States (Staar, 
1986).  
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The practice of public diplomacy has been mastered during a half-century 
history of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which made a great contribution to the 
integration of public diplomacy into the foreign policy (Bardos, 2000). According to 
Wang (2006), during the Cold War the U.S. public diplomacy included covert 
psychological war operations run by CIA and informational operations run by USIA. 
The USIA’s objectives were later expanded to serve foreign policy goals, such as 
influencing public attitudes abroad and advising the President. As a result, the U.S. 
public diplomacy became an ad hoc instrument of American foreign policy and has 
been struggling to find its role within the foreign affairs apparatus as a strategic policy 
function versus merely as a “mouthpiece” of American foreign policy (Snow, 2009).  
The end of the Cold War raised the question of USIA’s relevance and the role of 
public diplomacy. In 1997, USIA ceased its existence and the Department of State 
assumed the responsibilities for public diplomacy programs. A new phase in the 
development of public diplomacy research started after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Snow, 
2009).  
In the aftermath of 9/11, both public diplomacy scholars and practitioners 
became increasingly concerned with the United States’ image in the Arab and Muslim 
countries. Tools of public diplomacy, temporarily abandoned after the victory of the 
Cold War, came in demand again when the war on terror became a new target of public 
diplomacy efforts (Snow & Taylor, 2006). These renewed public diplomacy efforts 
were criticized for using a Cold War approach to a very different problem - terrorism 
and anti-Americanism (Snow & Taylor, 2006).  
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As the attention of public diplomacy scholars and practitioners turned to the 
issues of the war on terror and the Muslim world, Russia and the Russian people were 
omitted from the list of important target audiences for American public diplomacy 
efforts (Seib, 2010). According to Seib (2010), there is no articulated U.S. public 
diplomacy policy toward Russia. In fact, the primary instrument of the American public 
diplomacy during the Cold War, the Voice of America, seized its Russian-language 
broadcasting in 2008 (Kiel, 2008). The closure of the Voice of America broadcasting in 
Russia was done following the American policy to put an emphasis on public 
diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world and to free up funds for recently created Arab-
language broadcasting company Al-Hurra (Kiel, 2008). Currently, the Russian service 
of the Voice of America provides information online only, while the Russian radio 
station Voice of Russia began the English-language broadcasting in the United States 
(Tlisova, 2011). 
To the contrary, Russia has been actively building its information assets for the 
last 15 years. Although the term public diplomacy reflects a relatively new field of 
practice and study in Russia, its earlier form of propaganda has historically been an 
intrinsic part of the Soviet foreign service, working as a propaganda device of the 
Soviet state, its voice and face abroad through overseas embassies and ambassadors 
(Kenez, 1985). Some Western scholars argued that public diplomacy is not a very 
appropriate term for the Soviet efforts in this field (Staar, 1986; Wettig, 1986). 
According to Wettig (1986), Soviet propaganda was often treated as a political action, 
which meant “mobilizing, organizing, and as much as possible, controlling political 
forces in Western societies in order to exploit them for the attainment of definite Soviet 
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purposes” (p. 275). In contrast with the U.S. public diplomacy, which promoted policies 
after they were publicly discussed and agreed upon, Soviet propaganda was an essential 
part of the foreign policy from its very inception (Wettig, 1986).  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the foreign policy 
conception of the newly created Russian Federation had two important communication 
objectives to achieve: to dissolve the Soviet-era stereotypes and to promote the new 
image of democratic Russia (Feklyunina, 2008). However, public diplomacy efforts 
were stagnated by persistent and reoccurring political and economic problems that 
Russia faced in the 1990s. According to Finn (2008), despite the progression toward 
democratization and modernization, it has been increasingly hard to create an image of 
Russia as “a country where the economy is booming and democracy is developing” 
(para. 5).  
The turn of the 21st century marked the new beginning for the Russian public 
diplomacy. After a decade of political and economic instability, the interest of Russia in 
public diplomacy was revived (Astakhov, 2008). Gradually, Russia has been building 
its strategic communications structure, integrating and centralizing its information 
services, bringing it under government control and growing capacity for effective public 
diplomacy outreach both in the near abroad and the West (Hayden, 2017). Russian 
language and culture became central elements of Russia’s strategic public diplomacy 
efforts (Klyueva & Tsetsura, 2015).  
In recent years, Russia has rediscovered public diplomacy as means to cope with 
the image problem and a way to re-establish country’s presence in the international 
arena. Realizing that it has an unfavorable reputation worldwide, Russia has 
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implemented many efforts to project a more positive image with the primary goal to 
diminish traditional stereotypes of Russia and negative perceptions (Simons, 2011). In 
2005, Kremlin initiated an extensive public diplomacy campaign to improve Russia’s 
image abroad (Orttung, 2010). The arsenal of tools for the newly launched public 
diplomacy efforts ranged from traditional international broadcasting to sophisticated 
efforts that included lobbying in the United States, cultural and educational exchanges, 
and counseling services from the biggest public relations firms, such as Ketchum and its 
affiliates (Feklyunina, 2008; Orttung, 2010).  
According to Finn (2008), since 2005 Kremlin has been investing millions of 
dollars into various forms of public diplomacy, together with “new media ventures to 
target international audiences; foundations to promote Russian language and culture 
around the world; conferences to charm Western opinion-makers; and nongovernmental 
organizations that are setting up shops in Western capitals to scrutinize the failings of 
Western democracy” (para. 6). These new media ventures included the launch in 2005 
of an international broadcasting company, Russia Today, and the formation of an 
integrated information agency with the same name in 2013, comprised of the former 
news service RIA Novosti and radio Voice of Russia (Toor, 2013). Among other 
established public diplomacy institutions was the New York-based Institute for 
Democracy and Cooperation (Osipovich, 2008), D.C.-based Center on Global Interests 
(Shitov, 2013), Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy (Burlinova, 2013) and Russkiy 
Mir Foundation (Voice of Russia, 2007). According to Avgerinos (2009), these efforts 
produced mixed results and did not improve Russia’s image abroad significantly, 
partially due to the fact that the existing Russian public diplomacy policy was 
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characterized by inconsistent government rhetoric and a lack of clear and coherent 
strategy. 
Rawnsley (2015) investigated the capacity of Russia’s international broadcaster 
Russia Today as an instrument of public diplomacy and observed that the Russian 
government’s mouthpiece did not necessarily dedicate its airtime to remedy negative 
perceptions of Russia but rather focused on providing an alternative coverage of 
political and social events in the United States, allowing to grow its audiences quickly. 
Rawnsley (2015) argued that presenting itself as alternative or different from the U.S. 
media, Russia Today diminished its credibility and strengthened the perception of it 
being a propaganda machine.  
Kiseleva (2015) argued that the Russian public diplomacy efforts are connected 
to the need and desire of Russia to establish itself as a recognized soft power state. She 
postulated that the notion of soft power attracts Russian political elites seeking status 
recognition and influence in the international system. According to Kiseleva (2015), 
when the recognition is not granted, Russia falls back on countervailing discourse 
ascribing itself a great power status in opposition to the West. Dougherty (2013) 
explained: 
Russia, as yet unable to define its own values, takes an “oppositional” approach 
to soft power, seeking to improve Russia’s image by undermining the narrative 
projected by the United States. To accomplish this goal, Russia does not need to 
carry out a full frontal assault on Western values; it can simply “relativize” the 
values promoted by the West (p. 96). 
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Sergunin and Karabeshkin (2015) observed that Russia has two key interests in 
implementing a soft power strategy: 1) fostering economic, political and socio-cultural 
integration in the post-Soviet space; and 2) improving its international image. 
Analyzing Russia’s soft power approach, they observed that Russia’s soft power 
strategies go beyond public diplomacy and are often rooted in Russia’s hard power. For 
example, often the socio-political integration of the post-Soviet countries implies 
securing the position of local regimes through financial and military resources 
(Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015).   
Importantly, most recent research on Russia’s public diplomacy and Russia’s 
soft power has been conducted in the context of Russia’s international actions, 
specifically Russian involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. In 2014, under the pretext of 
the right for self-determination, Russia had annexed a Crimean peninsula, a Russian-
speaking autonomous region of Ukraine (Biersack & O’lear, 2014). Arguably, this 
action was in response to the Euromaidan protest movement and ousting of the pro-
Russian president of Ukraine. Biersack and O’lear (2014) suggested two key factors for 
annexing Crimea by Russia – control of the Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea 
and some newly discovered energy potential of the Black Sea that lead to territorial 
claims. In March of 2014, the Russian government deployed its unmarked troops to 
conduct a secessionist referendum that prompted Russia’s incorporation of Crimea into 
its territory. Biersack & O’lear (2014) found that by appealing to Russia’s geopolitical 
and historical imaginations of Crimea and the sense of historical injustice, the Russian 
government was able to disseminate narratives justifying the annexation of Crimea 
successfully.  
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Examining the Ukrainian counter-narratives of the time, Hayden (2017) argued 
that most of the efforts were directed toward managing the narratives around Russia’s 
involvement in Ukraine. The United States attempted to contest Russia’s narrative on 
the Ukrainian conflict but with a limited degree of success as Russia’s media monopoly 
has been strongly cemented in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, where narrative 
often emphasized the rights of ethnic minorities. According to Hayden (2017), the U.S. 
actions countering the Russian narrative were more about the de-legitimizing Russia’s 
portrayal of events (e.g. demonstrating Russia’s fake news) than about providing a 
competing narrative. Russian international broadcaster Russia Today and information 
agency RIA Novosti played a critical role in amplifying the legitimacy of Russia’s 
actions and policy in Ukraine (Richter, 2014).  
The presented background sets the stage for the study of the strategic narratives 
of Russia projected via its public diplomacy efforts. The situation provides a context for 
the timeline identified for the purpose of this study and puts in perspective the findings 
of this dissertation. The next section provides a brief overview of the theoretical and 
methodological approaches used in this study.     
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches 
This dissertation utilized a narrative approach to communication phenomena of 
public diplomacy and soft power as its overarching theoretical framework. The 
narrative approach to communication phenomena questions simplified understandings 
of communication processes that separate communication and behaviors 
(communication is behavior) and ponders on the general issue of what happens when 
humans communicate (Maines, 1993). There are several assumptions to the narrative 
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approach (Martin, 1986). First, narratives are pervasive and present in many strides of 
our lives as narratives inform our understanding of events and the world (Kent, 2015).  
Second, narratives are a form of human behavior and can be characterized as social acts, 
when narratives are treated as the rhetorical movement of language and writing through 
time (Dolby-Stahl, 1989). Third, narratives are collective processes pertained to 
representations of facts and are frequently political because they serve as a framework 
for interpretations of events (Maines, 1993).  
Scholarly work on the narrative approach embraces numerous theoretical 
approaches from different disciplines, including communication theory, international 
relations, and sociology. For the purpose of this study, a framework on strategic 
narratives proposed by international relations scholars Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and 
Roselle (2014) was utilized. Miskimmon et al. (2014) proposed to think about strategic 
narratives as a way to understand soft power. They defined strategic narratives as an 
instrument for political actors to change the discursive environment in which they 
operate. Particularly, Miskimmon et al. (2014) argued that narratives about international 
actors and states structure expectations about behaviors of certain actors within the 
international system, and by doing so exert power. However, the abilities of strategic 
narratives to survive the transmission process from formation and reception are not 
examined or tested in the existing literature. There is also a lack of research to inform 
our understanding of the relationship between strategic narratives and soft power. In 
addition, there are no comprehensive studies that examine and trace strategic narratives 
from formation to projection to reception. This dissertation aims to close these gaps.  
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Examining soft power through the lenses of strategic narratives delivered via 
public diplomacy allows one to understand better how shared meaning and 
understanding of a policy or issue comes to be and how it influences the attractiveness 
and soft power of a country. Signitzer (2008) found that in fact public relations plays an 
important role in foreign policy by building and cultivating relationships, researching 
and scanning environments, building communities around a foreign policy issue, 
facilitating dialogue and socializing foreign policies. 
Specifically, this dissertation examined the strategic narratives of Russia, 
developed and used in the recent years to explore the potential of strategic narrative to 
enact soft power. Russia has been noted for its increased activity of information 
dissemination and narrative projection in recent years, specifically to influence the 
arena of international relations and sway global view of Russia in its favor (Saari, 
2014). Russian public diplomacy efforts were even noted in the Intelligence Community 
Assessment (ICA) report as influential. “Russia’s state-run propaganda machine—
comprised of its domestic media apparatus, outlets targeting global audiences such as 
RT and Sputnik, and a network of quasi-government trolls—contributed to the influence 
campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international 
audiences,” report states (ICA, 2017, p. 3). For this reason, strategic narratives of 
Russia can serve as a good case study and suitable testing grounds for ideas put forward 
in this dissertation.  
To satisfy the needs of this exploratory study, the dissertation developed a three-
level, multi-method study design that allowed investigating strategic narratives 
independently at each stage of development. Strategic narratives were investigated in a 
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consecutive order starting with a qualitative analysis of narrative formation, content 
analysis of narrative projection, content analysis of narrative reception, and comparative 
analysis of findings across all stages of narrative development.   
Goal of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the formation, projection, and 
reception of strategic narratives used by the Russian Federation in recent years and by 
doing so explore and explain how and in what ways soft power can be enacted via 
strategic narratives. In general, using the case of the Russian Federation, the dissertation 
strove to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between strategic narratives 
and soft power, and how the enactment of soft power does or does not take place.  
The results of the study provided insights into the process of soft power 
enactment. The empirical part of this dissertation explored and described how Russia 
uses strategic narratives, informed by the available soft power sources, and in what 
ways these sources are incorporated into specific strategic narratives of the Russian 
Federation. 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is in its contribution to our understanding of how 
soft power can be enacted. Many scholars and practitioners discuss soft power in 
relation to public diplomacy, often suggesting using soft power to enhance the 
achievement of political goals by nation states via public diplomacy and public relations 
(Hayden, 2012; Yang & Taylor, 2014). However, the understanding of the process of 
soft power enactment and how exactly soft power can be leveraged for political or any 
other kind of influence is limited and often lacking. This dissertation adds to the 
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discussion of soft power understanding and provides different ways of thinking about it. 
Such knowledge will be relevant for both scholars and practitioners. In addition, this 
research extends and clarifies the work of Miskimmon et al. (2014) on the relationship 
between strategic narratives and soft power. The findings of this study also lay 
foundation for future directions in research on strategic narratives and theoretical 
development of the field.  
Implications of the Study for Theory and Practice 
This dissertation contributes to theory development by examining and 
explaining how strategic narratives as power resources operate and how soft power can 
be enacted. Through examination of strategic narratives at different levels, this study 
demonstrated the opportunities and limits of strategic narratives projected via public 
diplomacy in enacting soft power.  
In addition, the dissertation addressed the role and relationship between the 
concepts of public relations, public diplomacy and soft power, propelling public 
relations theory development by extension. While strategic narratives address the 
formation, projection, diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system, it is 
through the functional and technical affordances of public relations and public 
diplomacy that strategic narratives are able to enact soft power and possibly to convert 
soft power into influence. 
Theoretical Contribution 
The dissertation addresses the role and relationship between the concepts of 
public relations, public diplomacy, and soft power, thus propelling the development of 
public relations theory. First, through a meta-analysis of the literature, this dissertation 
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contributes further to the understanding of public diplomacy as a strategic public 
relations function of the government by crystallizing public relations approaches to 
public diplomacy, defining theoretical contributions of public relations to the public 
diplomacy thought, and demonstrating their conceptual convergence. Second, by 
examining strategic narratives of public diplomacy, this dissertation extends public 
relations knowledge on the conceptualization and utilization of the strategic narratives 
in strategic communication, suggesting most appropriate applications of the public 
relations approaches to public diplomacy at different stages of the strategic narratives' 
development.            
The findings of this dissertation also provide a theoretical basis for the problem 
of soft power enactment via strategic narratives, demonstrating the process of strategic 
narrative development through stages and defining the discursive nature of soft power, 
created and maintained by strategic narratives. Therefore, the primary theoretical 
contribution of this dissertation consists in contributing to our understanding of how 
soft power operates. Many scholars and practitioners discuss soft power in relation to 
public diplomacy, often suggesting using soft power to enhance the achievement of 
political goals by nation states. The discussion of how soft power can be utilized or 
wielded for political or any other kind of influence is rather eclectic. This dissertation 
adds to the discussion of soft power instrumentalization. Such knowledge will be 
relevant for both scholars and practitioners.   
In addition, this research extends the work of Miskimmon et al. (2014) on 
strategic narratives and soft power by proposing an intermediate stage in the process of 
strategic narratives’ development and offering a conceptual model that attempts to 
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explain the soft power enactment via strategic narratives. The proposed research 
attempts to explain the role of strategic narratives in soft power. By examining a case of 
Russia’s strategic narratives, this research builds toward conceptualization of the soft 
power enactment process that positions soft power as a discursive environment, 
constructed by strategic narratives of the advocate state. Particularly, the dissertation 
submits that public relations and public diplomacy shape the soft power environment 
via strategic narratives. 
Practical Application 
The results of the study informed a conceptual framework and contributed to our 
understanding of the relationship between strategic narratives and soft power. 
Specifically on the practical level, the research demonstrated, to extent possible, how 
and when the influence of soft power does or does not take place. The empirical part of 
this dissertation explored and described how Russia deploys strategic narratives derived 
from its soft power sources, over time and how and in what shape these strategic 
narratives were able to reach the discursive environment of the target state.  
This chapter has established the need and purpose for the present study, 
summarized its research problems and objectives, and presented theoretical and 
practical implications. The next chapter reviews selected literature representing the 
extant knowledge on soft power, public diplomacy, and related concepts.  
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
This dissertation explores the understanding of soft power as it relates to public 
diplomacy, a subfield of public relations, by introducing the notion of strategic 
narratives. Utilizing the dominant view of public relations as strategic management of 
communication and relationships between organizations and its publics (Van Dyke & 
Vercic, 2009), public relations and public diplomacy are treated in this dissertation as 
strategic communication functions, examined from the perspective of the organization 
(government in this case). In what follows, the chapter reviews and discusses the 
existing literature on the intersection of public relations, public diplomacy, and soft 
power. With an assumption in mind that public diplomacy, public relations, and soft 
power are distinct concepts that share a symbiotic relationship, the first section of the 
chapter examines the intersections of public relations and public diplomacy by 
reviewing and analyzing literature and identifying several approaches to public 
diplomacy informed by the public relations scholarship.  
The second section of the chapter problematizes and elaborates on the often 
taken for granted link between public diplomacy and soft power. In addressing the core 
assumptions of soft power and public diplomacy, the dissertation proposes to 
conceptualize and treat soft power as a discursive environment, constructed via strategic 
narratives.  
In the third section, the chapter introduces scholarly work on strategic narratives 
that allows operationalizing the soft power environment as created and maintained by 
mediated strategic narratives and their projection onto the target publics. These 
mediated strategic narratives are being produced and projected by state and nonstate 
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actors using tools such as public diplomacy and public relations. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of gaps in the literature that inform the formulation of research 
questions and research design. 
Public Relations and the Study of Public Diplomacy 
The study of public diplomacy has a considerable track record in the public 
relations scholarship. Ever since Signitzer and Coombs (1992) observed a consistent 
convergence between two fields, public relations researchers embarked on a journey to 
integrate concepts from the two seemingly disparate disciplines and to move public 
diplomacy field forward. The significant scholarly attention, devoted to understanding 
the level of convergence and similarities between public diplomacy and public relations, 
facilitated the emergence of several broad approaches to public diplomacy introduced 
within the public relations scholarship (Fitzpatrick et al., 2013; Gilboa, 2008; Golan & 
Yang, 2014; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006; Wang & Chang, 
2004; Zaharna et al., 2013).  
Analyzing public diplomacy related concepts, Melissen (2005) found that public 
diplomacy's modus operandi is remarkably similar to the public relations approach in 
the use of strategies to reach foreign publics. When traditional public relations strategies 
and tactics target foreign publics, two concepts are most frequently used – public 
diplomacy and international public relations (Golan & Yang, 2014). According to 
Golan and Yang (2014), international public relations could be understood as the 
communication management function on the global scene. Analogously, public 
diplomacy deals with the management of communication on a global scale among 
multiple stakeholders (Golan & Yang, 2014).  
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While one may easily discover striking similarities when examining public 
diplomacy and public relations definitions, identifying conceptual differences may be 
harder (Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). It can be argued, however, that the main distinctive 
characteristic of the international public relations and public diplomacy concepts is that 
one is initiated by a government and another by a multinational corporation (Kunzcik, 
1997; Signitzer & Wamser, 2006).  
According to Wakefield (2008), there are two defining characteristics of the 
international public relations that distinguish this practice from other public relations 
practices: 1) location of the institution, organization, or government and 2) publics with 
which the relationships are being built. In like manner, Wilcox, Cameron, Ault, and 
Agee (2007) defined international public relations as “the planned and organized effort 
of a company, institution or government to establish mutually beneficial relations with 
the publics of other nations” (p. 516). Signitzer and Wamser (2006) suggested that 
public diplomacy should be treated as a governmental public relations function, 
specifying that a national government virtually always initiates it, yet it can be executed 
by both state and non-state actors. Meanwhile, international public relations can be 
initiated and performed both by a government and a multinational corporation 
(Kunzcik, 1997; Wakefield, 2008). 
Analyzing differences in traditional definitions of public diplomacy and public 
relations, Wang (2006) concluded that the difference mainly lies in the types of actors 
involved. Traditional definitions of public diplomacy (Malone, 1985; Tuch, 1990) 
suggest that the key actors in public diplomacy initiatives are governments and other 
state actors, whereas for international public relations main actors involve both state and 
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nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and even inter-governmental organizations (INGOs). At the same time, Gilboa 
(2008) argued that with the advance of communication technology and public relations 
and public diplomacy tools, the basic concept of public diplomacy has evolved to 
include both state and nonstate actors. With such diverse definitions, it becomes 
increasingly hard to distinguish between international public relations and public 
diplomacy.  
While questions regarding the perceptual intersections between public 
diplomacy and public relations still exist, the debates surrounding this discussion 
propelled the development of several public relations perspectives on public diplomacy 
and allowed to reconcile some of the questions of convergence. Notably, the infusion of 
public relations theories into public diplomacy scholarship helped crystallize such 
public relations approaches to public diplomacy as mediated approach (Buhmann & 
Ingenhoff, 2013; Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2006; Golan & Caroll, 2012; Kunzcik, 1997), 
relational approach (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Yang et al., 2012), networked and collaborative 
approaches (Zaharna et al., 2013), and integrated approach to public diplomacy (Golan, 
2013). In what follows, the section discusses four public relations approaches to public 
diplomacy with the purpose of identifying gaps and future directions for public 
diplomacy research within the field of public relations.  
Mediated Approach to Public Diplomacy 
A mediated approach to public diplomacy has been a predominant one 
throughout the 20th century and had its roots in the study of images of nations and 
image cultivation (Kunczik, 1997). It is based on the notion that governments attempt to 
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cultivate certain images of their countries using strategies and tactics offered by public 
relations (Kunzick, 1997; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Yang et al., 2012). 
Kenneth Boulding described the importance and power of image in meaning 
creation in his book, The image: Knowledge in life and society. He explained the image 
as "what I believe to be true, my subjective knowledge that largely governs my 
behavior" (Boulding, 1956, p. 6). Images, according to him, are created from messages 
coming from family, friends, experiences, and media. The message consists of 
structured experiences, and its meaning represents the change that it produces in the 
image. Therefore, according to Boulding, individual's behavior depends on the image 
and the meaning that a person draws from that image. As the image altered so is the 
behavior. Boulding also suggested that different images are subjected to a different 
degree of alteration, with some being resistant to change. He argued that when a 
message gets in contact with an image, the image may remain unaffected; the image 
may change in a distinct way – clarified or modified; or the image may change in a 
drastic way. Boulding's conception of the image, therefore, provided a lens for many 
perspectives in the study of image cultivation. 
According to Luther (2002), national images can determine and govern both the 
individual and institutional attitudes and behavior toward a nation and thus affect the 
course of governmental relationships and foreign policy. That is why nations spend 
resources on cultivating their image. Hayden (2012) argued that image cultivation 
amplifies broader efforts to conduct public diplomacy, as public diplomacy often uses a 
strategy of image management and strategic communication. 
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As Golan and Yang (2014) pointed out, mediated public diplomacy focuses on 
strategic management of communication content and coverage of international affairs in 
pursuit of a favorable image of the nation. This managed communication content caters 
to the pre-existing collection of shared national images, created and reproduced by 
language and discourse (Boulding, 1956; Yang et al., 2012). Therefore, managing 
communication content via media is important because it allows for effective image 
cultivation through individual perceptions of other nations created by personal 
experiences and mediated messages. Such cultivated image serves as a frame of 
reference for people judging about other countries (Kunczik, 1997; Yang et al., 2012).  
In addition to image cultivation that occurs via individual perceptions, created 
by personal experiences and mediated messages, it is equally important to consider not 
only the content of communication but also attributes of a country’s image such as its 
political and economic characteristics, as well as the existing identity markers of the 
nation. The political and economic structures of nations can significantly influence their 
image (and its perception) either in a positive or negative way (Kunzcik, 1997; Luther, 
2002). Consequently, positive changes in political structures and economic conditions 
of a nation result in the positive changes of that nation’s image (Luther, 2002).  
National identity similarly plays a role in image cultivation. Research 
demonstrated that images of nations often manifest national identities (Hayden, 2012; 
Luther, 2002; Said, 1979, 1994; Zollner, 2006). As particular images of foreign nations 
became an accepted form of the Western consciousness throughout the history, these 
images were also embraced as the sense of identity for foreign nations in relation to 
other countries and people (Said, 1979, 1994). For example, Powers and Samuel-Azran 
 33 
(2014) found that as individuals consume more information via international 
broadcasters, these individuals become more susceptible to internalization of the 
ideological perspective promoted by the medium and making it part of their identity. 
Buhmann and Ingenhoff (2013, 2015) aggregated these ideas about different 
components of a country’s image and developed the 4D Model, using concepts from 
reputation management, national identity theory (Smith, 1991), and attitude theory 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The researchers conceptualized the country image as “a 
subjective stakeholder attitude toward a nation and its state, comprising specific beliefs 
and general feelings in a functional, a normative, an aesthetic, and a sympathetic 
dimension” (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2015, p. 113). Thus, the country image is 
comprised of cognitive and affective components. Cognitive component consists of 
beliefs regarding a country’s political and economic performance, its norms and values, 
and its cultural and natural attractiveness. The affective component consists of general 
feelings of sympathy toward a country. As Buhmann and Ingenhoff (2013, 2015) 
argued, emotions and sympathy toward a country (affective component) are dependent 
on the beliefs of publics/stakeholders about the functional, normative, and aesthetic 
dimensions of the country image (cognitive component). Such conceptualization of the 
images of nations highlights the complexity of the country image as a construct in 
international public relations (Kunczik, 1997) and mediated public diplomacy (Gilboa, 
2000; Yang et al., 2012) that has “manifest effects on the success of a country’s 
business, trade, tourism and diplomatic relations because it affects the behavior of 
central stakeholders abroad” (Buhmann & Ingenhoff, 2013, p. 62).  
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Zaharna (2010) described mediated approach to public diplomacy as a mass 
communication approach. From the mass communication perspective, communication 
problems are largely perceived as information problems, derived from the lack of 
sufficient and accurate information. For this reason, the international broadcasting and 
other information initiatives are considered the staples of mediated public diplomacy 
(Zaharna, 2010). Sheafer and Gabay (2009) called mediated public diplomacy a 
"strategic contest over international agenda building" (p. 448) and Entman (2008) 
described it as a "government's strategic attempts to exert control over the framing of 
the country's policy in foreign media" (p. 89). 
Images of nations and the mediated approach to public diplomacy have been 
preoccupying the minds of scholars, practitioners, and nation-states alike. A variety of 
studies examined mediated public diplomacy (Albritton & Manheim, 1985; Buhmann & 
Ingenhoff, 2015; Golan & Viatchaninova, 2013; Fullerton & Kendrick, 2006; Lee & 
Hong, 2012; Wang & Chang, 2004; Yang et al., 2012;) and found support for the first- 
and second-level agenda setting effects of mediated public diplomacy, arguing that 
international media coverage influences the perceptions of foreign nations (Wanta, 
Golan, & Lee, 2004). Specifically, mediated images have been at the center of attention 
because they provide mental references for individuals to evaluate the actions of other 
countries (Yang et al., 2012). Furthermore, "exposure to mass media is associated with 
relatively positive, if not well-informed, images of foreign countries and perception of 
them as being successful" (McNelly & Izcaray, 1986, p. 546). Therefore, understanding 
the image cultivation through media is important because many countries engage in 
international public relations and public diplomacy efforts, heavily relying on media 
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tactics (Dolea, 2015; Zhang & Cameron, 2003). These efforts often are closely 
associated with the mediation of the nations' images, identities, and their foreign 
policies via international broadcasting (Kunzcik, 1997; Zaharna, 2010). 
This view draws a parallel with Hayden's (2012) assertions regarding the 
cultivation of nation's image through the media with frequent references to cultural 
norms and values, and dispositional characteristics of the nation could have an expected 
diplomatic benefit. In other words, positive image of a country, constructed via 
communicating and projecting identity and globally accepted social norms and values 
that represent the country (i.e. democracy, human rights), enables positive political 
outcomes. 
According to Yang et al. (2012), until recently mediated image cultivation has 
been an unchallenged approach to public diplomacy. Scholars (Fitzpatrick, 2007; 
Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002; Melissen, 2005; Szondi, 2009; Wang, 2006) 
suggested that public diplomacy is not merely about information campaigns; it is about 
relationship building, the idea that is central to contemporary public relations 
scholarship. Further, Yang et al. (2012) argued that "a recognition of the multiple, 
complex, ongoing relationships" is missing from the modern conceptions of public 
diplomacy (p. 653). Zaharna (2007, 2013) also criticized mediated approach to public 
diplomacy, saying that it is no longer about an "information battle," and the Cold War 
strategies are largely ineffective. She postulated that the intricate web of relationships 
and relationship building between and among numerous actors should be at the heart of 
discussions on public diplomacy. This idea is embodied in the relational approach to 
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public diplomacy that places relationship-centered initiatives at the heart of public 
diplomacy scholarship and practice.  
Relational Approach to Public Diplomacy  
The shift toward a relational approach to public diplomacy has been attributed to 
the influence of public relations on public diplomacy as public relations scholars 
attempted to reconceptualize and classify public diplomacy activities under the 
framework of four public relations models (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Signitzer & 
Wamser, 2006; Yun, 2006). Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) contended that in order 
for modern public diplomacy to be effective, it "should rely, not only on political theory 
and the theories of international relations but also on theories and models of public 
relations that are based on two-way symmetrical communication and community 
building" (p. 296). Conceptualizing public diplomacy practice through the lens of public 
relations models opened doors for the influx of public relations theory into public 
diplomacy. 
As an evolving practice, public diplomacy increasingly resembles modern 
understanding of public relations, both conceptually and practically. Many public 
relations scholars suggested a relational approach to public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 
2007; Snow, 2009; Yang et al., 2012). Among the first studies to apply public relations 
theories was Yun's (2006) research testing the applicability of the Excellence Theory to 
public diplomacy. Yun (2006) concluded that all public relations principles of 
excellence are transferable to public diplomacy and the two-way symmetric model of 
public diplomacy is viable with the focus on such public diplomacy practices as 
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international exchanges, cultural diplomacy, interpersonal communication and virtual 
networks. 
Similarly, Wang (2006) suggested that "public diplomacy is not merely about 
advocating and promoting political and economic goals to the international public; it is, 
instead, about the relationship between nations and cultures through better 
communication" (p. 93). Further, Snow (2014) argued that “relationship-building is by 
far the most closely aligned dimension of public diplomacy associated with public 
relations” (p. 85).  
Indeed, relationship building can be considered a unifying construct between 
public relations and public diplomacy. Melissen (2005) suggested that public diplomacy 
must learn from public relations the value of relationship building because “the strength 
of firm relationships largely determines the receipt and success of individual messages 
and overall attitudes” (p. 21). Szondi (2009) also advocated a public relations approach 
to public diplomacy because “public relations is about building and maintaining long-
term relationships and trust with key stakeholders and publics in order to create mutual 
understanding" (p. 296). Therefore, for both fields, public relations and public 
diplomacy, relationship (i.e. cooperation) represents the ultimate goal and an essential 
element in ensuring good reputation and positive image.   
The relational approach to public diplomacy emphasizes engagement over 
information dissemination (Snow, 2014). In comparison to mediated approach, the 
solution to communication problem is not more information but the increased contacts 
and interaction between parties, enhancing appreciation of the other culture through 
movies, literature, sports, tourism, culture, language, etc. (Zaharna, 2010). As such, 
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relational approach seeks to maintain positive social structures to create a better 
international environment, because from the relational perspective communication is a 
social process that regulates the relationships within a larger social context (Melissen, 
2005). 
In the relational approach to public diplomacy the communication problem is 
viewed as a relationship problem, and therefore, all efforts are directed toward defining, 
maintaining, and enhancing the relationship (Zaharna, 2010). However, the act of 
communication in itself inescapably implies a relationship, where interpersonal 
communication plays an integral part (van Ruler & Vercic, 2004; Zaharna, 2015).  
According to Leonard (2002), interpersonal communication is the ideal channel 
for public diplomacy because it is more credible than media and reflects the 
participatory nature of the relational approach. However, interpersonal communication 
is not the most efficient medium as it is time and resource consuming, yet it might be 
the most effective in the long term (Zaharna, 2010). Further, while publics in public 
diplomacy still receive information via traditional media, the interpretation of this 
information occurs in the context of interpersonal relationships. In other words, the 
meaning that an individual draws from an image or a media message, its reception and 
retention depend on the relationship. As Zaharna (2010) described it, "Information 
draws its value not by how effectively it is designed or delivered (a one-time 
occurrence), but by how fast and excessively it is circulated within the social context" 
(p. 147).   
According to Zaharna (2010), there are several prominent characteristics of the 
relational approach to public diplomacy that are essential for the understanding of 
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public diplomacy initiatives undertaken under the umbrella of the relational framework. 
First, the relationships are central, and there are many of them. The focus of relational 
public diplomacy initiatives is to identify the important ones and then maintain and 
enhance those relationships. Second, mutual interests define the importance of the 
relationship, and therefore relational public diplomacy activities are focused on finding 
common grounds. Third, relational public diplomacy initiatives often neglect strategic 
communication elements such as messaging strategies and instead focus on symbolic 
gestures demonstrating reciprocity and mutuality. Fourth, relational public diplomacy 
activities emphasize coordination rather than control (cultural exchanges, for example). 
Fifth, participatory nature of relational approach tends to focus more on interaction 
rather than presentations. Finally, because relationships are at the center of relational 
approach, relational public diplomacy activities focus on continuity and sustainability 
(Zaharna, 2010, p. 148-149). 
Similarly, in public relations literature, positive and trusting relationships 
contribute to the organizational successes and allow organizations to benefit from it by 
advancing organizational goals (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998). As such, good 
relationship history between an organization (governments in the case of public 
diplomacy) and its stakeholders ensures positive image, making it a by-product of the 
relationship building. At the same time, “in relational initiatives defining, maintaining, 
and enhancing the relationship is primary; pursuing the relationship by-products is 
secondary” Zaharna explained (2010, p. 147). In other words, relationship building is 
viewed as the end in itself without clear expectation of the gains. This makes the 
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relational approach to public diplomacy hard to justify, partially due to the need for 
measurement and evaluation (Pamment, 2014a).  
Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy  
The relational and mediated approaches to public diplomacy often are described 
in the literature as antagonistic, as scholars and practitioners declare their preference for 
one or the other (Fitzpatrick, 2007; 2013; Golan, 2013). These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, and according to Golan (2013), "should complement rather than 
replace a strategic global communication effort" (p. 1251). 
The integrated approach to public diplomacy builds on the idea that strategic 
government-to-citizen engagement is a type of interpersonal communication that is 
mediated through global satellite networks and social media and, therefore, relational 
and mediated approaches are fused together to enhance the effectiveness of public 
diplomacy. Golan (2013) identified three components of integrated public diplomacy 
based on the goal orientation of public diplomacy initiatives: long-term, medium-term, 
and short-term. The goal orientation of public diplomacy initiatives corresponds to the 
relational public diplomacy initiatives, nation-branding/country reputation initiatives, 
and mediated public diplomacy initiatives respectively (Golan, 2013).  
The classification of public diplomacy activities based on goal orientation goes 
back to one of the first conceptualization of public diplomacy by international relations 
scholars Deibel and Roberts (1976), who distinguished between tough-minded and 
tender-minded approaches to public diplomacy. They characterized the distinction as 
the separation of information and culture as two different foreign policy functions, 
because “information connotes the one-sided advocacy of a point of view while culture 
 41 
signifies the furthering of mutual understanding” (Deibel & Roberts, 1976, p.11). The 
tough-minded and tender-minded approaches to public diplomacy correspond with the 
short-term and long-term goal orientation respectively (Snow, 2009). 
The tough-minded view of public diplomacy argues that the purpose of public 
diplomacy is to influence foreign attitudes to favor nation's image and policies 
(Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). The tough-minded approach tends to see public diplomacy 
mostly as an informational activity rather than a cultural program; therefore, it is 
represented primarily by media diplomacy (e.g. international broadcasting) with the 
main goal of exerting influence for a relatively short-term policy ends (Snow, 2009). 
Short-term orientation refers to government policies that have a need to be achieved in a 
short period. In this case, consequences of public diplomacy are seen as immediate and 
not continuous (Singnitzer & Coombs, 1992). Public diplomacy initiatives with short-
term orientation are mostly concerned with options and outcomes of the current period 
and are often curated by the tough-minded public diplomats who "stand ready to push 
whatever line seems best calculated to advance the policy need of the moment" (Deibel 
& Roberts, 1976, p. 14). The tough-minded perspective was later named in the public 
relations literature as the mediated approach to public diplomacy (Signitzer & Coombs, 
1992; Snow, 2009; Taylor & Kent, 2013; Yang et al., 2012; Zaharna, 2010). 
A tender-minded approach to public diplomacy, on the other hand, represents a 
cultural function, a cocreational approach with a goal of creating a climate of mutual 
understanding for a long-term relationship building (Botan & Taylor, 2004; Deibel & 
Roberts, 1976; Singnitzer & Coombs, 1992). It focuses mostly on people-to-people and 
government-to-people communication (Snow, 2009). As Signitzer and Coombs (1992) 
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maintained, in the tender-minded approach, cultural programs may bypass current 
foreign policy goals in order to achieve long-term national objectives. Long-term goal 
orientation refers to government policies that do not yield immediate results but project 
a relational, political and economic gain in the future. In this case, consequences of 
public diplomacy are not seen immediately and can be measured only indirectly 
(Signitzer & Wamser, 2006). Deibel and Roberts (1976) argued that "changing foreign 
attitudes is a process to be measured in years, and the only feasible goal is to create a 
climate of mutual understanding in which the particulars of future national policies can 
be communicated abroad in a receptive atmosphere" (p. 15). Public diplomacy 
initiatives with long-term orientation focus on achieving future goals and are concerned 
with both current and future outcomes. Tender-minded view of public diplomacy is 
concerned with the long-term policy objectives that include broad-gauged messages to 
promote peaceful and cooperative solutions to the major problems of the world (Deibel 
& Roberts, 1976). This perspective has later been labeled in public relations literature as 
a relational approach to public diplomacy (Snow, 2014; Zaharna, 2010).  
According to Golan and Yang (2014), relational approach to public diplomacy is 
usually long-term because it focuses on building and maintaining mutually beneficial 
relationships with foreign publics over time. The relational initiatives, or what Golan 
(2013) called “soft power programs” (p. 1251), include international aid, development 
and exchange programs, and target governments, corporations and NGOs.  
Golan and Yang (2014) argued that a complete understanding of public 
diplomacy is not possible by siding with either a relational (tender-minded) approach or 
a mediated (tough-minded) approach, because "the long-term success of relationship 
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building and stewardship is often contingent on the success or failure of organizations 
to communicate their values, culture or policies to their target audience" (p. 4). Signitzer 
(2008) similarly argued that both types of public diplomacy have a place in government 
communication as they can be applied to achieve different goals. 
To tackle this shortcoming, Golan (2013) advocated for an integrated approach 
to public diplomacy that would address a variety of communication goals in public 
diplomacy ranging from long to medium to long term. By so doing, he introduced three 
layers of public diplomacy: 1) the short- to medium-term oriented mediated public 
diplomacy, 2) the medium- to long-term oriented nation branding, and 3) the long-term 
oriented relational public diplomacy.  
While mediated and relational approaches to public diplomacy have been 
previously discussed in the public diplomacy literature, nation branding has been 
considered an outsider. By introducing nation branding as one of the components of 
integrated public diplomacy, Golan (2013) argued that the nation branding initiatives 
are more tactical in nature linking issues and cultural attributes to nations through 
public relations and marketing tactics (Kaneva, 2011; Rassmussen & Merkelsen, 2012).  
The concept of nation branding was introduced by Simon Anholt, who argued 
that nation branding creates a nation brand or a competitive identity, a way "to consider 
how the nation as a whole presents and represents itself to other nations" (Anholt, 2006, 
p. 271). Initially, for Anholt (2006), public diplomacy was a subset of nation branding 
because public diplomacy appeared to focus mostly on presentation and representation 
of government policies to other publics. The main reason for arguing the superiority of 
nation branding over public diplomacy was that policy represents only one aspect of 
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national activity, whereas “nation branding attempts to harmonize policy, people, sport 
and culture, products, tourism, trade and investment promotion and talent recruitment” 
(Anholt, 2006, p. 271).  
While agreeing with Anholt on his understanding of the association between 
nation branding and public diplomacy, Roy (2007) suggested that nation branding 
should be distinguished from the related concept of public diplomacy, because the latter 
refers to the “activities of a government engaged in promoting a certain image of its 
nation-state to be used as an instrument of power and influence in international political 
relations” (p. 571). Public diplomacy, on the other hand, in its true calling builds mutual 
understanding (Zaharna, 2013).   
According to Melissen (2005), nation branding and public diplomacy are 
“distinct but not entirely dissimilar responses to the increased salience of countries 
identities” (p. 19). Further, he argued that nation branding and public diplomacy are 
mostly complementary and public diplomacy may prosper more if used by a country 
that invests in nation branding. Dolea (2015) referred to such phenomenon as “country 
promotion” (p. 275), when state actors use public diplomacy, nation branding, and 
public relations for competitive advantage.  
To emphasize the distinction, Anholt (2014) suggested that public diplomacy is 
more suitable for building and maintaining international relations by developed 
countries, whereas nation branding is more suitable for promoting the economic 
development of the emerging and transitional countries, where "country brands" have 
not been strongly established, and those who lack soft power. By creating a competitive 
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identity, a nation then is able to wield the soft power to achieve its public diplomacy 
goals (Anholt, 2014; Golan & Yang, 2014). 
The main difference between public diplomacy and nation branding and the 
argument against its incorporation into public diplomacy is that while public diplomacy 
and nation branding are the overlapping and complementary concepts, they 
fundamentally differ in their approach (manipulating perceptions vs. building 
relationships). As such, nation branding is about re-shaping and accentuating one’s 
country identity (Melissen, 2005). Nation branding traditionally uses marketing 
techniques to project the desired identity to foreign audiences using one-way 
communication (Szondi, 2008). Public diplomacy, on the other hand, is concerned with 
maintaining and promoting smooth international relations. This is achieved through 
communication and relationship building (Fitzpatrick, 2007).  
To harmonize the contradictions between nation branding and public diplomacy 
and to avoid labeling nation branding as an instrument for promoting propagandistic 
and ideologically charged messages about a country, Szondi (2008) advocated for the 
integration of public relations in nation branding. Building on Gregory's (2007) notion 
of negotiated brands where external and internal stakeholders create value through 
engagement with a brand, he suggested treating nation brands as value-enhancers and 
relationships rather than perceptual entities or images. “Meaning creation proceeds 
value creation particularly in the case of nation brands. Nation brand values are often 
rooted in and reflect national values, which can be interpreted in different ways by 
different cultures. Meanings and values are culture-specific and not universal," 
explained Szondi (2008, p. 337).   
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By integrating mediated and relational approaches to public diplomacy with 
nation branding/country reputation components, Golan and Yang (2014) focus on 
medium-to-long-term public diplomacy initiatives and thus cover the gap that was not 
addressed by other approaches.  
Collaborative and Network Approaches to Public Diplomacy 
The collaborative and network approaches to public diplomacy also emerged in 
response to the dominance of mediated and relational perspectives. One may argue that 
the collaborative and network perspectives represent an extension of the relational 
approach to public diplomacy, where relationships still hold a central place (Zaharna, 
2013). However, relationships in this approach are conceptualized in the context of 
networks and collaboration activities.  
Describing the mediated approach as monologue and relational as dialogue, 
Cowan and Arsenault (2008) introduced a third layer of public diplomacy – 
collaboration. In short, they defined collaboration as a "cross-national participation in a 
joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal" (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 10). 
Arguably a more effective approach to engaging with foreign publics, collaboration as a 
public diplomacy strategy is designed to complement existing taxonomies rather than 
replace them. 
According to Cowan and Arsenault (2008), monolog (mediated public 
diplomacy), dialogue (relational public diplomacy) and collaboration have their 
advantages in application to a particular situation. As Melissen (2005) argued, instead 
of focusing on identifying the best ways to reach foreign publics, one must focus on 
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relationship building aspects of each public diplomacy mode. Both network and 
collaborative approaches emphasize relationship building. 
Indeed, relational activities are the basis for collaborative and network 
approaches to public diplomacy. According to Zaharna (2010), there are three levels of 
relational activities: 1) cultural and educational exchanges, special envoys, 2) public 
participation, partnership coordination, 3) policy networking strategies and coalition 
building, an increased involvement of nonstate actors. The complexity of relational 
activities varies significantly, and the more complex relational initiatives morph into the 
network and collaborative forms of public diplomacy (Zaharna, 2010). 
The collaborative and network approaches belong under the same theoretical 
umbrella, yet the two perspectives differ in a number of ways. While similar in purpose, 
communication and relational dynamics separate network and collaborative forms of 
public diplomacy. Network public diplomacy initiatives emphasize structure, whereas 
collaborative efforts emphasize process (Zaharna, 2013). For example, mediated digital 
public diplomacy initiatives allow to create a network structure relatively easily and 
disseminate information within that network, yet they do not necessarily ensure 
collaboration. On the other hand, as argued by Fisher (2013), collaboration facilitates 
“means through which individual actions could collaborate to produce something 
meaningful” (p. 209).  
According to Zaharna (2013), network public diplomacy is not a panacea or a 
substitute for other forms of public diplomacy. As Lovink (2012) contended, networks 
without a cause are a waste of time. That is because networks vary widely based on 
their design characteristics such as network structure, network synergy, and network 
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strategy. As such, networks serve different purposes. Zaharna (2013) identified six 
types of networks of purpose that match available public diplomacy tools: 1) networks 
of awareness for information dissemination; 2) networks of influence for changing 
attitudes and behaviors; 3) networks of exchange for sharing information and resources; 
4) networks of empowerment for building individual and institutional capacity; 5) 
networks of cooperation for coordination of tasks and resources; and 6) networks of 
collaboration for generating value-added information.   
These networks of purpose differ in their design – network structure, network 
synergy and network strategy. A scarcity of one component or the other will determine 
an alignment of design with purpose. Zaharna (2013) argued that the effectiveness of an 
initiative "depends on the alignment between public diplomacy goals and the network 
initiative's structure and communication/relational dynamics" (p. 174). 
To extend Zaharna’s argument on network public diplomacy, Yang and Taylor 
(2014) introduced a soft power network approach to public diplomacy. Using Castells’ 
(2001) understanding of social structures as expressions of networks, Yang and Taylor 
argued that nations and organizations could acquire soft power by being included in 
important networks. For example, the expulsion of Russia in 2014 from the G8, a 
network of the world's greatest powers, significantly affected Russia's soft power 
standing from 22 to 25 (Monocle, 2015). In other words, networks produce soft power 
and therefore governments "should shift their focus from sending out information to the 
public in other nations to building a collaborative network that facilitates and fulfills the 
objectives of all of the partners" (Yang & Taylor, 2014, p. 578). 
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The main critique of the network approach and network studies of public 
diplomacy is their focus on egocentric networks that emphasize the personal nature of 
communities and social relations (Chua, Madej, & Wellman, 2011; Yang & Taylor, 
2014). In this approach, public is treated as networks of social relations emanating from 
a focal individual (opinion leader, influencer), whose position within the network is 
essential for information flow.  
Zaharna (2013) argued that egocentric view of networks in public diplomacy 
initiatives is not as insightful as understanding the overall strength of the network and 
its capabilities for information flow. Thus, looking at the whole network design 
characteristics such as network structure, synergy and strategy may inform the 
practitioners’ expertise of which network of purpose is most suitable for which public 
diplomacy initiative. For example, Zaharna (2013) argued that matching network 
synergy and strategy have the “potential to transform a collection of network ties into a 
dynamic, sustainable collaborative initiative” (p. 174). Therefore, in a way, a 
collaborative approach to public diplomacy can be considered a better approach to 
ensure sustainability and continuity that lead to change and innovation (Fisher, 2013).  
As such, "collaborative projects almost without exception include dialogue 
between participants and stakeholders, but they also include concrete and typically 
easily identifiable goals and outcomes that provide a useful basis and structure upon 
which to form more lasting relationships" (Cowen & Arsenault, 2008, p. 21). 
Examining collaborative forms of public diplomacy and comparing it to how an open 
source software propels change and innovation, Fisher (2008, 2013) offered three 
building blocks of the collaborative approach to public diplomacy: 1) relationships and 
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information pathways, 2) coordination and aggregation, and 3) inter-organizational 
innovation. In other words, collaboration, interaction, and connection become the key to 
creating change and driving innovation in targeted communities. 
The first block of collaborative public diplomacy focuses on understanding the 
relationships, or what Fisher (2013) calls "pathways through which information flows" 
(p. 210). This is an alternative view of relationships as conduits of information as 
opposed to receivers of information. According to Fisher, a relationship can ensure the 
access to information, disseminate information, as well as constrain the information 
availability. Therefore, a collaborative public diplomacy is dependent on good 
relationships as it relies on it as pathways through which information flows within and 
between communities (Fisher, 2013). 
The second block of collaborative public diplomacy focuses on coordination and 
aggregation, by way of identifying focal points – pre-existing shared desires and needs 
of the target communities (Fisher, 2013). Recognizing focal points allows developing 
means of collaborating with communities who are ready to take action, aggregating that 
impact. Such approach provides the potential to understand a community through 
aggregating interactions or opinion. 
The third block of collaborative public diplomacy blends relationships and 
societal needs and desires (focal points) to produce innovation (Fisher, 2013). In other 
words, to create change and innovation in target communities, it is important to 
understand relationships as conduits of information (information pathways) and 
recognize aspirations of the target communities to capitalize (aggregate) on. As Fisher 
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explained, the produced innovation constitutes the value of collaboration in public 
diplomacy. 
For Fisher, the core issue of other approaches to public diplomacy rests on the 
assumption that foreign audiences are passive and because of that these publics require 
an external authority to bring about change. This conjecture often misjudges the power 
and capacity of citizens within target communities to act. The collaborative public 
diplomacy takes it into account and is concerned with ways of translating the desire to 
change into action by focusing on the most likely means to influence behavior, not just 
on improving messages and perception (Fisher, 2013). 
Zaharna (2013) argued that collaborative initiatives in public diplomacy are not 
common, because "collaboration means individuals are not only connecting and sharing 
information, but through the process of their interactions are generating knowledge, 
innovation, and synergistic results" that affects all parties (Zaharna, 2013, p. 173). 
Cowen and Arsenault (2008) argued that collaboration can serve as a conduit for 
information sharing and collaborative endeavors possess transformative power for 
public diplomacy relationships. 
The challenge of collaborative and network approaches is that there is no clear 
strategies or operationalization for how to develop, implement and measure an effective 
network and collaborative public diplomacy initiative. As Cowen and Arsenault (2008) 
contended, the value of such approach lies in the creation of social capital where 
"projects, networks, and partnerships, both within and between communities, have value 
because they breed social trust, foster norms of reciprocity, and create stores of 
goodwill" (p. 23). 
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Yang and Taylor (2014) argued that the benefit of network and collaborative 
approaches to public diplomacy lies in enhancing a country's soft power. In network and 
collaborative perspective, the relative worth of individuals and nation-states is 
contingent upon the fact whether they are included or not in major networks. The 
inclusion in a network and the position within the network, therefore, fosters soft power 
of a country.  
Public Relations’ Contribution to Public Diplomacy 
The review of the literature on public relations and public diplomacy identified 
four public relations approaches to public diplomacy. Some of the approaches were 
clearly articulated in the literature, while others required a literature synthesis and a 
meta-analysis to formulate them as stand-alone approaches to public diplomacy. The 
identified four approaches can be considered distinct approaches to public diplomacy 
but may also represent a theoretical development of public diplomacy thought within 
the public relations scholarship over time. There is a clear chronological progress from 
mediated to relational to integrated and network perspectives on public diplomacy (see 
Figure 2 that visualizes theoretical development of public diplomacy within the public 
relations scholarship).  
To summarize, there are two distinct public relations approaches to public 
diplomacy: mediated and relational (see Table 1). Mediated approach is informed by 
mass communication view of public diplomacy (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009), image 
cultivation literature (Kunczik, 1997), and theories of national and cultural identities 
(Luther, 2002). In the mediated approach to public diplomacy, image is important and 
public relations plays a pivotal role in image cultivation, particularly if one considers 
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how public relations facilitates media coverage of a country or nation state. Informed by 
mass communication perspective, mediated approach treats publics as inert consumers 
of public diplomacy messages. These publics are passive and require an external 
authority to initiate change. For this reason, the information distribution is preferred 
over the engagement. The increased flow of information via such public diplomacy 
strategies as international broadcasting and country promotion is expected to deliver 
clear outcomes in terms of image cultivation.  
Figure 2. The Association Between Public Relations Approaches to Public 
Diplomacy as a Result of Their Theoretical Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relational approach to public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 2007) is informed by 
public relations perspective, specifically by the relationship building theory (Ledingham 
& Bruning, 1998) and two-way symmetrical approach (Yun, 2006). It emphasizes 
engagement over information dissemination via interpersonal communication using 
such public diplomacy strategies as cultural and educational exchanges (Zaharna, 2010). 
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Relationships, therefore, are at the center of relational approach through functional 
practices of public relations. To participate in the relational public diplomacy initiatives 
publics need to be active, yet they still require an external authority to bring about 
change, as relationships are usually initiated by the advocate state. Relational public 
diplomacy initiatives are not expected to produce clear outcome or gain, yet they are 
expected to create value (see Table 1).   
The integrated approach and network and collaborative approach to public 
diplomacy are variations and/or extensions of the previous two approaches (see Figure 
2). The integrated approach successfully marries relational and mediated approaches to 
create one of strategic nature (Golan, 2013). It combines relational initiatives, nation 
branding initiatives, and mediated initiatives to addresses diverse strategic goals (short-
term, medium-term, long-term) of the advocate state. The image of a country is 
conceived as a negotiated brand, value of which is created by engaging with the brand. 
In this approach, public relations helps facilitate the value of the brand by encouraging 
engagement. However, engagement is treated as a mediated interpersonal 
communication, highlighting the role of new participatory media. Integrated approach 
utilizes full spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives plus marketing strategies of nation 
branding and country promotion (see Table 1). Being a strategic approach, there are 
always clear expectations of gain in the form of information dissemination, image 
cultivation or relationship maintenance.     
Although the network and collaborative approach to public diplomacy can be 
considered an extension of the relational approach, such an approach also represents a 
qualitatively different thinking about public diplomacy, bringing the role of publics and 
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engagement to the forefront of public diplomacy initiatives. Network and collaborative 
approach is informed by ideas of dialogue and collaboration (Cowan & Arsenault, 
2008; Kent & Taylor, 2002), as well as relational perspective (Botan & Taylor, 2004; 
Fitzpatrick, 2007). It is considered an extension of the relational approach because 
relationships are the basis of networks and collaboration, as more complex relational 
activities morph into network and collaborative forms of public diplomacy (Fisher, 
2013). The role of public relations in this approach is to facilitate these relationships as 
pathways for information flow. In other words, the structure of relationships (network) 
encourages information sharing and collaboration. Publics in network and collaborative 
approach are active and do not need external authority to initiate change – they initiate 
and are actively involved in implementing collaborative public diplomacy initiatives. 
There are expectations of value creation as a result of collaboration in the form of 
change or innovation using such strategies as coalition and network building.  
Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. For example, the 
shortcoming of the mediated approach to public diplomacy is its focus on clear 
outcomes, which are not always possible to deliver purely through mediated initiatives. 
In contrast, relational approach’s lack of clear expectation of gain makes this approach 
hard to justify. The integrated approach combines concepts with very different 
underlying assumptions. The network and collaborative approach’s focus on egocentric 
network where one individual is at the center of social relations, presents a challenge for 
the argument of networks as information pathways.  
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Table 1. (Un)acknowledged Assumptions in Public Diplomacy Approaches 
 
Approaches to 
public diplomacy 
Unacknowledged assumptions 
Mediated public 
diplomacy 
- Image is important  
- Public relations efforts facilitate media coverage of a country 
- Political and economic structures of nations affects their image 
- National identity play a role in image cultivation 
- Publics are mostly passive and require external authority to bring 
change  
- Short-term initiatives 
- Emphasis on information over engagement  
- Communication problem is information problem 
- Clear expectation of gain 
- Main strategy: international broadcasting, nation branding, country 
promotion 
Relational public 
diplomacy 
- Mutual interests define the importance of relationship 
- Emphasis on engagement over information dissemination 
- Emphasis on more contacts and interaction than on more information 
- Emphasis on symbolic gestures rather than strategic messages 
- Emphasis on coordination rather than control 
- Interpretation of mediated messages occurs in the context of 
interpersonal communication  
- Image is a by-product of relationship building and not a strategic goal 
- Publics are mostly passive and require external authority to bring 
change 
- Long-term initiatives 
- No clear expectation of gain 
- Main strategy: interpersonal communication via educational and 
cultural exchanges 
Integrated public 
diplomacy 
- Image as a negotiated brand is important 
- Marries mediated and relational approaches 
- Engagement is a mediated interpersonal communication 
- Communication is government-centered 
- Long, medium and short term initiatives 
- Long-term successes depend on short-term initiatives 
- Clear expectation of gain 
- Main strategy: international broadcasting, nation branding, exchanges, 
country promotion 
Collaborative 
and network 
public diplomacy 
- Relationships are basis for network and collaboration initiatives 
- Relationships as pathways for information flow 
- More complex relational activities morph into network and 
collaborative forms of public diplomacy 
- Networks’ strength and structure affect capabilities for information 
flow 
- Publics are active and involved in public diplomacy initiatives 
- Expectation of value creation  
- Main strategy: Coalition and network building 
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Public relations contributions to public diplomacy are often discussed in terms 
of practical applications, where public diplomacy adopts public relations practices of 
relationship building and creating mutual understanding. The presented analysis of the 
four public relations approaches to public diplomacy demonstrated that public relations 
casts deep theoretical influence on public diplomacy and highlights the interdisciplinary 
nature of public diplomacy. While there is an observable chronological progress in the 
development of these approaches, these approaches are not mutually exclusive and 
successfully coexist in practice and theory (see Figure 2). 
The presented approaches to public diplomacy highlighted the 
interconnectedness and conceptual convergence between public relations and public 
diplomacy. It also presents a convincing case for treating public diplomacy as one of the 
applied functions of public relations. For this reason, this dissertation treats public 
diplomacy as a subfield of public relations, to which theories and principles of public 
relations are transferable.    
 In general, the influx of public relations thought into public diplomacy 
scholarship facilitated a significant shift in public diplomacy theory, forcing a 
reconceptualization of public diplomacy as new public diplomacy. As Melissen (2005) 
argued, the emergence of new public diplomacy was preconditioned by the 
technological developments and characterized by the embrace of nonstate actors as 
public diplomacy conductors and by the acceptance of the soft power role in it.  
Many discussions of public diplomacy today are largely based on the notion of 
soft power, yet the role and place of soft power in public diplomacy are not clearly 
articulated and the two terms are often conflated (Fisher, 2011; Macnamara, 2012; 
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Servaes, 2012). The next section addresses this concern and discusses the available 
literature on the topic.  
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: Defining the Relationship 
In international relations, power is usually exerted to achieve a strategic goal of 
foreign policy – be it cooperation or coercion. Nye (2002) described three ways to 
influence international actors and achieve strategic goals: 1) using sticks (military 
threats, use of force), 2) using carrots (inducements, economic sanctions), and 3) using 
attraction (soft power). Based on this taxonomy Joseph Nye (1990) originally defined 
power in international relations as multidimensional: military power, economic power, 
and soft power. Later, this categorization of power was reformulated as a dichotomy, 
hard power versus soft power (Nye, 2004).  
According to Nye (2004), hard power uses material means of coercion and 
payment to achieve desired goals, whereas soft power is the ability of the state to attain 
its strategic objectives immaterially through co-option – “getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want” (p. 5). The exertion of hard power is usually associated with 
the use of military and economic sanctions. The exertion of soft power is associated 
with the softer means of persuasion, good will, shared values, and cooperative 
sentiments. In other words, soft power is all things immaterial such as appealing values, 
ethics, and exemplary achievements of a country (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2009). Soft 
power, however, is often used in conjunction with more forceful and threatening forms 
of compliance and persuasion, which Nye calls smart power (Nye, 2008).  
The concept of soft power is widely used to explain the function and value of 
public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 2010, 2013; Hayden, 2012; Melissen, 2005; Seib, 2006; 
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Wang, 2008; Zaharna et al., 2013). According to Hayden (2012), soft power was readily 
adopted by policy makers to justify and implement “foreign policies and programs that 
specifically leverage the assets of attraction” (p. 17), such as public diplomacy. 
In a bipolar world of the Cold War, public diplomacy did not require 
justification. Its purpose was clear – to fight the ideology of the competing bloc (Staar, 
1986). In a modern, multipolar world, the purpose of public diplomacy is more 
ambiguous, and the effectiveness of its traditional tools is disputed (Hayden, 2012; 
Yang et al., 2012; Seib, 2006). Because soft power represents a third, complementary 
dimension to the traditional understanding of a nation's power, soft power became a 
catchphrase to validate relocation of resources to policies like public diplomacy, 
international broadcasting, and strategic communication (Hayden, 2012).  
The constant need to justify, assess and reassess the purpose and effectiveness of 
public diplomacy resulted in a conceptual conflation of the terms public diplomacy and 
soft power. Scholars and practitioners often use these terms interchangeably, and many 
conceptualizations of public diplomacy include soft power (Fitzpatrick, 2013; 
Pamment, 2014a; Taylor & Kent, 2013; Yang, et al., 2012). For example, Batora (2003) 
argued that public diplomacy is comprised of “activities by state and nonstate actors 
that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power” (p. 4). Lord 
(2006) advocated that “public diplomacy, in order to be truly effective, must be about 
the active projection of soft power in order to reinforce American influence – or to 
generate it where otherwise absent” (p. 20). Hayden (2012) postulated that there is a 
strong link between soft power and public diplomacy because of the common emphasis 
on influence. Taylor and Kent (2013) argued that activist organizations build social 
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capital and opportunities through networks for soft power public diplomacy, which 
“may also provide a useful measuring stick for soft power appeal” (p. 180). Rugh 
(2009) stated that public diplomacy “can – and often does – make use of soft power” (p. 
12). In addition, scholars and practitioners advanced the idea that to leverage soft power 
implies efforts to influence or cultivate attitudes through public diplomacy (Fisher, 
2011; Gilboa, 2006; Hayden, 2012; Risse, 2000; Solomon, 2014).  
Taking into consideration public relations and soft power influences, Audette 
(2013) defined public diplomacy as the “communication of state and nonstate actors 
with publics in an attempt to shape favorable public opinion about an issue, to gain a 
better understanding of the public, and to achieve a certain policy objective within the 
government or an international institution” (p. 50). In other words, according to Audette 
(2013), public diplomacy utilizes public relations tools and non-coercive soft power 
strategies to create change through harnessing the power of the people. Although public 
diplomacy is inevitably linked to power – the ability of one country or government to 
influence the actions of another country or government (Snow, 2009) – the association 
between soft power and public diplomacy requires examination and scrutiny.  
Being broadly defined as the power of attraction (Nye, 2004), the soft power 
concept undoubtedly competes for shared meaning with public diplomacy. Perceived as 
non-coercive, soft power is seen as a more ethical solution to furthering national 
interests and foreign policy, particularly as applied in public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 
2013). This power exists regardless of whether it’s being utilized or not; therefore a 
view of public diplomacy from the soft power perspective focuses on capitalizing on the 
soft power reserves by state and nonstate actors.  
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However, the unacknowledged assumptions about the nature of soft power (e.g. 
the notion of attraction) prevent the application of the term not only theoretically but 
also practically, as practitioners who claim to use soft power strategically are yet to 
discover how to make their ideas attractive and cultivate or apply soft power (Mattern, 
2005).  
There are several assumptions in the discussions of soft power and public 
diplomacy that need to be addressed before defining the role of soft power in public 
diplomacy and in formulating the soft power approach. First, soft power represents a 
form of power and, therefore, it is necessary to discuss the assumptions associated with 
it. Second, it is important to consider the sources of soft power. The basic assumption 
behind Nye’s idea of soft power is that there are sources of power beyond material 
assets (Nye, 2004). These sources are rooted in a country’s ideological and cultural 
appeal to others (Mattern, 2005). 
Third, soft power is often discussed either as an instrument of public diplomacy 
or its outcome (Nye, 2004; Rugh, 2011), which might differ based on the approach 
used. Recognizing and discussing these assumptions will inform our understanding of 
the soft power and its role in each of the identified public relations approaches to public 
diplomacy. In what follows, this section outlines several unacknowledged assumptions 
about soft power that need to be considered when conceptualizing and defining soft 
power role in public diplomacy.  
The Issue of “Power” in Soft Power  
Max Weber (1946) suggested that politics is about the allocation and 
distribution of power. Given that public diplomacy and soft power are the domains of 
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international relations and foreign policy, both are inevitably tied to power. The broad 
definition of soft power as the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading 
others to adopt your goals highlights this issue of power (Hayden, 2012; Fitzpatrick, 
2013; Garrison, 2005; McDowell, 2008; Rugh, 2011; Wang, 2006), yet it also 
underestimates the question of whether soft power is found in materials resources, such 
as economy and military, or immaterial resources, such as relationships and image 
(Hiebert, 2005). 
For many years public diplomacy was exclusively seen as a communication 
function of the government exerting influence over foreign publics with the goal of 
influencing their governments (Bardos, 2000). The discussions over this view became 
particularly heated after 9/11, and the view of mediated public diplomacy as a one-way, 
asymmetrical, power-over type of communication was cited as one of the reasons for 
failed public diplomacy campaigns in the early 2000s (Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005). 
Therefore, the proposition of non-coercive, soft power approach was welcomed 
enthusiastically and was perceived as a more ethical approach to public diplomacy 
(Fitzpatrick, 2013; Fisher, 2011; Mattern, 2005). As a result, soft power became 
associated with the non-coercive “new public diplomacy” based on the ideas of cultural 
and ideological appeal (Melissen, 2005, p. 3), and traditional public diplomacy became 
associated with coercive, one-way, mediated strategies (Seib, 2009; Yang et al., 2012). 
As such, the new public diplomacy falls under the relational and network/collaborative 
approach to public diplomacy, whereas traditional public diplomacy is better explained 
through mediated and integrated approaches to public diplomacy.  
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Fisher (2011) suggested that there is a clear dichotomy of power relations in 
public diplomacy: (1) power over, when public diplomacy seeks to exert influence 
(coerces people into changing the perception or attitude) and (2) empowerment, when 
public diplomacy seeks to invest or equip people with power, enables them to act 
(relationships empower, networks empower). Fisher (2011) described these two 
approaches to public diplomacy as empowering the community and exerting power over 
the target audience, citing that the former one has greater potential for symmetrical 
engagement, but soft power has no place in it because of its inherent asymmetry.  
Fisher (2011) also criticized Nye's description of soft power application to 
public diplomacy, because getting others "to adopt your goals" (Nye, 2013, §5) 
represents an understanding of influence in public diplomacy as power over. He further 
argued that such conceptualization leaves public diplomacy practitioners with a limited 
arsenal of tools, where dialogue, mutuality, and two-way communication become 
problematic. Fisher (2011) argued, “Soft power may sound dynamic to the domestic 
constituency, but it ultimately limits the power of public diplomacy practitioners to 
engage in the full range of possibilities” (p. 276).  
Although Nye (2004) in his initial conceptualization defined soft power as a 
non-coercive power of attraction, Mattern (2005) suggested that soft power should be 
treated as a coercive form of power that is exercised through language. She argued that 
soft power, predetermined by more advantageous cultural and economic conditions, 
often serves as a trap for the target audience in which the audience is left with a non-
choice and forced into compliance with a particular built-in worldview, ideology, 
values, and policies. Mattern (2005) explained: "What makes hard power ‘hard' is its 
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ability to threaten victims into compliance; that is, to coerce. Thus, where attraction 
rests upon coercion the logic of a distinction between soft and hard forms of power 
becomes unsustainable" (p. 587).  
Mattern (2005) also argued that attraction is expressed through individual 
perceptions and therefore “soft power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard 
power but as a continuation of it by different means” (p. 583). In other words, because 
many different material and immaterial things constitute soft power sources, economic 
and military might of a country (hard power) serves as one of them in the minds of the 
target audience. To Nye (2008) attraction is non-coercive, whereas to Mattern (2005) 
attraction, expressed through individual perceptions, is coercive by virtue of rhetorically 
trapping the target audience with a non-choice.  
Fisher (2011) similarly argued that soft power is not a neutral power in itself and 
needs to be treated as any other form of power. According to Fisher, in a true 
engagement and empowerment-based approach to public diplomacy, all parties should 
be equally open to persuasion while attempting to persuade one another. He warned 
against the blind acceptance of soft power as the main approach to public diplomacy: 
The assumptions of this approach characterize it [public diplomacy] as neither 
mutual nor based on a reciprocal relationship. It excludes the development of 
common goals through dialogue, nor provides support to empower others to 
realize their goals. It is neither compromise nor negotiation. It is a belief in one's 
own perspective over another. It is an asymmetric power relationship in favor of 
the actor over the foreign public (p. 281). 
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To Nye (2004), the soft power that rests on attraction seems to promise an 
ethically superior method of political interaction. The empowerment-based 
understanding of soft power could lessen some of the contradictions brought by the 
issue of power, but this can depend on the utilized public diplomacy approach and the 
view of soft power as an instrument or outcome of public diplomacy. Importantly, a soft 
power based approach to public diplomacy does not make public diplomacy of an 
advocate country morally legitimate by default. Instead, it is up to the recipient, the 
foreign public, to decide whether to recognize public diplomacy message as acceptable 
and legitimate (Fitzpatrick, 2013).  
This discussion highlights inherent contradictions in soft power-based 
conceptualizations of public diplomacy. Fitzpatrick (2103) argued that the focus on soft 
power fails to acknowledge “the importance of mutuality and dialogue in which both 
parties are conducive to change in attitudes and behavior and in which the achievement 
of mutual benefit is the designed outcome” (p. 33). Furthermore, “association between 
public diplomacy and power contributes to the notion that public diplomacy is more 
about competing and winning in the global marketplace of ideas instead than about 
building and sustaining mutually beneficial relationships” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p. 32). 
However, the role of soft power in public diplomacy may also be preconditioned by 
how scholars and practitioners think about it – is it an instrument or an outcome of 
public diplomacy? 
Soft Power as an Instrument and an Outcome of Public Diplomacy 
Scholars and practitioners frequently discuss whether public diplomacy uses soft 
power as a tool that enhances the effectiveness of public diplomacy initiatives or 
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whether public diplomacy serves as a source of soft power, contributing to its build-up 
(Rugh, 2009). In other words, does public diplomacy build or wield soft power? Is soft 
power an instrument or an outcome of public diplomacy activities? Do some public 
relations approaches to public diplomacy treat soft power as an instrument of public 
diplomacy while others treat as an outcome of public diplomacy activities? 
As with other types of power, soft power instruments (and resources) may take 
many different forms, including a country’s cultural appeal, foreign development aid 
and disaster relief, and participation in international cooperation efforts (Szondi, 2009). 
Nye (2004) argued that soft power involves not only shaping the messages that a 
country wishes to present abroad, but also analyzing and understanding the ways these 
messages are interpreted by diverse societies, and developing the tools of listening as 
well as the tools of persuasion. In sum, Nye (2008) also considered public diplomacy as 
an essential instrument of soft power, which, to a certain extent, can only be achieved 
through public diplomacy. 
According to Rugh (2009), soft power can be used as a resource in public 
diplomacy that furthers national interests. Although Nye (2008) conceived soft power as 
both a tool for a more successful public diplomacy and as a potential outcome of public 
diplomacy efforts, he saw public diplomacy mostly as an instrument that governments 
use to mobilize resources of attractiveness expressed through soft power:  
In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part 
from the values an organization expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets 
by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles relations with 
others. Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize 
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these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, 
rather than merely their governments. Public diplomacy tries to attract by 
drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing 
cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth. But if the content of a 
country’s culture, values and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that 
“broadcast” them cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite 
(p. 95).  
Soft power as an instrument. Many scholars relate soft power to public 
diplomacy as its instrument. Hayden (2012) argued that public diplomacy remains a 
necessary tool for those actors seeking to leverage their soft power assets. Zaharna 
(2010) argued that the underlying strategic approach for wielding soft power is 
essentially a mediated (image-building) approach to public diplomacy. She suggested 
that a public diplomacy strategy that relies on carefully crafted messages delivered to 
target audiences via mass media with the goal of changing attitudes or behavior is 
amplified by a country’s soft power.  
Ostick (2002) also described public diplomacy and public affairs as mechanisms 
to enforce soft power: 
Soft power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs 
through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, 
or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired 
behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the 
agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. If a state can make its 
power legitimate in the perception of others and establish international 
 68 
institutions that encourage them to channel or limit their activities, it may not 
need to expend as many of its costly traditional economic or military resources 
(p. 3).  
As an instrument, soft power serves as a strategic asset for successful 
implementation of the foreign policy goals through public diplomacy means. Public 
diplomacy initiatives can capitalize on existing soft power to achieve more substantial 
results. As such, it serves as a strategic tool that scholars can explain the mechanisms of 
and practitioners should be able to apply when necessary. Yet, the descriptions of 
mechanisms behind the strategic application of soft power as an instrument of public 
diplomacy are virtually nonexistent and/or vaguely defined (Mattern, 2005; Roselle et 
al., 2014).  
Soft power as an outcome. As stated earlier, in Nye’s formulation, soft power is 
both a tool to use for advancing national interests but also an asset to cultivate. As 
Hayden (2012) explained, to achieve foreign policy goals public diplomacy uses soft 
power and its many sources as leverage. However, soft power is often seen as a public 
diplomacy’s “post hoc measure of effectiveness in achieving foreign policy objectives” 
(Hayden, 2012, p. 5). In other words, the strengthening of the soft power of an advocate 
country can be treated as an outcome of public diplomacy efforts and a measure of its 
success.  
According to Rugh (2009), public diplomacy can potentially contribute to the 
fostering of one country’s soft power through government efforts designed to appeal to 
the hearts and minds of foreign publics and thereby influence their government to be in 
favor of the desired policies. In this case, it goes beyond government communication 
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efforts because it adopts forms other than just simple top-down communication. Instead, 
it focuses on the forms that create opportunities for discussion, honest exchange, and in-
depth understanding (Wyne, 2009). In such conceptualization, treating soft power as an 
outcome of public diplomacy seems to fall in the realm of relational approach. For 
example, public diplomacy efforts such as Voice of America or international exchanges 
such as the Fulbright program often enhance soft power by “highlighting the 
attractiveness of U.S. cultural, political and educational capital” (Hayden, 2012, p. 4). 
Rugh (2009) also suggested that public diplomacy is used to amplify the aspects 
of existing soft power by 1) explaining country's position in the international arena, 2) 
countering distortions and misinformation and 3) enhancing country's image and 
prestige. When soft power is instrumentalized by public diplomacy like this, it appears 
that by wielding soft power public diplomacy also yields it.  
Soft power differential. To put in perspective the debate over soft power as a 
tool or an outcome of public diplomacy, Zaharna (2010) proposed a soft power 
differential. On one side, using the mediated approach, public diplomacy wields power 
(soft power as a tool). On another, public diplomacy creates soft power through a more 
relational and network communication approaches (soft power as an outcome).  
Table 2. Soft Power and Approaches to Public Diplomacy 
 
Public diplomacy 
approaches  
Instrument/Outcome 
(Rugh, 2009) 
Mode of Power 
(Fisher, 2011) 
Sources of Soft 
Power (Nye, 2004) 
Mediated Approach Instrument  Power over Culture, values, 
policies 
Relational Approach Outcome Empowerment N/A 
 
Integrated Approach Both Both  Culture, values, 
policies 
Network/Collaborative 
Approach 
Outcome Empowerment N/A 
 70 
According to Zaharna (2010), mediated/image-building approach is based on 
production and dissemination of information attempting to wield soft power through 
targeted, mostly one-way, communication. Network communication approach is based 
on relations-centered connective strategy, which arguably helps create soft power 
(Zaharna, 2010). Although a good explanation, such conceptualization is problematic 
because it implies that mediated and image-building approach to public diplomacy is 
only about exerting soft power and never building it. This is a conflicting assertion 
considering the definition of soft power as the power of attraction with a potentially 
infinitive number of sources contributing to its accumulation or diminution, including 
one-way projections of an image, an essential element of a country promotion (Dolea, 
2015; Nye, 2004). In addition, the integrated approach to public diplomacy suggests 
that relationships and relationship building in public diplomacy are mediated.   
The assumptions of soft power differential (see Table 2) can be helpful and 
insightful when conceptualizing soft power and defining its role in public diplomacy. 
These assumptions may inform the choice of public diplomacy approaches and 
strategies. When practitioners consider wielding soft power through pubic diplomacy, 
they treat soft power as an instrument capable of exerting power over publics and, 
therefore, will utilize either a mediated approach or integrated approach to public 
diplomacy. On the other hand, when practitioners focus on the empowerment of 
publics, they are likely to turn to relational approach and network and collaborative 
approach to public diplomacy, yielding soft power as a result.     
Whether soft power is used as an instrument or an outcome public diplomacy, it 
rests on “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals” (Nye, 2004, p. x). 
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Therefore, it is important to examine assumptions of what constitute a soft power 
source.  
Sources of Soft Power 
Nye (2004) suggested three main sources of a country’s soft power: its culture 
(only the appealing parts of culture), its values (when values are widely accepted and 
implemented), and its foreign policies (when perceived as legitimate). He argued that 
“many of the effects of culture, for better or worse, are outside the control of 
government” (Nye, 2004, p. 266). Domestic values are also outside of direct 
government control. The only source of soft power that can be considered to be under 
government control is foreign policies.  
Foreign policy. Soft power generated from foreign policies can be regarded as 
the primary source through which soft power of a country can be strategically 
cultivated, at least in theory (Rugh, 2009). Nye (2004) argued that the attractiveness of 
a country "depends very much upon the values we express through the substance and 
style of our foreign policy," but "policies that express important values are more likely 
to be attractive when the values are shared" (pp. 60-61). As an example, Lundestad 
(1998) explained the success of American soft power in Europe through shared ideals 
and values, such as democracy and open markets, embedded in American foreign 
policies directed toward Europe. The same can be applied toward Russia's soft power in 
the post-Soviet space, where countries have a shared history and common values 
(Bogomolov & Lytvynenko, 2012).   
Strategically, therefore, soft power can be cultivated through foreign policies 
when policies include some understanding and consideration of needs and opinions of 
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foreign publics (Rugh, 2009). For example, American soft power was reinforced when 
George Bush announced that the United States would take the lead in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS and increase its foreign aid (Nye, 2004). However, national interests and 
domestic considerations often dominate in the policy making process, overshadowing 
foreign public opinion (Rugh, 2009). This is where public diplomacy efforts fail, and 
soft power of an advocate country suffers.  
Culture. Soft power generated from culture comes from many different sources 
including pop culture, music, literature, art, movie industry, television, news, and the 
Internet. Most of these soft power sources are available to foreign publics through 
public, private, and commercial channels (Rugh, 2009). Public diplomacy's role, in this 
case, is to make certain aspects of culture available where they are otherwise 
unavailable. For example, arts diplomacy such as VOA jazz program during the Cold 
War was a major public diplomacy tool (Brown, 2009). 
However, it is important to remember that culture can also be a source of soft 
power diminution. Graber (2009) analyzed three American television entertainment 
programs broadcasted in the Middle East, The West Wing, That’s 70s Show, and 
Friends, and concluded that “the images presented by the programs are distorted and 
portray an unrealistic picture of life in America” and  “can be another reason for the 
continued low regard for Americans and for the United States” (p. 735). She also argued 
that these shows undermine American public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East and 
negatively affect American soft power in the region (Graber, 2009).  
Nye (2013) acknowledged the danger of culture as an uncontrolled variable 
impacting the strength of American soft power abroad: "Hollywood often portrays 
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consumerism, sex, and violence, but it also promotes values of individualism, upward 
mobility, and freedom (including for women). These values make America attractive to 
many people overseas" (para. 5). This example highlights the argument that culture is 
outside of government control.  
Values. Likewise, soft power emanating from domestic values and ideals cannot 
be strategically managed by the government and can equally be as detrimental as 
instrumental to a country's soft power. According to Nye (2004), foundational 
American values like democracy and human rights can serve as powerful sources of 
attraction because these values are incredibly appealing and seductive to people in 
oppressed societies. These values can only be translated into power when they are seen 
implemented and not just proclaimed (Wyne, 2009). At the same time, when these 
values are pushed down on to the foreign publics, they can deter some people as much 
as they can attract others (Nye, 2004). For example, the rapid and wide introduction of 
such American values as capitalism, consumerism, and democracy led to the 
disappointment and rejection of the American democracy model by the post-Soviet 
Russia (Orlova, 2009).   
Limits of soft power sources. Despite the acknowledgment by Nye (2004) that 
culture and values are the sources of power that are outside of government control, 
practitioners often treat them as products or goods that can be marketed. In 2001, the 
former Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed to a State Department audience: 
“What are we doing? We’re selling a product. The product we are selling is democracy” 
(Dumenco, 2001, para. 2).  According to Kennedy and Lucas (2005), such treatment of 
values suggests the confluence of strategic communication and public diplomacy.  
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Similarly, Leonard et al. (2002) argued that values and cultural appeal of a 
country are public goods, which can create either an enabling or a disabling 
environment for individual transactions. Wolf and Rosen (2004) argued that equating 
values with products is a deeply flawed logic due to a misunderstanding of differences 
between “private goods and public (or collective) goods” (p. 5).  
There are three basic distinctions between private and public goods. First, 
private goods such as Hollywood movies or Levi’s jeans allow for an easy empirical 
validation that is available at low cost (Wolf & Rosen, 2004). For public goods, values 
such as democracy, empirical validation is difficult because “the meaning, quality, and 
benefits associated with these public goods largely depend on a high degree of 
understanding, acceptance, adoption, and practice by others, rather than by an 
individual acting alone” (Wolf & Rosen, 2004, p. 6).  
Second, private goods can be consumed individually, but the public goods can 
only be consumed collectively because the actualization of benefits from public goods 
(value such as democracy) for an individual depends upon collective consumption by all 
or a majority. In other words, it is easy to sell Coca-Cola individually to a large group 
of people, but to sell democracy as an ideal, one needs to ensure its collective 
consumption.   
Third, private goods are rivalrous and distinct products. The consumption of 
private goods by one individual does not require another to consume the same product. 
If a person dislikes a private good she can simply refuse to consume it. The public 
goods are non-rivalrous, and when one individual consumes it, the rest are not isolated 
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from that product. In other words, "their [public goods'] availability to one beneficiary 
entails their imposition on all” (Wolf & Rosen, 2004, p. 7).  
Further, Rittenberg and Tregarthen (2009) argued private goods are excludable 
products or services, meaning that consumers may be prevented from accessing them if 
they do not pay for it (e.g. bus ticket, Coca-Cola, trip to Hawaii). Public goods are non-
excludable products or services, and consumers have access to them without payment 
(e.g. democracy, public libraries). 
This highlights the need to understand the mechanisms of soft power sources 
(culture and values specifically) and the lack of control over the worth associated with 
one’s culture and domestic values, before one decides to strategically use domestic 
values and ideals to boost soft power and amplify public diplomacy efforts, as values 
are public goods that require collective consumption and do not allow for an easy 
empirical validation.  
Consequently, foreign policy is the only source of soft power within government 
control and the only one that can be overtly managed (McDowell, 2008). By extension, 
public diplomacy as a strategic communication function of the government, designed to 
communicate and explain foreign policy, can serve as a tool for wielding soft power 
strategically to the benefit of the advocate state.  
Attraction and Soft Power 
To reiterate Nye's definition (2004), soft power is the power of attraction. Such 
description of soft power raises a question: what is an attraction? Solomon (2014) 
argued that soft power is grounded in "the political dynamics of emotion" (p. 720). He 
argued that to understand the soft power it is important to consider the recipient's side 
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and examine the affective investment of publics in the images and identities that soft 
power and cultural influences produce. In other words, Solomon suggested that soft 
power is manifested through images of identities fostered by cultural influence. 
Similarly, Nye (2011) argued, “the production of soft power by attraction depends upon 
both the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target” (p. 92). 
Ortony, Clores, and Collins (1990) in their book The Cognitive Structure of 
Emotions described attraction as an emotion of liking. It can also be presented as the 
quality of being attractive or as the ability to attract – attractiveness. According to 
Turban and Keon (1993), attractiveness is a perception held by the involved parties, and 
as such, it is a subjective experience, constructed through the communicative exchange.   
Mattern (2005) suggested that there are unacknowledged assumptions about soft 
power as an attraction that prevent scholars and practitioners to explicate and apply soft 
power to theory and practice. Notably, Mattern (2005) raised the question of whether an 
attraction is a natural, pre-existing condition of certain countries, or if an attraction of a 
country is something that can be cultivated and constructed (see Table 3). This 
distinction corresponds to Buhmann and Ingenhoff's (2015) cognitive and affective 
dimensions of a country image (see mediated approach), where the cognitive 
component deals with beliefs about a country and the affective component deals with 
emotions about a country.    
Nye’s description of soft power as the power of attraction resonates with the 
description of the country image, eloquently conceptualized by Buhmann and Ingenhoff 
(2013, 2015). Nye (2004) stated that sources of soft power might include sports, 
fashion, Hollywood movies, tourism, infrastructure, economy, political system, etc. 
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Although economic and military might is considered hard power, Mattern argued “soft 
power should not be understood in juxtaposition to hard power but as a continuation of 
it by different means” (p. 583). In other words, the attraction emanating from the 
economic, political and military might of a country (hard power) serves as one of the 
soft power sources. Because these sources of soft power can be used to cultivate 
attraction of a country as manifest features of the country, it can be argued that these 
sources of power represent the cultivating characteristics of attraction. To Buhmann and 
Ingenhoff (2013, 2015) this is a cognitive dimension of a country image when 
stakeholders make judgments about normative, aesthetic, and functional characteristics 
of a country.  
Table 3. Mapping Attraction of a Country 
 
 Attraction as a pre-existing 
condition of a country 
Attraction as a cultivated 
attribute of a country 
 
Nature of soft power 
sources 
Based on intangible soft 
power sources such as 
values, culture, democracy, 
human rights. 
 
Based on tangible soft power 
sources such as education, 
sports, economy, infrastructure. 
 
Dimension of a country 
image it corresponds to 
Affective dimension 
(emotion of liking) 
Example: I like Russian 
literature. I dislike American 
consumerism.  
Cognitive dimension consists of 
normative, aesthetic, functional 
characteristics of a country 
(beliefs, judgments) 
Example: The US is great at 
innovation. Russia has bad 
roads. 
 
On the other hand, the soft power, according to Nye (2004), rests on “the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals” (p. x). This description of soft 
power sources suggests that attraction of a country can be a natural, inherent 
characteristic of the nation expressed through its commitment to human rights and other 
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values; thus inducing an emotional response from the publics (an emotion of liking, for 
example). According to Buhmann and Ingenhoff, this constitutes an affective 
component of a country’s image, although it is important to note that emotions are often 
the result of one's beliefs/judgments (2013, 2015). Further, Nye maintained that sources 
of soft power such as values of democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities 
are extremely attractive and seductive. This seducing attraction produces co-option 
rather than coercion. Such conceptualization once again resonates with the Buhmann 
and Ingenhoff (2015) affective dimension of the country image (see Table 3).  
However, Nye (2004) also warned that the arrogance of soft power could 
destroy the real message of these values and the attraction can turn to repulsion (e.g. our 
values are better than your values). Case in point, Shared Values Initiative, an 
advertising campaign attempted to depict the life of Muslims in the United States and 
demonstrate underlying American values, generated such repulsion and rejection of the 
message because the ads were “too positive”, “too good to be true” and therefore 
“misleading, false, and one-sided” (Armstrong, 2009; Fullerton & Kendrick, 2006; 
Pratkanis, 2009). 
Despite the proliferation of public diplomacy approaches and recurrent debates 
about the role of soft power in public diplomacy, the understanding of soft power as it 
relates to public diplomacy and how it operates is still lacking. As outlined in Nye’s 
original conception of soft power (2008), there are three main sources of soft power: 
values, culture, and policies of a country. These values, culture, and policies create an 
appeal or attraction that serves as a conduit for exerting soft power, while public 
diplomacy is thought of as an instrument that governments use to mobilize resources of 
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attractiveness expressed through soft power (Nye, 2008). By doing so, public diplomacy 
may be enacting soft power through broadcasting “the content of a country’s culture, 
values and policies” (Nye, 2008, p. 95) that is attractive.  
While Nye and other scholar agree that soft power’s major agreed-upon 
definition is that it is a power of attraction, existing research neglects to develop a 
coherent conceptualization of attraction applicable to soft power. Roselle et al. (2014) 
observed that the mechanisms through which soft power produces attraction and the 
desired outcome of influencing others to “want what you want” are not well defined. 
This neglect of attraction constitutes the main criticism of Nye’s soft power concept 
(Hayden, 2012; Mattern, 2005; Solomon, 2014). Importantly, the question of how does 
soft power attraction occur in international relations remains open. The discussions on 
how to enact soft power are scarce in general and lack clear suggestions for 
practitioners on how to achieve it. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to address the 
question of how one leverages soft power attraction for strategic outcomes.  
One such potential explanation is offered by the international relations scholars 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2014) who proposed to think about soft power 
through the lenses of strategic narratives. This dissertation adopted this approach with 
adjustments to satisfy the needs of this research, address the research problem and 
answer the research questions. The following section presents a review of relevant 
literature on strategic narratives, soft power, and public diplomacy to inform the 
theoretical framework of the study.  
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Theoretical Framework: Soft Power Enactment and Strategic Narratives 
The term strategic narrative was introduced in response to the growing 
discussions of asymmetric warfare and initially represented a way to frame the domestic 
political debates about the "discretionary and often controversial nature of 
contemporary conflicts" (Freedman, 2006, p. 24). The narratives represent an alternative 
approach to warfare because they are focused not on eliminating the assets of the enemy 
but are concerned with undermining narratives that provide appeal to the enemy's ideas. 
Freedman (2006) defined narratives as convincing stories that describe events in a way 
that allows drawing definite conclusions. In other words, strategic narratives are 
rhetorical narratives that enact a specific interest in a story that frames issues and 
structures responses. 
Roselle et al. (2014) argued that strategic narratives could be regarded as “soft 
power in the 21st century” concerned with “whose story wins” (p. 71). International 
relations scholars Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle (2014) proposed strategic 
narratives as a way to understand soft power. They defined strategic narratives as "a 
tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the 
discursive environment in which they operate" (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 2). As 
Dimitriu (2012) argued, to be effective, narratives need to resonate with values, 
interests, and beliefs of the intended audiences and be based on existing ideas and 
values. By deliberately constructing and reinforcing the ideas that are already current, 
narratives offer frames for the issues and suggest responses. By doing so, narratives 
structure expectations and behavior of actors. According to Miskimmon et al. (2014), 
by structuring behavior and expectations about international actors and states narratives 
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exert certain influence. As such, it is a political actor's ability, or in some cases 
government's ability, to construct narratives that enhance the appeal of a country for 
foreign audiences. Similarly, this is what Nye (2004) called soft power or the power of 
attraction.   
Likewise, Lucaites and Condit (1985) argued that narratives play a role in 
constructing political and social consciousness. Political elites provide meaning to the 
past, present, and future through relaying of narratives, because narratives usually 
portray a sequence of events, shaping our understanding of social and political history. 
As Freedman (2006) explains, "Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of 
structuring the responses of others to developing events" (p. 22). By so doing narratives 
convert soft power into influence by getting people "to want what you want" (Nye, 
2008, p. 94). 
What is narrative?  
Narratives are sequential accounts of events that people produce in the form of a 
story. By organizing material in a chronological manner, narratives convey a coherent 
story about what happened (Stone, 1979; Stryker, 1996). According to Griffin (1993), 
narratives do not necessarily present a set of facts about the world and are not primarily 
concerned with the truthfulness of the account. They connect the past to the present 
with an assumption that the accounts of the past are rarely unbiased. Narratives are 
constructed through the selection of stories that are pieced together both chronologically 
and contextually (Stryker, 1996). They are social products developed in the context of 
specific social, historical and cultural locations (Griffin, 1993). Narratives are present in 
a variety of human communication, including literature, television dramas, political 
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speeches, advertisements, news releases, news reports, documentaries, and in everyday 
conversations (Lucaites & Condit, 1985).  
Narratives focus on the actions of the individual, institutional or collective 
actors, both state and nonstate. The narrated story encompasses answers to questions 
such as what, when, where, why, how, and with what consequences something has 
occurred. Many explanations of events often built on narratives, because they not only 
tell us what happened but also rationalize why it happened in one way and not the other 
(Stryker, 1996). Aminzade (1992) called it path dependence, a type of a causal logic 
that bears "contingent, yet cumulative and constraining effects of past action on future 
possibilities" (p. 462). In other words, narratives emphasize that history (context) 
matters.  
Narratives and Narrative Discourse 
     The focal point of all narrative definitions is that narratives exist in relation to 
events. In comparison to other forms of storytelling, like stories that can simply be 
about description, narratives require an actual occurrence of an event, or of an action 
(Abbott, 2002). Simply put, narratives can be described as a representation (stories that 
are told or written) of events, something that has happened. Roselle et al. (2014) argued 
that narratives could be presented through both verbal and non-verbal communication 
means and, therefore, bridge the gap between the dyadic understanding of hard and soft 
power concepts. As Mattern (2005) argued, soft power may represent an extension of 
hard power perception. For example, when a nation state implements a policy using the 
hard power that affects specific publics, it constitutes an event that constitutes a 
narrative.  
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To Abbott, a narrative is a complex communication transaction that involves 
events, their manner of representation, and the audience. Importantly, Abbott (2002) 
distinguished between a narrative (a story) and narrative discourse (how the story is 
conveyed). If the actual event constitutes a narrative, then the representation of events 
constitutes a narrative discourse. In sum, the narrative is the representation of events 
consisting of a story and narrative discourse. Abbott defined story as an event or an 
action itself and narrative discourse as events retold. Notably, Abbott argued that stories 
"can be conveyed in a variety of media, with a variety of devices, none of which, 
including the device of a narrator, will necessarily be present in any particular narrative" 
(p. 17). A story has two components – the events and the entities involved in events. 
Such entities can be defined differently and can be an object or a subject of the story. 
 Because narratives are about events, they are defined by their temporal logic 
(Chatman, 1990). In other words, narratives incorporate movement through time, 
although the chronologic order is not necessary. According to Abbott (2002), narrative 
discourse is infinitely malleable, leaving up to the audience to decipher the sequence of 
events and ultimately the story itself: "It can expand and contract, leap backward and 
forward, but as we take in information from the discourse we sort it out in our minds, 
reconstructing an order of events that we call the story" (p. 15). In other words, 
narratives retell the story of events, not necessarily in chronological order; they may or 
may not have a narrator, yet the audience is able to reconstruct or interpret the story.      
Narrative Functions and Forms   
The discussion of narratives and their role in communication and applied 
communication fields such as public relations and public diplomacy has roots in the 
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rhetorical heritage of public relations. As Kent (2015) explained, storytelling is 
grounded in the rhetorical convention of public relations and is a staple of the public 
relations practices. In this sense, public relations practitioners are homo-narrans, or 
story-telling animals (Kent, 2015; Vasquez & Taylor, 2001), who employ their 
storytelling skills in different strides of practice such as crisis, branding, reputation 
management, as well as public diplomacy.  
Describing the rhetorical roots of public relations, Heath (1992) referred to 
rhetoric as a clash of perspectives. These perspectives have narrative form and content 
that can be confirmed and modified through clashing with other narratives, creating the 
most satisfying narratives that later guide actions of an actor (Fisher, 1985). 
Importantly, rhetoric, and, by extension, narratives can be manipulative. Foss and 
Griffin (1995) warned that strategic persuasion "constitute a kind of trespassing on the 
personal integrity of others when they convey the rhetor's belief that audience members 
have inadequacies that in some way can be corrected if they adhere to the view point of 
the rhetor" (p. 3). As such, strategic narratives can be thought of as manipulative, 
especially in the context of soft power enactment. Therefore, multiple competing 
strategic narratives can “temper the privileging of an advocate's point of view” (Heath, 
2000, p. 78) and contest a strategic narrative. By allowing and inviting diverse 
perspectives and narratives, public relations may serve as a catalyst for ensuring a 
healthier discursive environment.   
According to Heath (2000), the rhetorical heritage of public relations highlights 
the role of discourse through which ideas, values, and issues are examined and 
contested. Through its application, public relations contributes to the public discussion 
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in the marketplace and public policy arena, where "values are brought to bear on 
economic and sociopolitical matters" (p. 69). In other words, a rhetorically rooted 
public relations participates in the creation of value perspective that shapes society and 
politics, possibly via strategic narratives. 
While narratives are pervasive in our lives and are often political, not all 
narratives can be considered strategic. There are three general forms of narratives 
discussed in the literature: poetic, dialectical, and rhetorical. According to Lucaites and 
Condit (1985), these forms serve different narrative functions: beauty, truth, and power. 
These functions of narratives can be interpreted as “the display of ‘beauty,’ the 
transmission of ‘truth,’ and the wielding of ‘power’” (p. 92). Interestingly, within the 
narrative discourse literature, most of the theoretical explanations of narratives originate 
from poetic forms of discourse, without recognizing differences in their form and 
function (Abbott, 2002).  
As Lucaites and Condit (1985) explained, the poetic narrative is designed to 
delight. Its main purpose is the artistic manifestation of beauty by creating a narrative 
that provides pleasurable and entertaining experience. Truth and power are not central 
in the poetic discourse, the artistic expression of a story matters more. An example 
would be a historical drama that is based on historical facts but presented in a poetic 
way for the viewing pleasure. Many cultural products designed for public diplomacy 
and cultural exchanges rely on the poetic form of narratives.      
The purpose of a dialectical narrative is to instruct. Its primary concern is with 
the discovery, revelation, and presentation of facts as truth (Lucaites & Condit, 1985). It 
is separated from a poetic narrative by representing a verifiable phenomenon, existing 
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in the outside world, unlike the artistic fiction of the poetic narrative. Dialectical 
narratives are found in official reports, accounts of histories, news reports, etc. 
International broadcasting efforts initiated by nation states as part of their public 
diplomacy strategy largely rely on the dialectic form of narratives. 
The primary goal of a rhetorical narrative is the enactment of interest to the story 
through persuasion. The rhetorical form of the narrative appeals to the audience and 
creates a call for action. According to Lucaites and Condit (1985), “a rhetorical 
narrative is a story that serves as an interpretive lens through which the audience is 
asked to view and understand the verisimilitude of the propositions and proof before it” 
(p. 94). Rhetorical narratives are found in public relations materials, social advocacy, 
policy briefs, white papers, and in public diplomacy materials, including international 
broadcasting. Lucaites and Condit (1985) argued that through engagement and 
enactment of interest, rhetorical narrative wields power by creating a shared meaning. 
This is the form of the narrative that brings together our understanding of soft power 
and its rhetorical construction. 
A rhetorical narrative is strategic in nature because it strives to achieve a 
specific goal by taking into account the target audience and the context in which it is 
presented. Similarly, to Freedman (2006), strategic narratives are those that “do not 
arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and 
thoughts that are already current” (p. 22). In comparison to the poetic and dialectical 
narrative, the audience is at the core of the rhetorical enterprise because the goal of the 
narrator is to achieve the active assent of an audience. Poetic and dialectical narratives 
have broader conceptualizations of the audience since the audience does not necessarily 
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prevent a narrator from achieving beauty or truth. Similarly, context is also more 
important to the rhetorical narratives than it is for poetic and dialectical forms of 
discourse. Dealing with fiction and facts, poetic and dialectical narratives do not operate 
in a conflicting and contesting environment where competing interests are at stake. 
Finally, rhetorical (read: strategic) narratives that aspire to enact soft power have vested 
interest in its acceptance by the audience because getting publics' assent is one of its 
goals. This is not always the case for the poetic and dialectical narratives whose 
manifestation of the truth and beauty is the end goal in itself (Lucaites & Condit, 1985). 
The next section presents a discussion of the literature on strategic narratives.  
Strategic Narratives 
To advance an argument that soft power is enacted via strategic narratives, it is 
important to define a strategic narrative as a rhetorical narrative in its nature with 
specific attributes that enable a soft power enactment. In summary, strategic narratives 
are affected by considerations of the audiences and their expectations, the context in 
which they are formed, received and interpreted, and by their inherent purpose to attract 
attention through persuasion. To achieve persuasion through strategic narratives, 
narratives must emphasize certain elements or “various components of narratives must 
be framed in a certain way” (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 7).  
Drawing on Burke (1969), in the description of strategic narratives Roselle et al. 
(2014) emphasized such characteristics of narratives as actors, context, action (conflict), 
and [suggested] resolution of the conflict. Actors are the characters within the narrative. 
In relation to strategic narratives, governments, NGOs, multinational corporations, 
activist organizations, terrorist organizations, experts, scientists, etc., can often be 
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included in strategic narratives. The context of strategic narratives is equally important 
as the context may define the need for a narrative, highlight expectations and justify 
narrative interpretation. The action refers to the events, actions or conflicts around 
which narratives are being shaped. Finally, the suggested resolution to an identified 
problem that needs solving is often part of the strategic narrative, as publics interpret 
the events in the context provided by the narrative with an eye for a potential solution. 
In other words, because strategic rhetorical narratives exist in relation to events, 
these narratives may offer frames for issues and policies to structure responses of the 
audience. For these reasons, strategic narratives are conceptualized not as static 
messages but as amorphous or fluid narratives that may take on a different form 
depending on the narrative frame and environment in which they operate. As rhetorical 
narratives, strategic narratives may enact soft power by creating consensus around 
shared meaning. 
Types of Strategic Narratives  
There are three general levels of strategic narratives: international, national and 
issue-level narrative (Roselle, et al., 2014). International system narratives describe how 
the world is structured (Cold War, War on Terror, Rise of China). National narratives 
describe what the story of the state or nation is, what values and goals it has (USA 
values democracy). Issue narratives explain why a policy is needed, and how it will be 
effectively implemented (Voluntary Resettlement of Russian Compatriots). These 
narrative levels are not mutually exclusive and often have a reciprocal influence on each 
other.  
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International narratives deal with narratives that describe international issues, 
and to an extent, international order. For example, the narrative that describes “peaceful 
rise of China” may provide context for understanding the growing economic and 
political power of China. Strategic narratives at the national level are in essence national 
biographies (Berenskoetter, 2014), and critical to understanding how a state wants to be 
perceived (image of the nation) in the world and status it seeks. Berenskoetter (2014) 
described national narratives as “an experienced space (giving meaning to the past) 
intertwined with an envisioned space (giving meaning to the future) and delineated 
through horizons of experience and of possibility” (p. 3). For example, Russian 
narratives on the shared historical and cultural heritage within the post-Soviet space put 
Russia’s geopolitical claims in perspective. Finally, issue-level strategic narratives 
provide context for governmental policies. For example, Russian cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation policy is presented within a larger narrative of the Russian culture to affect 
opinion and create positive image.   
Life Cycle of Strategic Narratives 
To understand how strategic narratives help enact soft power it is important to 
understand processes associated with the communication of strategic narratives. First, 
the questions of how strategic narratives are being formed need to be answered. Second, 
the projection of strategic narratives via different communication channels (mediated or 
not) needs to be addressed. Third, the reception of strategic narratives needs to be 
examined (Miskimmon et al., 2014).  
The process of formation. Understanding the formation of strategic narratives 
involves understanding strategic goals and communication of the state actors. The 
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formation of strategic narrative by political elites is based on the premise that a political 
actor is able to construct a narrative, out of the ideas already present in the environment, 
to enhance its appeal for target audiences (Miskimmon et al., 2014). Political actors 
may develop several strategic narratives at the same time, and, depending on the level 
of impact they seeks, these narratives may focus on long- or short-term outcomes. 
According to Miskimmon et al., strategic narratives that seek long-term influence are 
often focused on enhancing positive image and perceptions of the country, “a process to 
be measured in years” (Deibel & Roberts, 1976, p. 15). Such strategic narratives are 
most likely to be delivered via public diplomacy (Miskimmon et al., 2014).  
Traditionally, the formation of strategic narratives was a prerogative of political 
elites, those who set agendas and develop policies (Antoniades, Miskimmon, & 
O’Loughlin, 2010). With the advent of the Internet and social media, the participation 
of masses in narrative formation becomes more and more possible (Zaharna, 2016). In 
general, the formation of narratives occurs through deliberations among the political 
elites and through the choice of language to describe and construct a policy program 
(Schmidt, 2002). Often, policies serve to define and embed narratives describing 
problems that should and can be addressed, and actions that should be taken and can be 
achieved (Roselle, 2006). As Hayden (2012) argued, a nation-state can construct 
narratives that enhance a policy appeal for foreign audiences and in support of soft 
power. As such, policies are a common source of narratives that can be explored to 
trace narrative formation (Miskimmon et al., 2014).  
Further, foreign policy is the only soft power resource within government 
control that can be overtly manipulated and managed for strategic purposes (McDowell, 
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2008). Similarly, Rugh (2009) argued that foreign policy is the primary source through 
which soft power of a country can be strategically cultivated. For this reason, foreign 
policies may represent a great source through which strategic narratives of the advocate 
state may be shaped.   
The process of projection. Narrative projection is a process through which 
strategic narratives of the nation states are being mediated and delivered to the target 
audiences. As George (2015) notes, “As one moves from the highest level of policy 
making to the mass public, one expects to find a considerable simplification of the set of 
assertions and beliefs that lend support to the legitimacy of foreign policy” (p. 19). The 
projection of a narrative occurs through both mediated and non-mediated 
communication. Mediated strategic narratives are projected via media, both traditional 
and new, which increases the narrative contestation as many more actors project their 
narratives at the same time. In general, media environment thwarts the projection of 
strategic narratives due to increased interactivity of the media, added actors, and diverse 
audiences.  
To Miskimmon et al. (2014), the projection of strategic narratives represents 
both challenges and opportunities for advocate states. First, the type of media conditions 
how a narrative should be constructed. The mode of narrative delivery matters as actors 
must consider how the narrative will be perceived. Second, the advocate state must take 
into account the environment in which their messages will be received and possibly 
contested. Third, the delivery of strategic narratives via public diplomacy may also 
affect the nature of strategic narratives.  
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When examining the process of strategic narrative projection, it is important to 
take notice of who projects and represents the narrative, and who is the guarantor 
(referee) of its credibility (Miskimmon et al., 2014; Nye, 2008). Narrative projections 
through public diplomacy and public relations efforts often highlight joint projection of 
strategic narratives through cooperative initiatives with business, NGOs, and cultural 
and sporting institutions. This needs to be taken into consideration when examining 
narrative projection.  
The process of reception.  The reception of strategic narratives is concerned 
with identifying the effect of a narrative on audiences (Miskimmon et al., 2014). Such 
impact can be measured via analysis of attitudes and opinions, but also via 
interpretation of the narrative by elites as expressed in the media. According to (Liao, 
2017), media environment has the ability to reconfigure the way foreign policy 
information is being formed, collected and circulated, constituting a discursive arena for 
strategic narratives discussion and contestation. Miskimmon et al. (2014) described 
narrative contestation as narrative clash or narrative battles, when many state actors 
project their own narratives about international relations issues and by doing so contest 
each other’s narrative. Narratives are often contested before audiences consume them. 
This provides context of how those “audiences consume news and political 
information, how they compare sources and attribute credibility, and whether they 
discuss narratives with friends, family, or colleagues” (Miskimmon et al., p. 12). As 
Barry and Elmes (1997) argued, whether the narrative is accepted or not, the 
successfully received strategic story depends on whether it stands out among others, is 
persuasive, and invokes retelling. In other words, the reception of the message happens 
 93 
in a discursive media environment relevant to the target publics, and does not imply 
acceptance of the message carried by the narrative.  
Further, it is also important to take into consideration the referees of the 
credibility or legitimacy of the narrative and the soft power sources referenced. As 
Miskimmon et al. postulated "how convincing any state's narrative is depends on 
whether other states' narratives are more or less compelling in some way" (p. 116). The 
narrative reception could be preconditioned by whether or not sources of soft power 
were successfully communicated. When an actor accepts the legitimacy of the soft 
power source, by extension it accepts the influence of the soft power over him/her (See 
Table 2).  
According to Roselle et al. (2014), understanding narrative reception implies an 
analysis of attitudes, opinions, and behavior before and after the narrative projection. 
However, to understand narrative reception it is equally important to understand how 
the projected narratives are being re-told by media and elites in the discursive media 
environment of the target state.  
Strategic Narratives and Guarantors of Soft Power  
Soft power is embedded in our lives through our culture and values and to 
leverage it, it is important to communicate and highlight these diverse soft power 
sources in order to wield soft power influence. As Hayden (2012) suggested, the 
resources such as values, culture, and policies lie within a communication domain and 
are vested with the rhetorical capacity of the actor. In other words, how an advocate 
state communicates about these resources determines whether an influence can be 
projected via strategic narrative and soft power can be enacted. By way of explanation, 
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the soft power’s appeal or the power of attraction needs to be communicated in order 
for it to be enacted. 
Table 4. Soft Power Sources, Referees, and Receivers (adopted from Nye, 2008) 
 
Sources of soft power 
 
(Narrative formation) 
Referees for 
credibility/legitimacy 
(Narrative projection) 
Receivers of soft power 
 
(Narrative reception) 
Foreign policies Governments, media, IGOs Foreign publics and 
governments 
 
Domestic values and 
policies 
 
Media, NGOs, IGOs Foreign publics and 
governments 
High culture Governments, NGOs, IGOs Foreign publics and 
governments 
 
Pop culture Media, markets Foreign publics 
 
When thinking about soft power and its appeal one needs to consider its sources. 
If strategic narratives have the ability to enact soft power, sources of soft power must be 
considered. According to Nye (2008), soft power influence that originates from 
different sources could have a different influence on different publics. As described 
earlier, soft power influence originating from different sources can have a different 
impact on different publics (Nye, 2008). These resources (policies, values, culture) are 
assets that produce attraction and ability to entice. At the level of narrative formation, 
one must consider and examine all potential soft power sources: foreign policies, 
domestic values, and culture both high and pop.  
At the level of narrative projection and reception, the referees who accept or 
reject soft power resource as legitimate must vet the credibility of the soft power source 
(see Table 4). Often, referees of the soft power resources are independent and state 
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media, NGOs and INGOs, governments and market players (depending on the soft 
power source, see Table 4), who see value in those resources and the opportunity to 
capitalize on it. By projecting strategic narratives referencing sources of soft power, 
these referees have the ability to enact soft power through accepting and referencing the 
legitimacy of the soft power source within a strategic narrative (Nye, 2008, See Table 
2).  
In the words of Rugh (2009), “soft power exists whether anyone makes use of it 
or not” (p. 16), and as such can be thought of as an environment. Klyueva and Tsetsura 
(2015) argued that because soft power attraction emanates from a variety of sources it 
could be conceptualized as “a dynamic environment that is changing by the minute 
together with social, political and cultural circumstances” (p. 179). Yet, according to 
Roselle et al. (2014), for soft power to exist and produce the attraction its sources 
cannot be kept in reserve but be continuously deployed – freely exist in an environment. 
In other words, to enact soft power attraction, a country must channel sources of soft 
power through public diplomacy to project the power of attraction (Seib, 2006). 
However, Nye (2008) warned that attraction may or may not produce the desired policy 
outcome, which should be judged based on individual cases.  
Research on Strategic Narratives 
While the notion of strategic narratives has been floating around in the literature 
for quite some time, the empirical research on the subject is still quite limiting. Since 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) emphasized the role of narratives in social activism and 
suggested the narratives be used for analysis of soft power, scholars from different 
disciplines attempted to develop this field further. The most comprehensive framework 
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for analysis was introduced by Miskimmon et al. (2014). Several studies were published 
using their framework with a focus on the narrative projection and reception stages. For 
example, Hartig (2015) examined the strategic narratives that China’s Confucius 
Institutes attempt to project. Specifically, Hartig looked at several a priori strategic 
narratives of China, such as rising China and peaceful China. He found that while 
Confucius Institute has been effective in providing knowledge about Chinese language 
and culture, attracting more than 100 million learners of Chinese a year worldwide, it 
was less successful at projecting China’s strategic narratives because Confucius 
Institutes represent not a real China, but its corrected version (Hartig, 2015; Liu, 2014).  
Similarly, Krebs (2015) conducted a longitudinal analysis of the a priori 
strategic narrative that he called “Cold War Consensus” (p. 809). Specifically, he found 
that the narrative dominance “endures as long as leading political and cultural elites 
continue to reproduce them, and erodes when elites publicly challenges key tenets” (p. 
811). Zaharna (2016) also studied strategic narratives at the level of narrative projection 
and reception, by examining narrative battles on Twitter surrounding the 2014 Gaza 
conflict. Zaharna’s study expanded literature on narrative contestation (Miskimmon et 
al., 2014) by arguing that “narrative contests are inherently identity battles in that 
narratives contain intertwined elements of identity and image” (p. 4408) and suggested 
to look at imagery in addition to text for studying the projection of strategic narratives.  
Pamment (2014b) investigated the U.S. strategic narratives in its public 
diplomacy messages used to promote American foreign policies. Looking at several 
historical examples, Pamment argued that United States frequently utilized strategic 
narratives, such as Monroe Doctrine or the US winning the Cold War, for political 
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constructions of international relations “to define its geopolitical position in relation to 
other nations through discursive spatializations of the world” (p. 48).  
In the study of strategic narratives of the European Union, Kaldor, Martin, and 
Selchow (2007), looked at human security narrative as an illustration of the discursive 
shift in the language of European security. While the researchers did not necessarily 
study strategic narrative projection or reception, they investigated a strategic narrative 
that was already present within the discursive environment and argued that this 
narrative served to improve the image of EU’s individual nation-states, but also served 
to legitimize the European Union as a security actor in the world (Kaldor et al., 2007).  
Szostek (2014) studied media coverage of Russia in Ukraine and found presence 
of Russian regional influence through favorable media coverage of Russia. Yet, Szostek 
was hesitant to attribute the findings to Russia’s ability to exert soft power in Ukraine 
via strategic narratives of public diplomacy, as media outlets that covered Russia more 
positively had connections to Russia-based media conglomerates.  
Gaps in the Literature 
While strategic narratives have been gaining prominence in the communication 
and international relations literature, the review of available research pointed out to 
several gaps. Most gaps in the literature are related to the conceptualization of soft 
power as the power of attraction, which was addressed by highlighting the importance 
of communicating soft power sources in order to maintain the attraction of a country as 
a soft power. The suggested vehicle for communicating these diverse soft sources was 
introduced in the literature on strategic narratives, proposing that strategic narratives 
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can help enact soft power as the power of attraction via a three-step process of narrative 
formation, narrative projection, and narrative reception.  
While the literature indicates that strategic narratives could potentially explain 
soft power (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Roselle et al., 2014), the noticeable element 
missing from the discussions of public diplomacy approaches and the role of soft power 
in it is the articulation of how the enactment of soft power takes place. This dissertation 
argues that to enact soft power strategic the target publics must accept narratives; in 
other words, strategic narratives should pass through all three stages of the narrative life 
cycle. In addition, a discussion and understanding of how soft power and its resources 
can be used to exert influence, specifically through strategic narratives, needs attention. 
According to Hayden (2012), "soft power resources are vested with rhetorical capacity" 
(p. 51), yet these are not elaborated in most depictions of soft power. This dissertation 
bridges this gap by exploring how soft power can be enacted via strategic narratives and 
their development from the formation to projection, to reception, where most of the 
empirical gaps in the literature were identified.   
First, the empirical studies of strategic narratives focus predominantly on the 
narrative projection, and, to an extent, narrative reception. There were no studies found 
that specifically investigated the stage of narrative formation. Narratives and their 
formation is often taken for granted in the studies of narrative projection and narrative 
reception, often using the a priori strategic narratives without clear indication of where 
these narratives come from and how and by whom they were shaped (Hayden, 2017; 
Pamment, 2014b; Zaharna, 2016). 
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Second, according to Miskimmon et al., the essence of their approach lies in 
providing the explanation for how narratives are used strategically in international 
relations. Their primary argument is that how narratives are being formed and projected 
in the media environment shapes the dynamics of international affairs. Miskimmon et 
al. particularly emphasized that strategic narratives help define the international system. 
The authors justify such perspectives by arguing that narratives are central to all human 
relations. First, narratives craft worldviews and constrain behaviors. Second, political 
actors attempt to use narratives strategically. Third, communication environment itself 
affects how narratives are communicated and flow and with what effect (2014). 
Importantly, while the ideas of strategic narratives have been gaining attention in public 
diplomacy and international communication literature, there are no studies that 
empirically trace the strategic narrative development from their formation to projection 
to reception.  
Restatement of Definitions in the Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation is comprised of four foundational 
concepts that informed this study: public relations, public diplomacy, soft power, and 
strategic narratives.     
Public relations here is defined as the strategic management of communication 
and relationships between organizations and publics.   
Public diplomacy is conceptualized as a strategic public relations function of the 
government (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006) with the goal of communicating and 
explaining foreign policy of a country to global publics through available means of 
influence, including but not limited to strategic planning and execution of 
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informational, cultural and educational programming, as well as international 
development projects by state and non-state actors. 
Soft power is treated here as the power of attraction (Nye, 2004). For soft power 
to exist and produce attraction, its sources cannot be kept in reserve but need to be 
continuously deployed and freely exist in the environment (Roselle et al., 2014).   
Strategic narratives are tools for political actors to extend their influence, 
manage expectations, change the discursive environment in which they operate 
(Miskimmon et al., 2014), and, potentially, enact soft power. Public relations offers its 
functional capabilities to assist with crafting and projecting a strategic narrative via 
public diplomacy. Strategic narratives go through the stage of formation, projection, and 
reception (Miskimmon et al., 2014).    
Research Questions 
Many scholars and practitioners treat soft power as a potential tool for exerting 
political influence. However, the discussion of how soft power can be enacted is rather 
limited without clear suggestions for practitioners of how to achieve it.  
The argument of this dissertation is that understanding of strategic narratives 
enriches one’s understanding how soft power can be enacted. In brief, the phenomenon 
under study deals with the question of how an actor (advocate country) can enact its 
soft power? The literature review offered a potential answer – soft power of an actor 
(advocate country) can be enacted via strategic narratives. Arguably, to enact soft power 
strategic narratives must be received and accepted by the target publics; simply put, 
strategic narratives pass through all three stages of narrative life cycle. Also, the 
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projection of soft power via strategic narratives must reference different soft power 
sources (policies, values, and culture), embedded in strategic narratives.   
To answer this question, one first must identify narratives that a state attempts to 
project. This is the level of narrative formation. The literature suggested that political 
actors have the ability to construct narratives that enhance the appeal of a country for 
foreign audiences (Miskimmon et al., 2014). Further, Freedman (2006) argued that 
strategic narratives do not occur naturally "but are deliberately constructed or reinforced 
out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current" (p. 22). This fact highlights the 
importance of the narrative formation stage in the study of strategic narratives, as one 
needs first to carefully investigate which narratives are being shaped at the government 
level. According to Miskimmon et al. (2014), understanding the formation of strategic 
narratives involves understanding strategic goals and communication of the state actors. 
Because strategic (national level) narratives originate with the government, it is 
important first to examine foundational documents of one country's foreign policy, 
which usually outline values and goals this policy is built upon. This study examines the 
Foreign Policy Doctrines of the Russian Federation to identify major strategic narratives 
Russia aims to project. The narrative analysis of these documents will help answer the 
following questions: 
RQ1: What strategic narratives are embedded in the foundational (guiding) 
foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation? 
The introduction of the foundational foreign policy documents by a state actor 
constituted an action that later pre-determined narrative discourse of events retold by 
such public diplomacy practices as Russia's international broadcasting. In other words, 
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strategic narratives must also be projected onto the publics of the target country. 
Assuming that strategic national narratives originate with the government, it is logical 
to examine foreign communication of the Russian government that is directed toward 
foreign publics (narrative projection).  Particularly, it is important to explore in what 
shape and form narratives are presented via the medium of projection, in this case, via 
Russian public diplomacy efforts. Further, for strategic narratives to have the ability to 
enact soft power, sources of soft power must be considered and embedded within 
strategic narratives. According to Nye (2008), soft power influence that originates from 
different sources could have a different influence on different publics. These resources 
are assets that produce attraction and ability to entice: 
RQ2a: What strategic narratives are embedded in Russia’s public diplomacy 
efforts and in what way do these narratives manifest themselves? 
RQ2b: What sources of soft power are being referenced most frequently within 
the projected strategic narratives of Russia?  
Finally, to understand the relationship between strategic narratives and soft 
power it is necessary to evaluate the reception of strategic narratives, which is 
concerned with identifying the impact of strategic narratives on audiences (Miskimmon 
et al., 2014). Such impact can be measured via analysis of attitudes and opinions, but 
also via interpretation of the narrative by elites as expressed in the media: 
RQ3a: What strategic narratives of Russia, identified at the narrative formation 
stage, can be found in the discursive media environment of the target country and in 
what way do these narratives manifest themselves? 
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RQ3b: What sources of soft power are being referenced most frequently within 
Russia’s strategic narratives found in the discursive media environment of the target 
country?  
RQ3c: In what way does the manifestation of strategic narratives of Russia 
differ at the level narrative projection and the level of narrative reception?  
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
  The general goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the available knowledge 
on the relationship between public diplomacy, public relations, and soft power. This 
dissertation strives to improve our understanding of the role of strategic narratives 
projected via public diplomacy in the enactment of soft power. The phenomenon under 
study deals with a general question of how an actor (advocate country) can enact its 
soft power? In brief, the literature review suggests a potential answer – soft power of an 
actor (advocate country) can be enacted via strategic narratives that can be developed 
and deployed via public diplomacy means by state actors. In social science, narratives 
are seen as consensually defined social realities that inform people’s understanding of 
their life experiences (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994). The agreed-upon narratives 
help members of the society to interpret common experience; people who share the 
understanding of reality also share the understanding of a narrative and become a 
“rhetorical community, knit together by a common sense of purpose, agency, 
motivation, and action” (Garner, Sterk, & Adams, 1998, p. 63). Therefore, strategic 
narratives, deployed to structure the consensually defined social reality, may be 
enacting soft power of an advocate country by leveraging the power of appeal to its 
culture, values, and policies via strategic narratives. If this premise is true, one needs to 
investigate strategic narratives by looking at examples of strategic narratives produced 
by an advocate country. For example, studying how Russia attempts to exert its soft 
power influence via strategic narratives may offer insights into the enactment of soft 
power as a way of fomenting change (influence). To understand the enactment of soft 
power via strategic narratives, it is also important to trace the formation, projection, and 
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reception of strategic narratives. By doing so, the dissertation addresses gaps in the 
literature on strategic narratives that traditionally downplayed the narrative formation 
stage of strategic narratives, taking it for granted. In addition, the dissertation closes the 
loop by tracing strategic narratives from their inception to reception.   
There were several important considerations made in designing this study. First, 
strategic narratives are not spontaneous but rather “deliberately constructed or 
reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current” (Freedman, 2006, p. 
22). Such conceptualization of strategic narratives highlights the importance of the 
narrative formation stage. In order to study strategic narratives, one needs first to 
carefully investigate what narratives are being formed at the government level. Second, 
according to Kuchins and Zevelev (2012), political elites significantly influence the 
shaping of foreign policy, and Russia's foreign policy is often characterized by both 
continuity and change, reflected in its foundational foreign policy documents. 
Therefore, foreign policy documents can serve as one of the sources that reflect the 
formation of narratives. Third, a strategic narrative is rhetorical in nature because it 
strives to achieve a specific goal by taking into account the target audience and the 
context in which it is presented (Abbott, 2002; Lucaites & Condit, 1985). For this 
reason, public diplomacy materials serve as an appropriate data source and are most 
likely to contain strategic narratives of the government. In other words, public 
diplomacy projects strategic narratives of an advocate country. Fourth, while Roselle et 
al. (2014) suggest that understanding narrative reception often implies an analysis of 
attitudes and opinions before and after the narrative projection, for general publics of 
the target state to form an opinion or perception, those narratives must first reach the 
 106 
discursive media environment of the target state. As such, narrative reception can be 
interpreted in the context of how “audiences consume news and political information, 
how they compare sources and attribute credibility, and whether they discuss narratives 
with friends, family, or colleagues” (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 12). Therefore, 
narrative reception can also be understood as the way projected narratives are being re-
told by media and political elites of the target country.  
Justification for the choice of the country. The advocate country for the study 
of soft power enactment via strategic narratives in this dissertation is the Russian 
Federation. Because the phenomenon under study in this exploratory research is hard to 
measure or directly observe, the researcher limited the scope of this dissertation to the 
case of Russia and its public diplomacy efforts.  
Russia as a country of observation was chosen because of its increased activity 
of information dissemination and narrative projection in recent years, specifically to 
influence the arena of international relations and sway global view of Russia in its favor 
(Saari, 2014). Particularly, Russian public diplomacy efforts via international 
broadcaster Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik News (RIA Novosti) were noted in the 
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) report as influential. “Russia’s state-run 
propaganda machine—comprised of its domestic media apparatus, outlets targeting 
global audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a network of quasi-government trolls—
contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging 
to Russian and international audiences”, report states (ICA, 2017, p. 3). As such, Russia 
can serve as a good case study for the purpose of informing the understanding of 
strategic narratives, soft power, and public diplomacy. 
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Based on these considerations, the dissertation is set to study the narrative 
formation, narrative projection, and narrative reception to track the potential trajectory 
of strategic narratives deployed by an advocate country, Russia in this case. The 
following research questions, organized by the stage of narrative development, will help 
explore the phenomenon under study (See Table 5).  
Table 5. Summary of Research Questions 
 
Narrative formation 
 
Narrative projection Narrative reception 
RQ1: What strategic 
narratives are embedded in 
the foundational (guiding) 
foreign policy documents of 
the Russian Federation? 
RQ2a: What strategic 
narratives are embedded in 
Russia’s public diplomacy 
efforts and in what way do 
these narratives manifest 
themselves? 
 
RQ3a: What strategic 
narratives of Russia, 
identified at the narrative 
formation stage, can be found 
in the discursive media 
environment of the target 
country and in what way do 
these narratives manifest 
themselves? 
 
 RQ2b: What sources of soft 
power are being referenced 
most frequently within the 
projected strategic narratives 
of Russia? 
RQ3b: What sources of soft 
power are being referenced 
most frequently within 
Russia’s strategic narratives 
found in the discursive media 
environment of the target 
country?  
 
  RQ3c: In what way does the 
manifestation of strategic 
narratives of Russia differ at 
the level narrative projection 
and the level of narrative 
reception? 
 
Study Design 
 According to Wimmer and Dominick (2006), research questions define the 
method of inquiry. As Table 5 indicates, research questions are grouped based on the 
stage of narrative development they are investigating. This creates unique challenges 
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and calls for different research methods to answer the different research questions. 
Given the exploratory nature of this study and posed research questions, the researcher 
designed a study using the triangulation of methods, combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to data analysis. The chosen methods were included in study 
design to enrich the findings, to increase its validity and to reduce bias of a single 
method. Triangulation is a standard method in exploratory studies that allows for cross-
validation of results from either a qualitative or quantitative research (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2006). Fortner and Christians (2003) argued that the goal of triangulation is 
not only accuracy but more so a build-up of a fully rounded analysis of a phenomenon 
by combining multiple analytical methods.  
To answer the posed research questions (see Table 5), this dissertation research 
was conducted in three stages. During the first stage, the study examined the strategic 
narratives of the Russian Federation at the phase of narrative formation. Using the 
grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2014; Saldana, 2016; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), 
foundational documents of the Russian foreign policy were examined. At the second 
stage of narrative projection, Russian public diplomacy materials were analyzed to 
investigate which embedded narratives were being projected onto the publics of the 
target state. At this stage, content analysis was used to identify the salience of projected 
narratives and explore whether the projected narratives refer to any of the potential soft 
power sources. During the third stage of narrative reception, the study examined which 
strategic narratives of Russia were successfully delivered in to the discursive media 
environment of the target state and, specifically, in what way they manifested 
themselves in the media of the target country (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 3. Study Design 
 
Figure 3 depicts the research design by visually aligning the research stage with 
the research questions, data for analysis, and methods of analysis. The study design 
consists of analyzing the available data that inform narrative formation, narrative 
projection, and narrative reception. To answer the posed research questions, the study 
employs triangulation of methods to address various research needs and consists of: (1) 
grounded theory approach (open coding, pattern/axial coding, and selective coding) to 
examine the foundational foreign policy documents of Russia in order to identify 
strategic narratives embedded in those documents (Charmaz, 2014; Saldana, 2016); (2) 
content analysis of materials from the English-language media outlets that represent 
Russia’s public diplomacy efforts at the narrative projection stage (Krippendorf, 2004; 
Narrative formation  
RQ1 
Sources of data:  
Foreign policy doctrine 
Cultural Diplomacy doctrine 
President's executive order 
Method of analysis: 
Grounded theory (open, axial, 
selective coding) 
Narrtaive projection 
RQ2 a& b 
Sources of data: 
Russia Today 
RIA Novosti/Sputnik 
 
Method of analysis: 
Content  analysis 
 
Narrative reception 
RQ3 a,b,c 
Sources of data: 
New York Times 
Washington Post  
Method of analysis: 
Content analysis 
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Rawnsley, 2015); (3) content analysis of media materials found in the media of the 
target country to investigate the manifestation of Russia’s projected narratives at the 
stage of narrative reception (Krippendorf, 2004); and (4) comparison analysis of 
findings from all research steps. 
To preserve the logic of the proposed research design, the next section first 
describes the data and instruments used for analysis. It then proceeds to the description 
of the data collection and analysis in each step of the study design.  
Text as Data 
As argued by Grimmer and Stewart (2013), language and text is often a medium 
for politics. Foreign policy positions, debates on legislation, and written or broadcasted 
news reports document the day-to-day affairs in international relations. Political leaders 
often explain their views through media interviews, public addresses, position papers, 
etc.  As such, text and textual data provide a depth of insight into the understanding of 
many socio-political and communication phenomena. Therefore, the primary data for 
this study are available textual data comprised of foreign policy documents and media 
materials from both Russian and U.S. sources. 
The data for analysis were collected in chronological order to reflect the 
lifecycle of strategic narratives (see Figure 4). First, data for analysis of narrative 
formation were collected. This body of data consists of three foundational documents 
that inform Russian foreign policy: 1) Foreign Policy Doctrine (2013); 2) Addendum #1 
to Foreign Policy Doctrine (2010) that covers cultural diplomacy and humanitarian 
cooperation; 3) National Program for Foreign Policy Execution (2012) that outlines 
specific programs for enactment of the Foreign Policy Doctrine. These three documents 
 111 
were in Russian language and are available for download from the official website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
(http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents), listed under the 
“Foundational Documents” tab.  
Second, based on the topics and narratives identified through analysis of the 
foreign policy documents, media articles were collected for analysis of strategic 
narrative projection via public diplomacy outlets of Russia such as Russia Today and 
Sputnik News (former RIA Novosti). Because these are two major international news 
outlets of the Russian government, all materials from Russia Today and RIA Novosti 
were in English language. Importantly, materials from the international broadcaster 
Russia Today were downloaded from its official website and represented transcripts of 
their on-air programming.  
Because this step of analysis represents a narrative projection stage that occurs 
after narrative formation, the data for this step were collected for a period that 
chronologically followed the introduction of all strategic narratives embedded in the 
foundational foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation (see Figure 4). The 
data was collected using the keywords and key phrases identified during the analysis of 
data for the narrative formation and will be discussed in more details later in this 
chapter. 
Third, to address narrative reception, the data similarly were collected 
chronologically after the narrative was projected. The data comprised news articles 
from the two leading U.S. newspapers known for their ability to shape public opinion 
on wide array of issues (see Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Jordan, 1993), such as the 
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New York Times and Washington Post, on the topics and narratives identified in the 
previous step. Similarly, the data was collected using the keywords and key phrases 
identified during the analysis of data for narrative projection stage. The starting point 
for the study of strategic narratives was chosen the year of 2010 when the Cultural 
Diplomacy Conception was introduced. The Cultural Diplomacy Conception was 
widely considered as the first attempt by Russia to systemize its public diplomacy 
efforts and provide a policy framework for it (Hurn, 2016; Furman, 2015). This 
document was followed by an Executive Order for Foreign Policy Execution signed by 
the President of Russia and by the Foreign Policy Doctrine, introduced in 2013 (see 
Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Timeline of Data Collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notably, prior to 2013, a 2008 Foreign Policy Doctrine has guided Russia’s 
approach to international relations. In December 2016, another foreign policy document 
was released that presumably may have introduced different strategic narratives. 
However, this document remains outside the scope of this study because the recent date 
does not allow for tracing the development of strategic narrative life cycle over the 
course of two-three years. 
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As depicted in Figure 5, the data collection and analysis in each stage is 
dependent upon the completion of the previous step. Therefore, based on the narratives 
identified in the policy documents, a search of news items from Russia’s international 
broadcasters was executed to identify the projected narratives. International 
broadcasters are widely acknowledged as public diplomacy outlets of the advocate 
country (Golan, 2013; Saari, 2014). In the case of Russia, Russia Today and Sputnik 
News (RIA Novosti) served as primary sources of data for investigating narrative 
projection between 2013 and 2014. This period was chosen for several reasons. First, it 
was theorized that chronologically it follows the period identified as part of the 
narrative formation stage. Second, it covers a period of two years (24 months), which 
allows for a time overlap between the narrative projection and narrative reception stage 
that can be both concurrent and consecutive. Similarly, to examine narrative reception, 
the data from major media outlets of the target country, the New York Times and the 
Washington Post in this case, were collected based on the narratives identified during 
the narrative formation analysis using the time period between 2014 and 2015 (24 
months). 
Figure 5. Approach to Data Collection 
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Instrumentation 
The nature of the study and the study design required approaching the research 
questions in sequence. For this reason, each stage of the strategic narrative development 
was treated as the study in itself, with its own methodological approach. This 
dissertation relied on two general approaches to data analysis: qualitative and 
quantitative. Each methodological approach answered the specific research questions 
and used different instruments. 
For qualitative analysis of data during the first stage of narrative formation, the 
researcher used analytic software NVivo. As software for researchers who work with 
rich text-based data, NVivio is called “methodologically agnostic” (Hai-Jew, 2015), and 
allows a researcher to do thematic analysis, grounded theory, and content analysis. The 
use of qualitative computer software increases the validity of research because the 
implementation of the computer software decreases the chances of obtaining biased 
results (Hai-Jew, 2015). 
Because qualitative analysis requires intensive work with rich textual data, the 
NVivo software supports analysis by allowing to use such strategies as reading, 
reflecting, coding, annotating, linking and even visualizing concurrently (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013). In addition, NVivo can be used as a great tool for organizing data and 
ideas, contributing to methodological illumination of research questions.  
The content analysis of media materials was performed with the help of 
Qualtrics software. Although Qualtrics is a cloud-based platform for creating and 
distributing web-based surveys, it can also be used as a data aggregate and data editor 
for content analysis (Payne, Moxley, & MacDonald, 2015). Coding rubrics for content 
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analysis were created using Qualtrics, the link to which was used for data entry. 
Essentially, for the sake of data entry, the researcher and coders filled out a "survey" 
with coding structure multiple times instead of using a more traditional spreadsheet. As 
Payne et al. (2015) argued, using Qualtrics for content analysis adds validity to analysis 
as it allows minimizing mistakes of manual data entry.  
Narrative Formation: Methodology Overview 
The narrative formation stage is focused on answering one research question: 
What strategic narratives are embedded in the foundational foreign policy documents of 
the Russian Federation? The narrative formation analysis employed a general grounded 
theory approach to identifying embedded narratives in the foundational foreign policy 
documents of the Russian Federation. Importantly, the literature offers many views on 
grounded theory as a methodology (Charmaz, 2014; Saldana, 2016; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), yet "all variants of grounded theory offer helpful strategies for collecting, 
managing, and analyzing qualitative data" (Charmaz, 2014, p. 15). For the purpose of 
this dissertation, the researcher followed strategies for qualitative data analysis offered 
by Saldana (2016) and Charmaz (2014). Accordingly, the researcher engaged in an 
iterative data analysis process, drawing on textual data for narratives and descriptions to 
illuminate the emerged thematic categories using qualitative analysis software NVivo. 
This section reports on data preparation for qualitative analysis in NVivo and describes 
the coding approach used.    
Data Preparation 
The Russian-language documents for analysis were first downloaded as PDFs 
from the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
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(http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents). To make it compatible with 
NVivo, all downloaded documents were then converted into MS Word format to enable 
full NVivo capabilities. These three documents were uploaded to a project folder titled 
"Narrative formation" in NVivo.  
Each document has been treated as a case or unit of analysis. For additional 
classification and to ensure the possibility of cross-case comparison at later stages of 
analysis, each document was categorized based on the following "document type" 
attributes: government document, media documents, and year of the document. 
Coding Approach 
In general, coding is one of many methods to create knowledge out of a body of 
textual data. Corbin and Strauss (2008) defined a code as an abstract representation of a 
phenomenon. Codes can be descriptive (this policy is about cultural diplomacy), 
thematic (Russian language promotion), and interpretive or analytical (Russia’s position 
on non-interfering in sovereign state’s affairs). As Patton (2002) argued, data for coding 
represents the “undigested complexity of reality” (p. 463) that needs order and 
organization to allow for a rich interpretation. It can be achieved through the process of 
coding, which Bazeley and Jackson (2013) described as “tagging text with codes, of 
indexing it, in order to facilitate later retrieval” (p. 70). The naming of the tags or codes 
is an important technique as it assists in data organization and analytic thinking 
(Saldana, 2016). The coding approach in this study was to select, separate, and sort 
qualitative data through open and broad-brush coding, pattern and axial coding, and 
selective coding (Charmaz, 2014; Saldana, 2016).  
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The data analysis for narrative formation was conducted in three stages: (1) open 
and broad-brush coding was used to lay the foundation for identification of key themes 
and data; (2) pattern/axial coding was used to identify consistent topics and re-group the 
categories, based on connections (associations) between categories and subcategories; 
(3) selective coding was used to interpret the core categories emerged from all the data.  
Open and Broad-Brush Coding 
The initial coding – open broad-brush coding – included a close reading of the 
data, during which the researcher is open to all of the data interpretations. In the early 
stages of analysis, line-by-line coding was used. Charmaz (2014) argued that line-by-
line coding is particularly useful in the early analysis and in open coding of large text 
data because it makes it possible to look at the data critically and to recognize 
underlying assumptions.  
Therefore, first, the researcher read through the data several times using a broad-
brush coding, making annotations and memos in NVivo to keep track of idea 
development. Careful reading as part of the open coding allows creating tentative labels 
for chunks of data that summarize observations of constantly emerging themes. Coffey 
and Atkinson (1996) suggested the most common approach to open coding is to start 
with some very general categories, describing a researcher's categorization of the text. 
Bazeley and Jackson (2013) described it as a broad-brush coding that allows a 
researcher to treat coding as a dynamic and live process, in which a researcher can re-
code or code on from the already coded data. Such process places data in big chunks of 
broad topical areas to identify areas relevant to the investigation and creates categories 
that represent reflections on the text in a broad sense.   
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Importantly, open coding is not based on existing theory (Charmaz, 2014). The 
meaning emerges from the interpretation of data. NVivo allows coding themes as you 
go, adjust and re-code them as necessary. It also allows the researcher to record the 
examples of words that constitute a code or category, and establish properties of each 
code. In NVivo, codes are stored under nodes that contain information about the code 
and its properties as well as the information about instances or references in the text that 
belong to a certain code (category).   
The open coding started with a careful reading of the Cultural Diplomacy Policy 
(2010). Bazeley and Jackson (2013) recommended starting with a document that is 
typical or particularly interesting and rich in details because one is likely to generate the 
majority of the open codes while coding the first source. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) 
suggested the most common approach to open coding is to start with some very general 
categories, describing the researcher's categorization of the text. Saldana (2016) called 
this approach “lumper” coding (p. 19) and Bazeley and Jackson (2013) described it as a 
broad-brush coding, a coding process that places data in big chunks of broad topical 
areas to identify areas relevant to the investigation, as well as creates categories that 
represent reflections on the text in a broad sense. Broad-brush, or lumper coding, allows 
the researcher to treat coding as a dynamic and live process, in which a researcher can 
recode or code on from the already coded data.  
Cultural diplomacy policy was analyzed first by reading the text several times 
and making notes. The initial broad-brush coding of the document yielded 130 nodes 
(coding categories) with 523 text references. The second document to analyze was the 
Foreign Policy conception introduced in 2013. This document was signed into law by 
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the president in 2013 but has lost its power in 2016 after the new conception replaced it 
(the 2016 Conception is beyond the scope of this study due to the set timeline). The 
broad-brush coding of the document yielded 267 nodes (coding categories) with 680 
text references. The final document to analyze was the President’s order for foreign 
policy execution from 2012. The analysis resulted in 112 nodes and 252 text references 
(see Figure 6 for source comparison). 
The initial broad-brush coding of all documents resulted in 509 unique coding 
categories with 1455 text references (see Figure 6). To proceed with the further 
analysis, it was important to pay particular attention to categories common across all 
documents, and at least between two of them. At the first level of interpretation, this 
was an important indicator for exploring further each node (open code) as well as the 
text that brought it together. As Lucas et al. (2015) argued, looking at the data through 
groupings of text rather than individual documents provides a stronger sense of what the 
node is all about. In turn, it sets the stage for the next level of analysis. 
Figure 6. Sources Compared by Number of Coding References 
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Table 6 lists 90 emerged open codes that were present in at least two analyzed 
documents, with only 14 categories shared by all three foundational Russian foreign 
policy documents. These 14 open codes (not yet categories) were used as the building 
blocks for axial codes. These categories are: (1) international cultural humanitarian 
cooperation, (2) Russian language promotion, (3) cooperation with Commonwealth of 
Independent States, (4) cooperation with European Union, (5) intercultural dialogue as a 
tool of international relations, (6) state support of Russian compatriots and Diasporas, 
(7) cooperation with Asia Pacific, (8) cooperation with NGOs and nonprofits, (9) 
cooperation with Shanghai organization, (10) ensuring Russian interest, (11) supporting 
Russian language and culture abroad, (12) cooperation with G8, (13) dialogue with 
ASEAN, (14) Rossotrudnichestvo (see Table 6).  
Table 6. Initial Broad-brush Coding and Nodes Across at Least Two Documents 
 
Nodes Number of 
coding text 
references 
Number of 
documents 
coded 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 41 3 
Russian language promotion 14 3 
Cooperation with CIS 13 3 
Cooperation with EU 12 3 
Intercultural dialogue as a tool 11 3 
State support of Russian compatriots and Diasporas 11 3 
Cooperation with Asia Pacific 10 3 
Cooperation with NGOs and nonprofits 8 3 
Cooperation with Shanghai organization 7 3 
Ensuring Russian interests 5 3 
Supporting Russian language and culture abroad 5 3 
Cooperation with G8 4 3 
Dialogue with ASEAN 4 3 
Rossotrudnichestvo 3 3 
Special role of culture in FP 12 2 
Cooperation with INGOs 8 2 
Weapons of mass destruction 6 2 
Competition of cultures 5 2 
Fighting drug trafficking 5 2 
ODKB - collective security agreement 5 2 
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Rule of Law in international relations 5 2 
State support of media abroad 5 2 
Bilateral cooperation 4 2 
Cooperation with BRICS 4 2 
Cooperation with EC 4 2 
Cooperation with USA 4 2 
Cultural cooperation 4 2 
Eurasian economic integration 4 2 
International terrorism 4 2 
Non-interfering in sovereign states' affairs 4 2 
Promoting Russia's image 4 2 
Reputation of Russia 4 2 
Rights of Russian compatriots 4 2 
Russia advocates for political solutions to regional conflicts 4 2 
Building friendly relations between China & India 3 2 
Cooperation in Arctic 3 2 
Cooperation with G20 3 2 
Cooperation with Latin America 3 2 
Cooperation with UN 3 2 
Crisis in Afghanistan 3 2 
Culture in multipolarity 3 2 
Dialogue of cultures 3 2 
Economic integration of CIS 3 2 
Expanding Russia's shelf borders 3 2 
Multilateral cooperation 3 2 
NATO 3 2 
Network diplomacy 3 2 
Peace, security & stability 3 2 
President defines cultural diplomacy policy 3 2 
Shaping up of a polycentric international system 3 2 
Spiritual uniqueness of the nation 3 2 
Strategic partnerships in energy sector 3 2 
Transnational organized crime 3 2 
Unilateral sanctions 3 2 
Bilateral cooperation with the USA 2 2 
Constructive military cooperation with the USA 2 2 
Cooperation with African countries 2 2 
Cooperation with China 2 2 
Cooperation with Slavic countries 2 2 
Cultural diplomacy against containment policy 2 2 
EC as a leading organization for cooperation & partnership 2 2 
Economic discrimination 2 2 
Eurasian Union as an FP priority 2 2 
Expanding cooperation with Belarus in the Eurasian Union 2 2 
Expanding presence in Antarctica 2 2 
Finalize Russian borders 2 2 
Goal commonality – NATO 2 2 
Humanitarian cooperation with CIS countries 2 2 
Information support of Russian FP 2 2 
Modernization of Russia 2 2 
Multipolarity 2 2 
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Mutually beneficially relations with the USA 2 2 
National and inter-ethnic conflicts 2 2 
Non-discrimination in economic & trade cooperation with the USA 2 2 
Non-nuclear status of Korean peninsula 2 2 
Openness of Russia's FP 2 2 
Political solution for Iranian nuclear program 2 2 
Religion in intercultural dialogue 2 2 
Representing classic Russian culture abroad 2 2 
Resolving Arab-Israel conflict 2 2 
Russia in the UN peacekeeping missions 2 2 
Russia is multinational and multi-religious state 2 2 
Russia's responsibility to maintain global and regional security 2 2 
Russia's role international human rights 2 2 
Spiritual and cultural potential of Russia 2 2 
State support of international broadcasting in Russian 2 2 
Support of Abkhazia & South Ossetia 2 2 
Support of Russian citizens abroad 2 2 
Support of Russian-born children abroad 2 2 
Supporting Russian companies abroad 2 2 
 
Axial Coding 
This is the second level of analysis when the open codes are re-examined with 
the goal of identifying patterns or categories, their subcategories, and associations 
among them (Saldana, 2016). Strauss and Corbin (1998) observed that the process of 
open coding often yields too many codes or categories that need to be organized and 
related to each other based on shared features and axial coding might help organize the 
categories better. Pattern or axial coding begins during open coding when categories 
(emerged themes) and their subcategories (axes, characteristics or answers to questions 
about categories) are first identified (Charmaz, 2014; Saldana, 2016).  
According to Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe (2012), axial coding helps isolate the 
axis, or the phenomenon, “around which differences in properties or dimensions exist” 
(p. 154). To achieve this, axial coding involves disaggregating and reassembling data to 
highlight the association between and within categories. As Strauss and Corbin 
explained, the term axial comes from the understanding of axis of a category. In other 
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words, axial coding strives to define properties and dimensions of a category via a 
combination of inductive and deductive reasoning.  
In this dissertation, axial coding was used to explore the data further and to 
create connections (associations) between categories and subcategories to determine 
how they are related to one another. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), this 
strategy brings together the data that had been broken apart into specific pieces during 
initial coding and identifies associations between categories to answer such questions as 
“when, where, why, who, how, and with what consequence” (p. 125).  
Axial coding, instrumentalized in NVivo as tree maps, allows organizing nodes 
(open codes) in trees, essentially creating a hierarchy of codes. Re-categorizing using 
treemaps means combining multiple nodes into one to provide a better picture of a 
category, what that category is comprised of, and what the embedded meaning of it is. 
According to Bazeley and Jackson (2013), using tree structures has a number of benefits 
for analysis: 1) tree structures help with organization of nodes; 2) the sorting process 
prompts the researcher to clarify ideas and brings conceptual clarity; 3) re-organization 
of nodes into tree branches helps with identifying patterns of associations between 
groups of nodes and contributes to the analysis.  On the technical level, NVivo allows 
easy dragging and dropping nodes, creating links in the document yet preserving the 
wholeness of the document. It also saves all original text references, even after the 
categories are merged, and the researcher is able to see a bigger picture for analysis and 
interpretation.  
The initial open coding of materials for this study resulted in 509 individual 
nodes (codes) with 1455 coded passages of text. The number of open codes made it 
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difficult for the researcher to digest the information and prevented from seeing the big 
picture. Using tree maps, the open codes were revisited with the purpose of 
reorganization and re-coding where necessary. Starting with the 14 largest nodes, or 
nodes with the most text references in them, identified during open coding (see Table 
6), the researcher organized open codes into more meaningful categories. Some 
categories required renaming to reflect a broader meaning, while others needed 
disaggregating, and, in some cases recoding.  
Figure 7. Tree Structure – Nodes (Categories) Compared to Number of Coding 
References at First Iteration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, axial coding is a flexible and iterative process designed to “refine and 
differentiate concepts that are already available and lends them the status of categories” 
(Bohm, 2004, p. 271). One way to perform axial coding in NVivo is through creating 
tree structures and iterating categories, which can be a lengthy, time-consuming 
process. Figure 8 visualizes the initial hierarchy and structure of categories after the first 
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iteration. From Figure 8, one can observe the relative size of a category as well as its 
internal structure with subcategories. 
At the first iteration 22 raw categories emerged. The second iteration allowed 
creating a clearer tree organization that further highlighted the internal structure of 
categories with its axes (properties) and created 11 categories. At the third iteration, the 
tree structure was finalized, summarizing five dominating narratives across all three 
documents that were then subjected to selective coding and interpretation.  
Selective Coding 
Selective coding is the final stage of analysis that allows the researcher to 
interpret the core categories emerged from all the data. According to Charmaz (2014), 
selective coding is integrative and gives form to the axial codes collected. By doing so, 
selective coding helps tell a coherent analytic story, especially effective when 
describing narratives. When used appropriately, selective coding can specify possible 
relationships between categories and paint a big picture.  
To aid in data interpretation, the researcher used word association maps, 
produced by NVivo to examine association between key characteristics of the narrative 
and text. These word trees essentially visualize the context in which a word or a phrase 
occurs. In the case of this study, word trees were created for all narratives to help the 
researcher further identify recurring themes surrounding the narrative. Figure 8 presents 
an example of a word tree used for the international cultural-humanitarian narrative. 
In this dissertation, selective coding was the final stage of strategic narrative 
formation data analysis, describing and providing meaning to the most significant 
and/or reoccurring codes (Saldana, 2016). Specifically, selective coding allowed 
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digesting multiple codes and identifying manifest characteristics of the narrative. While 
the qualitative analysis of narratives allowed for critical description and retelling of the 
phenomenon of interest, the patterns, characteristics and elements that transcend the 
details of the narrative were not easily captured. Therefore, axial characteristics of the 
identified narratives were treated as frames that allowed identifying patterns and helped 
structure large volume of information related to the narrative (Miller & Riechert, 2001; 
von Gorp, 2007). However, using frames as characteristics of the narratives may have 
oversimplified the complexity of the narrative, yet it captured the manifest 
characteristics of that narrative, transferable for further analysis at the level of 
projection and reception.     
Figure 8. Word Tree Map Example 
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Reflexivity 
All Russian foreign policy documents were in Russian. The researcher, who is a 
native bearer of the Russian language, read all materials in Russian with all reflective 
notes and categorizations made in English. In a way, reading materials in Russian and 
doing analysis in English provided additional opportunities for reflection and analysis 
as the emerged ideas needed to be simultaneously translated from Russian into English. 
Setton (1999) described this process as simultaneous interpretation, when a bilingual 
person (a researcher) reacts to the text and other forms of communication with a need 
for immediate interpretation by placing the translation process within the knowledge 
and context previously available to the researcher.  
Notably, the researcher was the only person analyzing the materials presented in 
the original language. No back translation was performed; therefore the accuracy of 
translation lies within the investigator’s burden. Materials were analyzed directly from 
the Russian language with interpretations made in English. Such an approach may have 
attached the researcher's subjectivity and interpretation to the text without it being 
clearly acknowledged. As in many qualitative research projects, coding is a subjective 
process (Saldana, 2016). However, as argued by Bazeley and Jackson (2013), in solo 
research projects subjectivity becomes an important part of analysis: 
Each person approaching the data will do so with their own goals and 
perspective, and so each will see and code differently. Coding is designed to 
support analysis – it is not the end in itself. What becomes important, then, is 
that the coder records the way he or she is thinking about the data, keeps track of 
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decisions made, and builds a case supported by the data for the conclusions 
reached (p. 93).   
McCracken (1988) argued that scholars who work within their own culture 
should maintain a “critical distance from what they study” (p. 22) and be aware of the 
pitfalls associated with analysis of a familiar topic. The closeness to and familiarity of 
the phenomenon under study may limit the researchers’ ability to be critical observers. 
For this reason, reflexivity in qualitative research is important. As a former journalist, 
public relations practitioner with experience working in public diplomacy, and a native 
Russian speaker, the researcher started the investigation with a certain understanding of 
the phenomenon under study and wider issues associated with the Russian government 
and government communication. Such familiarity made it particularly important to 
consciously observe distance from the text in order to maintain a critical awareness of 
the information and avoid biased attribution of meaning (McCracken, 1988).  
In general, the following strategies were used to ensure distance from the text: 1) 
to code the text in increments; 2) slowly reading and re-reading the text; 3) to open code 
reflexively, creating categories with descriptive (as opposed to summative) names; and 
4) to complete open (free) and broad-brush coding first before ever thinking about 
larger thematic categories.    
Narrative Projection: Methodology Overview 
The narrative projection stage investigated two research questions: 1) what 
strategic narratives are embedded in Russia’s public diplomacy efforts and in what way 
do these narratives manifest themselves; and 2) what sources of soft power are most 
frequently referenced within the projected strategic narratives of Russia. These research 
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questions were answered using content analysis. Content analysis was chosen because it 
can be useful in exploratory studies to understand the phenomenon being studied 
indirectly and to retain the richness found within the text. According to Smith and 
Taffler (2000), content analysis may be used for a variety of purposes including theory 
development, hypothesis testing, and applied research. 
Content Analysis 
The nature of the phenomenon under study provides the researcher with limited 
analytical tools that can be used to answer the posed research questions. Because the 
study seeks to explore an abstract concept of strategic narratives and their role in the 
enactment of soft power, the phenomenon of interest is inaccessible in principle. In this 
case, content analysis can help infer the phenomenon that could not be observed directly 
(Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 2004).  
The basic definition of content analysis describes it as a research technique "for 
making replicable and valid inferences from the text (or other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use" (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). As an analytical tool, content analysis 
is expected to be reliable and replicable and is expected to yield valid results that could 
be upheld in the light of independently available evidence (Berelson, 1952; 
Krippendorff, 2004). The basic assumption of the content analysis is that it can provide 
a qualitative or quantitative description of the manifest content of communication 
(Daniels, 1963; Krippendorff, 2004). In other words, it is an explicit measure of what is 
contained in the text.  
Content analysis is widely employed in mass communication research, public 
diplomacy, and public relations. Content analysis in public relations examined positive 
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or negative coverage of an organization’s work (Graube, Clark, & Illman, 2010), 
especially in crisis communication (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2010). A significant 
application of content analysis is found in the examination of public relations 
scholarship (Botan & Taylor, 2004; Sisco, Collins, & Zoch, 2011; Sallot, Lyon, Acosta-
Alzura & Jones, 2003; Taylor & Kent, 2010; Vanc & Fitzpatrick, 2016). In one of the 
most recent studies, researchers looked at the content of public diplomacy scholarship 
to determine what theoretical paradigm is dominant in public diplomacy, focusing on 
theoretical approaches and scholars’ use of public relations theories (Vanc & 
Fitzpatrick, 2016). Public diplomacy scholars frequently use content analysis to 
investigate frames and agenda setting in the international broadcasting materials, and 
other public diplomacy materials (Dodd & Collins, 2017; Nisbet et al., 2004; Sheafer & 
Gabay, 2009). In a similar manner, this study utilized content analysis to examine 
public diplomacy materials and investigate whether the strategic narratives identified 
from the analysis of Russian foreign policy documents are being projected via Russia’s 
public diplomacy means, such as international broadcasters.  
Data Sources 
The narrative projection stage investigated strategic narratives of Russia 
embedded in the Russian public diplomacy efforts. As Abbott (2002) argued, narratives 
can be conveyed in a variety of ways and through a variety of media and do not 
necessarily need a narrator. Therefore, media materials can serve as a good vehicle for 
strategic narrative delivery and are suitable for analysis.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, two Russian international broadcasters were chosen: Russia Today and RIA 
Novosti (Sputnik News). These media outlets are widely considered the main 
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mouthpieces of the Russian government and Russian public diplomacy (Saari, 2014; 
Yablokov, 2015). Both media outlets are directed toward foreign audiences and produce 
media materials in English for consumption of English-speaking publics. These public 
diplomacy media were chosen because strategic narratives first and foremost target 
international audiences with the goal of structuring their responses to events. It is 
expected that public diplomacy carry the ideology of the political elites of the advocate 
country, Russia in this case (Saari, 2014).  
Data Collection 
To be considered systematic, objective and replicable, the content for analysis 
must be selected according to explicit and consistent rules. First, sample selection of the 
target materials must observe consistent procedures, and each item must have an equal 
opportunity of being selected for the analysis (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006).  
For the purpose of this analysis a census of all news reports that respond to the 
identified keywords in the period from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014, 
was sought. The beginning date was chosen for two reasons. First, 2013 is the year 
when the Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation was introduced (signed 
February 12, 2013). This is also the latest document among the materials for studying 
the formation of strategic narratives. Therefore, chronologically covering years 2013 
and 2014 allows examining whether any of the formulated strategic narratives within 
government documents were embedded in the public diplomacy messages of Russia.     
To collect data from the Sputnik News/RIA Novosti the researcher used 
LexisNexis Academic database, an online database that provides access to a wide range 
of news, business, legal, medical, and reference databases.  
 132 
Table 7. Number of Articles by Keyword in the Narrative Projection 
 
Narrative Keywords N Total 
International 
Cultural-
Humanitarian 
Cooperation 
Russian culture 
Russian culture 97  
Intercultural dialogue 1  
International cultural cooperation 13  
Humanitarian cooperation 10  
Russian education 21  
Russian tourism 18  
Russian history 55  
  215 
Russian language 
promotion 
Russian language 260  
Russian language discrimination 1  
Russian language media 10  
  271 
Russian compatriots Rights of Russians 77  
Russian World 38  
Russian-born children 4  
  119 
Russian values in FP International peace and security 51  
World order + Russia 35  
  86 
Russia’s stances in 
international relations 
Political solutions to conflicts 13  
Supporting the role of UN 7  
Rule of law + Russia + international 
relations 
25  
Non-interference 31  
  76 
    
 Total 767  
    
To collect data from Russia Today the researcher used its official website 
RT.com. Russia Today as an international multilanguage broadcaster does not have a 
centralized database that would allow for easy downloading of materials for identified 
narratives. For this reason, the researcher manually downloaded all searched articles 
one by one.  
Both media outlets were searched using keywords for strategic narratives 
identified through analysis of narrative formation, generating 767 total number of news 
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reports for Sputnik News/RIA Novosti (N=682) and Russia Today (N=85). Table 7 
provides a break down for number of articles for each identified keyword.  
Data Screening 
Before being subjected to analysis, the downloaded news reports were saved in 
separate files and screened for irrelevant and duplicate news items. News reports 
containing random mentions of keywords were eliminated from the analysis. The 
exclusion of media reports was made in the following cases across sources: 1) random 
mention of the keyword in a story that is irrelevant to the topic of the investigation, and 
2) a combination of words from the search key phrases in the context that does not bear 
the meaning of the concept (Example: Russian World Champion). Table 7 present final 
article count completed after data screening. 
Narrative Reception: Methodology Overview 
The narrative reception stage investigated two research questions: What 
strategic narratives of Russia, identified at the narrative formation stage, can be found in 
the discursive media environment of the target country and in what way do these 
narratives manifest themselves? What sources of soft power are being referenced most 
frequently within Russia’s strategic narratives found in the discursive media 
environment of the target country? and In what way does the manifestation of strategic 
narratives of Russia differ at the level narrative projection and the level of narrative 
reception? (see Table 5). These questions were also answered using content analysis 
method, defined in the previous section.  
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Data Sources 
Because narrative projection investigated the English-language public 
diplomacy efforts of the Russian Federation aimed at English-speaking publics, United 
States was chosen as a potential target country. For this reason, at the narrative 
reception stage the researcher sought to analyze news reports from two elite newspapers 
that are known to cover issues within international discourse and influence political elite 
opinion formation (Baum & Groeling, 2008). These newspapers included two major 
American newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post and were 
chosen for two reasons: 1) because of their extensive coverage of foreign policy news, 
and 2) their prominence and influence on decision making (Cohen, 2015).  
Data Collection 
The period for collection of media reports for the narrative reception stage was 
defined as January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2015. This period covered 24 months with a 
12-month overlapping period between narrative projection and narrative reception 
stages. Such design permitted to account for potential concurrent narrative projection 
and reception. To collect data from The Washington Post and The New York Times the 
researcher used LexisNexis Academic database, an online database that provides access 
to a wide range of news, business, legal, and reference databases (See Table 8). Both 
media outlets were searched using keywords for strategic narratives identified through 
analysis of narrative formation, generating a total of 184 news reports for Washington 
Post (N=184) and 292 news reports for New York Times (N=292).  
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Table 8. Number of Articles by Keyword in the Narrative Reception 
 
Narrative Keywords N Total 
International 
Cultural-
Humanitarian 
Cooperation 
Russian culture 
Russian culture 37  
Intercultural dialogue 1  
International cultural cooperation 0  
Humanitarian cooperation 0  
Russian education 3  
Russian tourism 8  
Russian history 73  
  122 
Russian language 
promotion 
Russian language 141  
Russian language discrimination 0  
Russian language media 2  
  143 
Russian compatriots Rights of Russians 22  
Russian World 15  
Russian-born children 2  
  39 
Russian values in FP International peace and security 51  
World order + Russia 58  
  109 
Russia’s stances in 
international relations 
Political solutions to conflicts 10  
Supporting the role of UN 3  
Rule of law + Russia + international 
relations 
42  
Non-interference 8  
  63 
    
 Total 476  
Data Screening 
Similarly, before being subjected to analysis, the downloaded news reports were 
saved in separate files and screened for irrelevant and duplicate news items. News 
reports containing random mentions of keywords were eliminated from the analysis. 
The exclusion of media reports was made in the following cases across sources: 1) 
random mention of the keyword in a story that is irrelevant to the topic of the 
investigation, and 2) a combination of words from the search key phrases in the context 
that does not bear the meaning of the concept. 
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Data Coding and Operationalization of Variables 
The goal of the content analysis is the accurate representation of a body of 
messages; therefore, both interpretation and quantification are important in fulfilling 
that goal since it aids researchers in the quest for precision (Rome, 1992). Media 
coverage can be considered as a manifestation of meaning and understanding of the 
issues by elites (Stemler, 2001). However, as Krippendorff (2004) argued, personal 
characteristics and biases of the investigator must not enter into the process of research 
and findings. Operational definitions and rules for the classification of variables should 
be explicit and comprehensive enough so that other researchers who repeat the process 
will arrive at the same decisions (Krippendorff, 2004). The analysis employed a detailed 
codebook that operationalized the variables to guide the research. The definitions in the 
codebook derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2.   
For the purpose of this dissertation, the researcher used deductive categories to 
guide the analysis. Deductive category application works with prior formulated aspects 
of analysis, bringing them in connection with the text (Mayring, 2000). Such approach 
allows for the methodologically controlled assignment of the category to a passage of 
text. To avoid poor description of the text, the researcher developed a set of coding 
rules for each deductive category, determining under what circumstances a text passage 
can be coded with a category (see Appendix I).  
Further, coding categories or dimensions helped the researcher specify what was 
being sought. The application of coding categories (variables in some instances) 
provides their qualitative description or a quantitative measure. According to Holsti 
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(1969), coding categories must be independent, mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The 
following coding categories were used in the analysis: 
Time period. The period of analysis covers two years or 24 months. Each month 
was coded as a separate time period. This variable was coded as a categorical variable 
from 1 being the January of 2014 to 24 being the December of 2015. This variable 
helped track and identify the change in the amount of coverage, as well as the level of 
salience of narrative in the news story and cited sources over time. 
Number of articles. This variable represents a number of news articles dedicated 
to a narrative. The narrative time, time period, as well as the level of salience of the 
narrative in the story could precondition the number of articles. 
Narrative. Because the narrated story encompasses answers to questions such as 
what, when, where, why, how, and with what consequences something has occurred 
(5W&H), most narratives in the news stories are located in the news lead (Abbott, 2002; 
Lucaites & Condit, 1985). Narratives like themes can be treated as coding units of 
analysis. This category was developed based on the narratives and themes identified 
during the analysis of data on narrative formation.  
Source (Speaker). According to Abbott, a story has two components – the 
events and the entities involved in events. For analysis of news stories in the narrative 
projection and narrative reception stages, the events were most often presented in the 
news lead and answering the traditional 5W&H. The entities involved in the events 
were thought of as sources of information mentioned in the story. Source or the speaker 
in the news story was conceptualized as any person or organization quoted directly 
(quotation marks were used) and indirectly (paraphrased but attributed to a specific 
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person or organization). In other words, it is a person or an entity that presents 
(projects) the narrative and serves as a soft power guarantor. This category helped 
assess the influence of different actors and sources of information on a number of news 
articles dedicated to a narrative or the narrative salience. The typification of sources was 
captured with these 10 questions (also see Appendix I):  
Domestic Government Sources: 
1) Russian government official or government agency 
Domestic Non-Government Sources: 
2) Russian scientists/researchers/analysts  
3) Russian non-governmental organization, NGOs  
4) Russian public figures, such as actors  
5) Other Russian sources (with no mention of business affiliation/occupation) 
International Sources: 
6) Non-Russian government officials or government agencies 
7) Non-Russian scientists/researchers/analysts  
8) Non-Russian NGOs  
9) Non-Russian public figures, such as actors  
10) Other non-Russian sources (with no mention of business affiliation/occupation) 
Type of strategic narrative. This category identified a type of narrative being 
projected: 1) international, 2) national, 3) issue-level.  
Sources of soft power used in the narrative. If strategic narratives indeed can 
enact soft power, it is important to understand what soft power sources are references or 
appealed to in the narrative. There are three primary sources of soft power: values, 
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culture, and policies. As Dimitriu (2012) argued, to be effective, narratives need to 
resonate with values, interests, and beliefs of the intended audiences and be based on 
existing ideas and values. This category coded information that referenced national 
values, cultural values, elements of pop or high culture, or policies. 
Level of salience. To assess the prominence of a narrative present in the Russian 
public diplomacy efforts, the method of assessing the level of salience by Williams 
(2007) was adopted with modification to fit the context of the study. First, coder(s) read 
the whole story and then decided on the level of salience of a particular narrative on a 3-
point scale with 1 being "negligible attention", which barely mentions identified 
narratives; 2 being "moderate attention," that devotes some attention to the identified 
narratives; and 3 being "significant attention," when a news story primarily focuses on 
the identified narrative, mentions the narrative clearly, and devotes significant part of 
the story to the issues relevant to the narrative.   
Tone of the narrative. A tone of the narrative is important to record to 
understand the context in which the narrative is presented. The tone was coded on a 3 
point scale, with 1 representing the tone that disfavors the narrative through the use of 
negative or critical words; 2 when the tone is neutral through providing or restating 
simple facts; 3 when the tone favors the identified narrative through the use of positive 
and supportive words. 
Unit of Analysis 
The text unit of analysis or a case was defined as an individual news item, which 
has natural boundaries of its own (the length of an article). Words, sentences, 
paragraphs or the whole news story can be used as the coding unit in the content 
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analysis. However, words and sentences are often considered inadequate units for 
analysis since they are dependent upon their context for their meaning (Krippendorff, 
2004). That is, using words or sentences as units of analysis makes it difficult to 
determine which of several potential meanings they convey. On the other hand, using a 
complete story as a unit of analysis is often too intensive to detect nuances and details in 
the text and can divert the researcher from extracting the meaning from the content.  
Similarly, defining a paragraph as the unit of analysis overcomes some of the 
difficulties of using sentences or the whole new stories. Paragraphs are comprised of 
logically connected sentences, with appropriate context provided for interpretation of 
ideas. However, as argued by Smith (2000), the most important aspect of the text that 
can be used as a coding unit is the theme "by which is meant the expression of a single 
idea, a statement about a topic, or a motif" (p. 321). Therefore, this dissertation uses a 
theme or the previously identified narrative topic as the coding unit.  
 Intercoder Reliability 
 Three coders conducted this content analysis. All coders were provided with a 
copy of the codebook, Qualtrics link to an electronic coding sheet, and electronic copies 
of the articles. First, the coders were briefed on the methodology, purpose of the study 
and asked to familiarize themselves with the coding materials. Second, three coders 
independently coded 13 identical articles and discussed the discrepancies in coding 
results. The intercoder reliability (IR) was measured using Holsti's coefficient of 
reliability (1969). 
    IR = 3 M/ N1 + N2 + N3 
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 Here, M equals the number of coding decisions that all coders agreed on. The 
symbols N1 and N2 represent the total number of coding decisions made by coders 
separately from each other (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). Given the exploratory nature 
of the study, the minimal acceptable intercoder reliability coefficient using this formula 
was set at 80 percent (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). The margin of error was left to allow 
for a tolerable subjective disparity in coding. Using Holsti’s formula the sum of coding 
decisions made by all coders was calculated and amounted to 468 ((13x12)x3). Here, 
each coder needed to do 12 coding decisions per article (n=13), therefore each coder 
made 156 coding decisions independently. The instances where all three coders agreed 
amounted to 405. Therefore, the calculated intercoder reliability was determined as 
follows  
IR = 405/ 156 + 156 +156 = .86.5 or 86.5% 
 Therefore, the intercoder reliability of 86.5% was deemed acceptable and the 
coders proceeded with coding the reminder of news articles. After the coding was 
completed, the final intercoder reliability coefficient was calculated.   
The sum of coding decisions made by both coders amounted to 44,748 ((1243x12)x3). 
The instances where all three coders agreed amounted to 13,835. Therefore, the 
calculated intercoder reliability was determined as follows  
IR = 41,505/ 20,040 + 20,040 +20,040 = .927 or 93% 
Instrument Validity 
 According to Cook & Campbell (1979), instrument validation should precede 
other core empirical validations. Instrument validation refers to the adequacy with 
which the data collection instruments (i.e. questionnaire, interview questions, coding 
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categories) measure what they are intended to measure. For this purpose, the reliability, 
content and construct validity of the instrument was determined.  
 Content validity refers to the adequacy of the content of a measuring instrument 
and its relations to the established literature (Cronbach, 1971; Kerlinger, 1973). The 
coding categories for content analysis were developed through a careful review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature. In addition, pretest increased instrument validity by 
judging the relevance of each category to the properties of public diplomacy concept 
and improved intercoder reliability. A test study was conducted to fine-tune the coding 
categories and ensure their accuracy using a sample of 13 articles coded by three 
coders.  
 Construct validity is concerned with identifying whether the measures chosen 
are true constructs or simply artifacts of the chosen methodology (Campbell & Fiske, 
1959; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). In this case, constructs used in the study derived 
from extensive review of relevant literature, as well as previously conducted study on 
narrative formation, and therefore are not simple artifacts of the methodology.   
Data Analysis 
The content analysis results were analyzed using statistical software Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 24.0). The collected data were processed and 
analyzed using primarily descriptive statistics and cross tabulation, and non-parametric 
tests such as independent sample t-tests and bivariate correlation.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
The results of this dissertation are presented in four sections: narrative 
formation, narrative projection, narrative reception, and comparative analysis of 
strategic narratives across stages. The first section reports the results of the qualitative 
analysis of Russian foreign policy documents at the level of narrative formation 
conducted with the purpose to identify strategic narratives that Russia can potentially 
project and deploy. This was the most extensive and time-consuming study one, the 
results of which informed two others studies of this dissertation.  
The second section of this chapter reports the results of the content analysis 
conducted on Russian public diplomacy materials, specifically news stories from Russia 
Today and RIA Novosti, to discern the presence of strategic narratives of Russia, 
identified at the level of narrative formation. This analysis was conducted to capture the 
way strategic narratives manifested themselves during the process of projection. 
Specifically, the news stories were examined to identify the overall dominance of 
strategic narratives in relation to each other, the tone of the narrative, the salience of the 
narrative within a news story, the type of the narrative, the referenced soft power 
sources and the sources of information.  
The third section similarly reports the results of the content analysis conducted 
on media materials found in the discursive environment of the target state. Specifically, 
materials from the New York Times and the Washington Post were examined to 
determine whether any of the projected strategic narratives of Russia reached the 
discursive environment of the Untied States and how these narratives manifested 
themselves. 
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Finally, the fourth section presents the results of the comparative analysis of 
results across stages to identify patterns, similarities, and differences.  
Study One: Narrative Formation 
The first study examined the process of narrative formation. Antoniades et al. 
(2010) argued that the formation of strategic narratives has traditionally been a 
prerogative of political elites, those who set agendas and develop policies. Specifically, 
the formation of narratives occurs through deliberations among the political elites and 
through the choice of language to describe and construct a policy program (Schmidt, 
2002). Often, policies serve to define and embed narratives describing problems that 
should and can be addressed, and actions that should be taken and can be achieved 
(Roselle, 2006). 
At the narrative formation stage three foundational documents of the Russian 
foreign policy were analyzed to answer the first research question designed to explore 
the strategic narratives embedded in the guiding foreign policy documents of the 
Russian Federation. The three Russian foreign policy documents chosen for analysis 
represent a continuous effort by Russia to build a consistent foreign policy to be 
communicated to the world. The documents also represent a policy development (and 
by extension, narrative development) over time spanning four years (2010-2013). The 
document “Main Directions of the Cultural and Humanitarian Cooperation of the 
Russian Federation,” commonly known as Cultural Diplomacy Policy, was introduced 
in 2010. President’s Order for Foreign Policy Execution, outlining foreign policy 
priorities and directing the development of a new comprehensive Foreign Policy 
Doctrine, was introduced in 2012. The Russian president approved the new Foreign 
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Policy Doctrine in February 2013. These three documents served as primary sources for 
understanding a strategic narrative formation at the government level. Overall, utilizing 
open and axial coding, the analysis revealed five major strategic narratives of Russia: 1) 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation, 2) Russia’s stance on international 
relations issues, 3) Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and international 
relations, 4) Russian language promotion, 5) state support of Russian compatriots and 
Diasporas. In addition, one more outlier category that emerged from a single category 
was identified. The category appeared to be independent, emerging from a single source 
and did not overtly contribute to any of the narratives (See Table 9). 
Table 9. Final Categories 
 
Category Number of 
sources 
Number of 
text references 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
3 273 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 3 268 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 3 145 
Russian language promotion 3 31 
State support of Russian compatriots and Diasporas 3 26 
Soft power 1 7 
 
As Bohm (2004) explained, axial coding creates a structure with one category 
located at the center with a network of associated subcategories developed around it. 
These subcategories can be interpreted as elements that describe and comprise the 
category per se. In what follows, this section reports the results of the axial coding, 
describing and explaining the axes or subcategories along with the interpretive selective 
coding that glues together and explains the potential associations and connections 
between and among categories and subcategories.  
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Values and Priorities in Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations 
The largest emerged category covered issues of values, ideals, and priorities that 
guide Russian foreign policy and inform Russia’s decisions in international relations. 
Overall, characteristics of Russia’s foreign policy values and priorities were grouped 
into 11 subcategories: 1) ensuring Russian national interests, 2) major directions in 
Russian foreign policies, 3) peace, security, and stability, 4) democracy and human 
rights, 5) common value system, 6) sustainability, 7) equality, 8) modernization of 
Russia, 9) shaping world order, 10) maintaining Russia's spirituality, 11) regional 
integration and competitiveness.  
Through interpretation of textual references within these axial codes, categories 
were further interpreted and organized into subcategories. It can be argued that many of 
the characteristics of Russian foreign policy values and priorities could be potentially 
embedded in the narratives projected by Russian public diplomacy efforts. However, 
this narrative can be summarized as consisting of two essential and somewhat 
dependent elements that maybe regarded as both Russian foreign policy value and 
priority: international security and new world order. Based on the interpretation of 
categories, it appears that to Russia it is in its national interests to be an active player in 
ensuring international security and stability, yet the existing international collective 
security system might be exclusionary (a potential reference to NATO). Therefore, new 
multipolar and polycentric world order needs to be created to provide a deserving 
position to Russia. The structure of the narrative is visualized in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Structure of the Russian Foreign Policy Values and Priorities Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New World Order 
Not surprisingly, foundational foreign policy documents of the Russian 
Federation discussed goals, priorities and strategies in relation to Russia’s national 
interests, particularly, Russia’s interest in the area of international security. One of the 
guiding principles of the Russian foreign policy in relation to international security 
became the notion of shaping a new world order, in which Russia will get a deserving 
position. The Foreign Policy Conception 2013 dedicated an entire section to the subject 
under the priorities of the Russian Federation in solving global problems. The nature of 
the new world order rests on the idea that stable and sustainable international relations 
are only possible through the creation of an international system that is based on 
international law, principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in 
domestic affairs. Thus, Russian foreign policy is committed to ensuring the 
implementation of such system because it allows for safeguarding and guaranteeing the 
equal security of every member of the world community. To Russia, therefore, the new 
world order is multipolar and polycentric with international peace, security and stability 
as paramount principles. 
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International Peace and Security  
Through selective coding and interpretation of axes, Russia's concern for 
international security in relation to its geopolitical priorities was found to be a general 
thread. International security and Russia's role was treated as both the value that Russia 
is committed to, as well as its foreign policy priority. Often, the value of security was 
connected to international peace with Russia playing a pivotal role in ensuring the 
peace, security, and stability in the world. The documents stated that Russia carries a 
special responsibility to uphold the security and stability in the world following tenants 
and principles of international law. Further, Russia strives to extend its contributions to 
ensuring international peace and stability through development of a modern system of 
collective security where Russia would occupy a central role.   
To achieve international peace and stability, Russia must focus on protecting 
such values and principles as human rights and democracy, yet, importantly, not 
allowing double standards in applications of human rights principles. Notably, Russia 
sees itself as a special protector of basic human rights and freedoms based on moral 
principles, without their selective interpretation. Specifically, the Foreign Policy 
Conception (2013) states that Russia is “committed to universal democratic values, 
including ensuring human rights and freedoms and sees its purpose in seeking respect 
for human rights and freedoms worldwide” (p. 17, §39a) and that “Russia is fully aware 
of its special responsibility for maintaining security in the world” (p. 8, §26). In this 
regard, Russia prioritizes the build-up of its position in the world as alternative power, 
seeking respect and international recognition.  
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Another value of the Russian foreign policy connected to the issues of 
international security was the issue of sustainability and sustainable development. To 
Russia, sustainable social and economic development of partner countries is an essential 
element of the collective security system because collective security is dependent on the 
balance in the political and economic development of various regions. This is 
highlighted as one of Russia’s priorities in economic and environmental cooperation: 
“Russia views the sustainable socio-economic development of all countries as a 
necessary element of the modern collective security system” (Foreign Policy 
Conception, p. 17, §36). Regional economic and political integration in the network 
format presents a potential solution to ensuring sustainable development. Further, to 
address regional development misbalances, Russia is prepared to provide humanitarian 
cooperation and donor support. 
From the three foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation, it is clear 
that geopolitical priorities of the Russian Federation are rooted in its ability to maintain 
and develop its sphere of influence. Based on the number of mentions and context of 
those mentions, Russia prioritizes cooperation with the following partners based on 
their geopolitical location: 1) cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (n=40), 2) cooperation with Asia Pacific (n=26), 3) cooperation with the 
European Union (n=22), 4) cooperation with the United States (n=22), 5) cooperation 
with the United Nations (n=20), 6) cooperation through network diplomacy with INGOs 
(n=19) (examples: BRICS, ASEAN, Arab League), 7) cooperation with the Middle East 
(n=5). Obviously, the major foreign policy focus of the Russian Federation was placed 
on its immediate neighbors within the post-Soviet space and Asia. The Cultural 
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Diplomacy Conception (2012) states that “the development of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States is a 
priority of Russia…” (p. 13), the President’s Order for Foreign Policy Execution (2012) 
similarly prioritizes CIS, by explaining the Policy needs “to consider the development 
of multilateral interaction and integration processes the Commonwealth of Independent 
States space as a key direction of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” (p. 2, 
§1d). The focus on this geopolitical region could be explained by shared geography, 
history, and values, allowing for the creation of a potential sphere of influence. These 
geopolitical priorities also indicate where and with which partners Russia can build a 
system of common values, such as freedoms and responsibilities, honesty, mercy, and 
diligence. 
International Cultural-Humanitarian Cooperation  
This category consisted of 12 axial codes, describing different aspects of the 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation and how it can be reflected and 
described in the projected narratives. These subcategories were: 1) cultural diplomacy, 
2) priorities of cultural-humanitarian cooperation (ICHC), 3) characteristics of Russian 
culture, 4) intercultural dialogue as a tool, 5) cooperation with NGOs and nonprofits, 6) 
structure and execution of Russia’s ICHC, 7) image and reputation of Russia, 8) 
cooperation in education, 9) Russia’s cultural influence, 10) tourism promotion, 11) 
preserving Russian history, and 12) public diplomacy.  
Further interpretation of textual references and axial codes, presented below, 
allowed explaining what the structure of the narrative on international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation would look like (see Figure 10). Many of these characteristics 
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of international cultural-humanitarian cooperation could be potentially embedded in the 
narratives projected by Russian public diplomacy efforts. To summarize, the 
overarching narrative related to this category comprises of stressing the uniqueness of 
Russian culture and the opportunities that it provides for improving the image and 
reputation of Russia in the world. This notion can be broken down into several sub-
narratives related to Russian culture, Russian history, Russian education, and tourism as 
well as intercultural dialogue. 
Figure 10. Structure of International Cultural-Humanitarian Cooperation Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First of all, it became apparent that political elites through their choice of words 
and policies to describe international cultural-humanitarian cooperation stressed the 
uniqueness of the Russian culture and Russian cultural potential due to the historical 
development of the country. Due to this unique position of Russian culture and Russian 
historical development, Russia has ascribed a special role in its ability to facilitate 
intercultural and intercivilizational dialogue. Yet, to protect its presumably unique 
position, Russia aspires to fight against what it calls history falsification that is basically 
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an anti-Russian propaganda. To allow for a first-hand experience with the Russian 
culture and Russian people with the purpose of swaying their opinions, the Russian 
government is prepared to encourage export of Russian education and cultivate the 
image of Russia as a tourist destination to entice foreign visitors to visit Russia.  
Humanitarian and Cultural Cooperation 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation emerged as a major theme 
throughout the analysis. The term alone was used 46 times across all analyzed 
documents. The term, often used in official Russian documents, is an umbrella term that 
covers a variety of concepts ranging from cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy to 
relief efforts to tourism promotion. The phrase "international cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation" often appeared in texts in relation to such words as "policy," "foreign 
policy strategy," "cultural relations," "public diplomacy," "mutually beneficial," and 
"intercultural dialogue" among others.  
The international cultural-humanitarian cooperation narrative can be thought of 
as a strategy of Russia to wield cultural influence and create a favorable image of 
Russia in the world. As a strategy, Russia uses cultural and humanitarian cooperation to 
deploy its spiritual and cultural potential with the purpose of increasing friendly 
relations with foreign nations, neutralizing anti-Russian political and ideological 
sentiments, and strengthening Russia’s international reputation. The international 
cultural-humanitarian cooperation first and foremost focuses on increasing the Russian 
cultural presence in foreign countries, as well as the foreign cultural presence in Russia, 
and contributes to the affirmation of Russia’s position on the world stage.  
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As highlighted in the Cultural Diplomacy Conception 2010, mutually beneficial 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation can increase the effectiveness and 
significantly contribute to the achievement of fundamental goals of Russia's foreign 
policy. Treated as a tool to influence perceptions in the world, the main purpose of the 
cultural-humanitarian cooperation as a foreign policy strategy is the creation and 
maintenance of a positive image of Russia by highlighting its achievements in culture, 
education, science, sports, civil society, and participation in the assistance programs to 
developing countries. These elements constitute some of the main attributes of the 
category highlighted through analysis.  
One of the major characteristics, which can also be considered a distinct 
strategy, of the international cultural-humanitarian cooperation, was cultural diplomacy, 
extensively discussed in the Cultural Diplomacy Conception (2010), “Using specific 
forms and methods of influencing public opinion, cultural diplomacy unlike any other 
instrument of ‘soft power’ can strengthen the international authority of the country, to 
serve as a convincing evidence of the revival of the Russian Federation as a free and 
democratic state” (p. 3). While this subcategory belongs under the umbrella of cultural-
humanitarian cooperation, it also has its own features. In a way, this subcategory 
exemplified Russia’s view on cultural diplomacy. These components included cultural 
collaboration, exchanges, international broadcasting, and collaboration in sports. In 
addition, the culture was treated as marketable goods, and cultural diplomacy was 
ascribed a special role in foreign policy that can help counteract the containment policy: 
“cultural diplomacy acquires special importance in the context of [Russia’s] efforts to 
counteract a propaganda campaign aimed at Russia’s ‘containment’”(p. 3). Based on the 
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analysis, cultural diplomacy is interpreted here as a concept that is closer in meaning to 
the U.S. concept of public diplomacy. Yet, such tactics as cultural exchanges, youth 
exchanges, educational exchanges, professional exchanges, artistic exchanges, TV and 
radio exchanges, and exchanges of cultural years were all attributed to cultural 
diplomacy. Similarly, international broadcasting and sports diplomacy also emerged as 
subcategories of cultural diplomacy. 
In comparison, the term "public diplomacy" was used exclusively in relations to 
foreign policy and referred to as a function of foreign policy with a limited description 
or examples of tactics. The Foreign Policy Conception described Russia’s public 
diplomacy efforts as following:   
As part of public diplomacy, Russia will seek an objective perception of itself in 
the world, develop its own effective means of informational influence on public 
opinion abroad, ensure the strengthening of the Russian mass media positions in 
the global information space, by providing them with the necessary state support 
(p. 20, §41).  
The difference in approaches to cultural and public diplomacy became evident 
as a result of source comparison. As one can see from Figure 11, cultural diplomacy as 
a term has been found across all documents, where public diplomacy was found only in 
the Foreign Policy Conception and the President's order. As such, public diplomacy can 
be treated mostly as a foreign policy instrument and a resource designed to increase the 
effectiveness of Russian foreign policy. 
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Figure 11. Comparison Diagram Between Public Diplomacy Node and Cultural 
Diplomacy Node  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian Culture 
Because, per description, cultural and humanitarian cooperation incorporates the 
relations in the field of culture and art, science and education, mass media, youth 
exchanges, museum cooperation, library and archives, sports and tourism, many of 
these fields emerged as integral characteristics of it. First, Russian culture was identified 
as the cornerstone feature of the cultural and humanitarian cooperation, capable of 
competing with others, as in "competition of cultures." To Russia, the Russian culture is 
unique in its position among other world cultures due to the accumulated rich spiritual 
and cultural heritage. In other words, by expressing a spiritual identity of the nation, the 
Russian culture simultaneously embodies the universal values of an entire world and 
also contributes to the global cultural and historical heritage. As such, Russian culture 
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in the foreign policy is envisioned as unique, with significant spiritual potential, 
originating from a multinational and multiconfessional state, and capable of offering 
universal values. At the same time, due to the peculiarities of historical development, 
Russian culture can be distinguished from others by its openness and understanding 
toward other cultures and nations.   
A closely aligned feature of the Russian culture is the Russian language. During 
the analysis, the Russian language has emerged as another important and distinct 
strategy of the Russian foreign policy. The Cultural Diplomacy Conception declared the 
Russian language as a major tool for improving Russia's image and stated that the main 
efforts in the field of international cultural and humanitarian cooperation should be 
focused on supporting and popularizing the Russian language in the foreign states. For 
this reason, the Russian language will be discussed as a separate narrative category. 
Intercultural Dialogue 
In addition, international cultural and humanitarian cooperation was conceived 
as a means of establishing an intercultural dialogue that would ensure mutual 
understanding among people and nations, paying particular attention to the dialogue of 
religions. In this regard, Russia also sees its special mission in brokering the 
intercultural dialogue because being a "multinational and multi-confessional state, 
having centuries-old experience of harmonious coexistence of representatives of 
different peoples, ethnic groups and faiths" (Foreign Policy Conception, 2013, p. 7) 
helps Russia promote dialogue and partnership between cultures, religions, and 
civilizations, including through United Nations and other intergovernmental 
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organizations. Importantly, Russia supports the intercultural dialogue in bilateral and 
multilateral formats and ascribes a special role in it to the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Russian Education 
An important aspect of the cultural-humanitarian cooperation from the Russia's 
perspective is the inclusion of Russia into the international educational space. Russia 
has been historically proud of its classic education model that produced many world-
renowned scientists, Nobel Prize winners, writers, and public figures. Therefore, to 
Russia export of the Russian educational services became one of the tasks for its foreign 
policy. In addition, as part of its focus on the Russian education export, Russia strives 
for the unification of educational norms and standards in order to allow for recognition 
of Russian degrees and diplomas documents in other countries. 
The Russian government in its foreign policy documents highlights the 
importance of promoting Russian education system and higher education institutions 
and envisions the expansion of the foreign specialists training in Russian educational 
institutions. Per policy, Russia is ready to allocate government scholarships for the 
purpose of attracting foreign students and increasing the attractiveness of education in 
the Russian Federation as a whole. Similar to educational exchanges programs, offered 
by other countries, the international cultural-humanitarian cooperation policy 
emphasizes collaboration with graduates of Russian universities, who often make up the 
political and intellectual elite of the foreign states, thus helping to build friendly 
relations with Russia. 
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Russian History 
Special attention in the promotion and popularization of the Russian culture and 
improving the image of Russia was devoted to Russian history. Notably, foreign policy 
documents refer to Russian history and its preservation as the task of national 
importance. Specifically, the Russian government is anxious about the potential re-
writing and intentional falsification of historical events to feed the anti-Russian 
propaganda in favor of political needs. As such, Russian government aims to encourage 
scientists and researchers to work on joint preparation of textbooks and teaching aids in 
order to ensure an objective representation of the Russian history.    
In addition, the preservation and popularization of cultural monuments and 
historical Russian heritage sites abroad (such as burials of Russian soldiers) are elevated 
to the level of national importance to memorialize Russia's historical ties with foreign 
countries with the purpose of protecting the Russian history. Further, to promote the 
Russian history, special events to celebrate memorable dates of Russian history abroad 
must be organized.  
Russian Tourism  
Tourism as one of the subcategories emerged in relation to the notion of 
promoting mutual understanding between nations under the international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation. Specifically, Cultural Diplomacy Conception 2010 ascribes 
an important role to Russian tourism as a tool in establishing mutual understanding 
between people of different countries and forming an objective view of their lives, 
traditions, and customs. Specifically, the policy encourages the expansion of Russia's 
participation in international tourist exchanges, admitting more and more foreign 
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tourists to the Russian Federation. To Russia, tourism can be a first-hand experience 
with Russian culture and Russian people, thus fostering tolerance and respect for the 
diversity of national, cultural, religious and moral beliefs.  
Specifically, per policy, Russia should deliberately work on attracting foreign 
tourists to Russia, as due to its landscape and climatic diversity Russia has every 
opportunity to become a leading tourist power. For this purpose, informational 
assistance abroad can be helpful in informing potential foreign tourists about the 
tourism opportunities of Russia, including through participation in international tourist 
exhibitions abroad, and the presentation of Russia as a tourist destination. 
Russian Language  
This category aggregated descriptions of strategies and justification for the need 
of the Russian language promotion. It is comprised of the following subcategories: 1) 
state support for the Russian-language media abroad, 2) supporting Russian language 
art and culture abroad, 3) cooperation with celebrities and public figures, 4) Russian 
language as the language of international communication, 5) discrimination against the 
Russian language abroad.  
Further interpretation of axial codes revealed that, overall, the discourse 
surrounding the narrative of Russian language promotion is organized around three 
topics: 1) the importance of the Russian language as a tool for social and political 
influence and Eurasian integration; 2) the importance of investment in Russian-
language media abroad to deliver cultural products of Russia; and 3) the protection of 
the Russian language against discrimination among the Russian-speaking communities 
in the foreign countries.  
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   The narrative of the Russian language promotion can be summarized then as 
the need to preserve the cultural and historical heritage of the Russian people, their 
identity and traditions, and most importantly the Russian language among the Russian-
speaking communities of the world. Figure 12 visualizes narrative structure   
Figure 12. Structure of the Russian Language Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian Language  
Russian language has been identified as one of the central topics of the 
conversation and the phrase was mentioned in all documents 43 times. Along with 
culture, the Russian language emerged as the central element of Russia's strategic 
cultural-humanitarian cooperation and an integral part of the Russian foreign policy, 
especially in relation to the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception 2010 dedicated significant attention to the promotion and popularization of 
the Russian language and culture of numerous ethnicities found in Russia as an 
important contribution to the diversity of modern civilization. 
Specifically, the discussion of the Russian language in the documents was 
frequently tied to the need for Russian language promotion, the Russian language 
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spread beyond the traditional geographic areas, and strengthening the positions of the 
Russian language in the historically Russian-speaking regions: “One of the priority 
activities is the preservation, strengthening, development and dissemination of the 
Russian language as the most important means of integration of the CIS member states” 
(Cultural Diplomacy Conception, 2010, p. 8).  
The analyzed documents offered many strategies by which to promote the 
Russian language, ranging from the study of the Russian language abroad to preparation 
of Russian language teachers. These strategies covered cooperation and cultural 
partnerships between cultural institutions, associations of artists and well-known 
individual personalities. Further, the support and creative assistance to the theaters with 
Russian-speaking crews help with the promotion of the Russian language. To strengthen 
the positions of the Russian language in the world, it is equally important to ensure the 
status of the Russian language as the working language of the United Nations and the 
language of international communication between cultures and nations. 
Importantly, the Russian language is treated in the documents as a tool of social 
and political influence in the far and near abroad, capable of delivering favorable 
outcomes to the Russian foreign policy needs. Specifically, the Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception (2010) prioritized the Russian language by stating that “The Russian 
language should remain the most important tool for familiarizing other peoples with 
Russian and world culture, which is a considerable factor in shaping positive 
perceptions of Russia in the world” (p. 8). 
The description of the Russian language as a foreign policy tool, emerged from 
the analysis of documents, stresses the Russian language as an important tool for 
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familiarizing people of the world with the Russian culture, history and its political 
traditions that can serve as a significant factor in shaping positive perceptions of Russia 
by the world community. Through the Russian language, a single cultural, educational 
and informational space can be created to satisfy the needs of Russian foreign policy, 
which explains the emphasis on the Russian language media in the foreign policy 
doctrine.  
Russian Language Media  
The analysis indicated that the increased state support of the media outlets that 
contribute to the popularization of the Russian culture and Russian language abroad as 
well as providing information support for various Russian cultural events is an 
important aspect of the Russian language promotion. In particular, the support for the 
broadcasting of Russian TV channels abroad, creation and operation of the satellite 
broadcasting systems in Russian, and distribution of the Russian press and Internet 
media abroad directed toward foreign audiences have been listed as strategies to assist 
in Russian language preservation and dissemination. As such, Russia sees the Russian-
language television and radio that promote the Russian language and culture as conduits 
in the formation of a positive image of Russia in foreign countries.  
Russian Language Discrimination 
Another element emerged as an integral part of Russian language promotion was 
the issue of infringement on Russian language in the historically Russian-speaking 
regions, according to the analyzed documents. Notably, while the conception advocates 
the promotion of heritage of all diverse ethnic cultures and languages of the Russian 
Federation, Russian language is prioritized and elevated to the level of a strategic 
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foreign policy interest of Russia. Moreover, the document politicizes the use of Russian 
language by suggesting, “it is necessary to appropriately resist any attempts of 
infringement or discrimination against the Russian language abroad” (Cultural 
Diplomacy Conception, 2010, p. 9).  
Overall, across all examined foreign policy document of Russia, the Russian 
language is described as the staple of the Russian cultural-humanitarian strategy and as 
the most important means for socio-political integration across the Post-Soviet space. 
Therefore, protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population of foreign states in 
the cultural, linguistic, educational and information spheres becomes an important 
foreign policy priority of Russia. The issue of Russian language discrimination, thus, 
brings the discussion to another narrative identified through analysis.  
Russian Compatriots and Russian Diasporas 
This category describes concerns and approaches to maintain social and political 
influence by supporting Russian compatriots, Russian citizens and Russian Diasporas in 
foreign countries. Overall, eight subcategories emerged to explicate the meaning of the 
category per se. These subcategories are: 1) rights of Russian compatriots, 2) rights of 
Russian speakers abroad, 3) support of Russian citizens abroad, 4) support of Russian-
born children abroad, 5) support of Slavic organizations, 6) access to Russian culture 
and media, 7) cooperation with Russian compatriots and diasporas, 8) cooperation with 
the Russian World.  
As with other narratives, further interpretation of axial codes allowed to deduce 
narrative structure while pinpointing its essential characteristics. Many of the 
characteristics of the category describing Russian compatriots and Russian Diasporas 
 164 
could be potentially embedded in the narratives projected by Russian public diplomacy 
efforts (see narrative structure, Figure 13). First, the discussion of Russian Diasporas 
and Russian compatriots abroad is often related to the issue of rights and freedoms of 
the Russian-speaking communities, including rights of the Russian-born children 
adopted abroad. Second, Russian compatriots and Diasporas collectively are described 
as part the Russian World – a space for historically spread out people of Russia. To 
summarize, the overarching narrative related to this category highlights the importance 
of Russian speakers within the socio-political and cultural space described as Russian 
world to Russian foreign policy and therefore can be treated as a potentially dominating 
narrative emanating from the Russian government and through its public diplomacy 
means.  
Figure 13. Structure of the Russian Compatriots Narrative 
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Rights of Russians 
The important thread in the Russian foreign policy documents, relevant to the 
discussion of Russian compatriots and Russian Diasporas, was the issue of rights and 
freedoms of Russian citizen and Russian compatriots living abroad, as well as Russian 
Diasporas, including the right to speak Russian. All three documents outlined the need 
for providing systematic and comprehensive support to Russian compatriots, protecting 
the rights of Russian citizens permanently residing abroad and the rights of the Russian-
speaking population. To provide a comprehensive protection of the rights, freedoms and 
legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots, the documents suggested 
developing legal and political approaches. Further rights of Russians and Russian-
speakers were treated as basic human rights that need defending in various international 
formats. This includes a recommendation to develop foreign policies toward countries 
with the Russian-speaking population based on their treatment of the rights of Russian 
citizens and compatriots residing in this country. Specific reference in this regard was 
made toward the Baltic States where Russian government should take into account the 
problems of observing the rights of the Russian-speaking population.  
Notably, rights of Russian compatriots and Russian Diasporas are often referred 
to the right to speak Russian language and to practice Russian culture. As such, forging 
close ties with Russian Diasporas abroad in the field of culture, education, information 
and other spheres of humanitarian interaction is an important foreign policy focus for 
the purpose of preserving the Russian language and maintaining the Russian cultural 
influence over the Russian-speaking population of the foreign countries. To do so, the 
policies recommend providing access to Russian television and radio channels, organize 
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performances of Russian artists and cultural figures, hold creative competitions and 
festivals, and also provide compatriots an opportunity to participate in similar events at 
the regional and international levels. Further, it is suggested to position Russia as the 
main educational center of the Commonwealth of Independent States by providing state 
scholarships to young people from the CIS countries.  
Russian-born children 
Russian-born children are treated as part of the Russian compatriots and 
therefore fall under the protection of the Russian government. Russian-born children 
adopted abroad were the only type of Russian compatriots that received special 
attention in the Russian foreign policy documents. Specifically, the documents 
advocated for special attention to building a solid legal framework for effectively 
protecting the rights and interests of Russian-born children adopted abroad, including 
the ratification of relevant intergovernmental agreements and the appropriate legislation 
of the Russian Federation governing the issue. The Foreign Policy Conception (2013) 
outlined the need “to expand the legal framework for international cooperation with a 
purpose of improving the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian 
children living abroad” (p. 19, §39n).  
Russian World (Russkiy Mir) 
Notably, Russia considers the multimillion Russian diaspora and Russian 
compatriots abroad to constitute the Russian world (Russkiy Mir). The Russian World 
in its broad sense is described as a partner in the expansion and strengthening the 
positions of the Russian language and culture. To strengthen the Russian cultural 
presence in the CIS countries the foreign policy documents outline and encourage 
 167 
strategies to engage with the Russian Diasporas and associations of compatriots in every 
possible way, including through the Forum of Slavic Cultures and other nonprofit 
organizations. Further, the Russian World is considered as a partner when it comes to 
protecting the rights and interests of compatriots living abroad on the basis of 
international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation. The consolidation 
of compatriots' organizations under the Russian World is important in order to more 
adequately ensure their rights in their countries of residence and to preserve the 
ethnocultural identity of the Russian diaspora and its links with the historical homeland.  
Russia’s Stances on International Relations Issues 
This category represents a set of Russian statements and official position 
regarding international relations norms, issues, and challenges. This category also 
summarizes the approach and philosophy behind certain foreign policy decisions and 
strategy choice. Overall, the researcher identified 11 political stances of Russia, 
including 1) political solutions to conflicts, 2) supporting the role of UN, 3) the rule of 
law in international relations, 4) non-interfering in sovereign states affairs, 5) shaping 
up a polycentric international system, 6) collaboration on ecologic security and climate 
change, 7) nuclear power issues, 8) Russia’s role in relations to international human 
rights, 9) economic interdependence, 10) militarism, and 11) challenges in international 
relations according to Russia.   
While the characteristics of the category describing Russia's stances on 
international relations issues were many, yet four clearly stood out due to their 
interconnectedness and salience. The structure of the narrative demonstrates that, first, 
Russia has expressed its adherence to the principles of non-interference in the domestic 
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affairs of states. Second, based on this principle, Russia sees a non-alternative to 
political solutions to conflicts (see Figure 14). In other words, military interference to 
solve a crisis or a conflict is not a good solution to Russia. Third, these strong stances 
on non-interference and political solutions to conflicts are rooted in Russia's 
commitment to uphold international law and promote Rule of Law in international 
relations. Fourth, Russia sees United Nations as the legitimate organization that 
oversees and governs international relations based on international law.   
Figure 14. Structure of the Russia’s Stances on International Relations Issues Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Solutions to Conflicts  
One of the major foreign policy stances emerged from the analysis was Russia's 
insistence on political solutions to conflicts. Specifically, the analyzed foreign policy 
documents emphasized: "the non-alternative politico-diplomatic settlement of regional 
conflicts on the basis of collective actions of the international community by involving 
 169 
all interested parties in the negotiations" (Foreign Policy Conception, 2013, p. 10, 
§32q). 
As an illustration of this position, the documents provided examples of Russian 
view to solving the situation around the Iranian nuclear program through dialogue on 
the basis of reciprocity and strict compliance with the requirements of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Further, the political solution must also be applied to such frozen 
conflicts as the one in Transnistria 1with respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
neutral status of the Republic of Moldova.  
In addition, as an example of a political solution, the Republic of Abkhazia and 
the Republic of South Ossetia should be treated and promoted as modern democratic 
states. Same principles must be applied to overcoming the intra-state crises in the 
Middle East and North Africa by stopping violence and holding a dialogue, with respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those states.  
The justification for non-negotiable position on political solutions stems from 
the fact that it is impossible, according to Russia, to solve modern conflicts using power 
and that the solution should be sought through the involvement of all parties in the 
dialogue, not through their isolation. The discourse surrounding this narrative of 
political solutions to conflicts stresses this specific Russian position to find a settlement 
to the disagreements by political and diplomatic means, with strict observance of the 
fundamental principles of international law. 
                                                
1 Transnisria is a secessionist country that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is 
considered a frozen conflict by Russia between the Republic of Moldova and the Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic (Transnistria). For more information, see Popescu (2006) and Blakkisrud and Kolsto 
(2011).  
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Rule of Law in International Relations 
Interestingly, the Russian foreign policy documents underscored another clear 
stance of the Russian Federation on the importance of Rule of Law in international 
relations. The basic narrative of this position is that Russia consistently stands for 
strengthening the legal framework in international relations and faithfully observes 
international legal obligations. In fact, ensuring the international legal system is one of 
the priorities for Russia's work in international relations, because the rule of law in 
international relations is designed to ensure the peaceful and fruitful cooperation of 
states while balancing their interests and guaranteeing the stability of the world 
community as a whole. 
To Russia, international law is an opportunity to leverage its position within the 
UN and the UN Security Council for the purpose of achieving its national interests and 
foreign policy goals. Specifically, through international law, Russia tries to counteract 
the attempts of "individual states or groups of states to revise the universally recognized 
norms of international law reflected in universal documents" (Foreign Policy 
Conception, 2013). As much as Russia seems to be supporting the rule of law, it equally 
strongly opposes any arbitrary interpretations of international legal norms and 
principles, such as the non-use of force or the threat of force, the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes, respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, 
the right of peoples to self-determination. Russia considers such interpretations 
"creative" and "dangerous" (p. 10) This position is perfectly summarized in this 
narrative: "It is unacceptable to implement military interventions and other forms of 
outside interference that undermine the foundations of international law under the 
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pretext of ‘responsibility to protect'" (Foreign Policy Conception, 2013, p. 10, §31b). 
Specifically, Russia expects that the United States will be strictly guided by the norms 
of international law, primarily the UN Charter, including the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
To ensure the rule of international relations, Russia ascribes a special role to the 
United Nations, believing that any progressive development of international law should 
be primarily carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.   
Supporting the Role of United Nations 
Through analysis of the documents, it became clear that Russia devotes a central 
role to the United Nations (UN) in world affairs. To Russia, current global challenges 
and threats often require an adequate response and joint efforts of the international 
community under the central coordinating role of the United Nations, taking into 
account the independence in the matters of security, sustainable development, and 
human rights. 
Russia's narrative on the role of the United Nations in international relations 
rests on the notion that the United Nations should remain at the heart of regulating 
international relations. To ensure the supremacy of international law, it is important to 
maintain the inviolability of the UN Charter's key provisions and principles. 
Specifically, it is important to preserve and strengthen Russia's position within the UN 
Security Council and to expand the contribution of the Russian Federation to UN 
peacekeeping operations. Further, UN Charter mandates the development of friendly 
relations between states on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and the principle of non-interference. 
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Non-Interference 
Another clear stance of the Russian Federation on the issue of international 
relations is the support for the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs. As a 
narrative, this position is reflected in Russia pursuance of a policy aimed at creating a 
stable system of international relations based on international law and the principles of 
equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Such a system 
is designed to ensure reliable and equal security for every member of the world 
community in the political, military, economic, information, humanitarian and other 
fields. 
Summary 
Overall, five major narratives emerged through analysis of the three 
foundational foreign policy documents of Russia. The analysis revealed narrative 
structure and indicated that these narratives received different degree of attention within 
foundational Russian foreign policy documents. The number of coded text references 
for each narrative allowed gauging narrative dominance at the level of narrative 
formation. Table 10 lists five potential narratives of Russia in a descending order.  
Table 10. Narrative Dominance at the Level of Formation 
 
Category N of text 
references 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
273 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 268 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 145 
Russian language promotion 31 
State support of Russian compatriots and Diasporas 26 
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In sum, Russian values and priorities narrative appeared to dominate at the level 
of narrative formation, followed closely by the international cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation narrative. Russia’s official positions on international relations issues was 
third most dominant narrative within narrative formation stage, followed by the Russian 
language narrative. The least prominent narrative at the level of formation was the 
Russian compatriots narrative. Assuming that the identified narratives are important to 
the Russian political agenda on the international arena, these narratives and their 
elements have the potential to be projected on to the target audience.  
Table 11. Finalized Narratives and Narrative Characteristics 
 
Narrative Keywords 
Russian values in FP International peace and security 
World order + Russia 
 
International Cultural-
Humanitarian Cooperation 
Russian culture 
Russian culture 
Intercultural dialogue 
International cultural cooperation 
Humanitarian cooperation 
Russian education 
Russian tourism 
Russian history 
 
Russia’s stances in 
international relations 
Political solutions to conflicts 
Supporting the role of UN 
Rule of law + Russia + international 
relations 
Non-interference 
 
Russian language promotion Russian language 
Russian language discrimination 
Russian language media 
 
Russian compatriots Rights of Russians 
Russian World 
Russian-born children 
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Table 11 presents a list of finalized strategic narratives of Russia, identified 
from analyzing Russian foreign policy documents along with narrative frames that are 
also used as keywords in other two studies. These keywords were suggested based on 
the assumption that critical description of the narrative’s patterns, characteristics and 
elements are not easily captured. Therefore, as suggested by Stevens (2012, also see 
Miller & Riechert, 2001; von Gorp, 2007), axial characteristics can be treated as frames. 
However, it is important to remember that using frames as characteristics of the 
narratives may have oversimplified the complexity of the narrative, yet allowed 
capturing the manifest characteristics of the narratives, that can be used in further 
analysis of these narratives at the level of narrative projection and narrative reception.  
The next section of this chapter presents results of the examination of strategic 
narrative at the level of narrative projection.   
Study Two: Narrative Projection 
The second study explored the process of strategic narrative projection. 
According to Miskimmon et al. (2014), the projection of a narrative can occur through 
both mediated and non-mediated communication. Mediated strategic narratives are 
projected via media, and as conceptualize in this study, often are projected via public 
diplomacy means namely international broadcasting. Therefore, at the level of narrative 
projection, this dissertation strives to answer two research questions: What strategic 
narratives are embedded in Russia’s public diplomacy efforts and what sources of soft 
power are being referenced most frequently within the projected strategic narratives of 
Russia.  
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To answer these two research questions, a content analysis of media materials 
was conducted to identify the projected strategic narratives and referenced soft power 
sources. Specifically, media articles from two major Russian public diplomacy media 
outlets RIA Novosti (Sputnik) and Russia Today (RT) were analyzed. These articles 
reflected the identified in the previous section strategic narratives of Russia. The 
examination of the narrative projection covered the period from January 1, 2013, 
through December 31, 2014. 
Research question 2a: Strategic narratives projection and their manifestation 
Overall, 682 articles from RIA Novosti and 85 articles from Russia Today were 
analyzed. There was a significant growth in the number of articles containing the 
projected narratives between 2013 and 2014 (see Table 12). For RIA Novosti the 
increase constituted 48 %, and for Russia Today the coverage increased by 76.5%.  
Table 12. Number of News Articles Containing Projected Strategic Narratives of 
Russia by Year and Source. 
Narrative RIA Novosti Russia Today 
2013 2014 2013 2014 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 95 100 7 13 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 12 48 4 12 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
17 67 1 2 
Russian language promotion 85 173 2 10 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 23 62 6 28 
Total 232 450 20 65 
 
Overall, 767 articles from Russia Today and RIA Novosti (Sputnik) were 
analyzed covering 24 months. There was a significant observable spike in articles 
containing projected narratives between 2013 (N=252) and 2014 (N=515). However, 
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two narrative themes dominated the most. First, Russian language promotion has 
emerged as the dominating narrative (N=271), with 87 articles in 2013 and 184 articles 
in 2014. Second, stories associated with the international cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation of Russia narrative were equally abundant (N=215), with 102 articles in 
2013 and 113 articles in 2014 (See Table 13). Also, the narrative on Russian 
compatriots was quite prominent as well (N=119), with 30 articles in 2013 and 89 
articles in 2014. 
 The least salient narrative in the Russian public diplomacy materials was the 
narrative explaining Russia’s position on international relations issues (N=76), with 
only 15 article in 2013 and 61 in 2014. This narrative was preceded in frequency by the 
narrative covering Russian values and priorities in international relations and foreign 
policy (N=86), with 18 articles in 2013 and 68 articles in 2014.  
Table 13. Cumulative Number of Articles Containing Projected Narratives in 
RIA Novosti and Russia Today by Year  
Narrative 2013 
N 
2014 
N 
Total 
N 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
18 68 86 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 102 113 215 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 15 61 76 
Russian language promotion 87 184 271 
State support of Russian compatriots and Diasporas 30 89 119 
Total: 252 515 767 
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Figure 15. Line Chart Depicting Narrative Dominance by Month in Russia 
Today and RIA Novosti (2013-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The narrative projection over 24 studied months was not equally spread out, 
with certain narratives emphasized more than others during certain times. As one can 
see from Graph 15, the dominating narrative on international cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation was the only narrative equally present throughout the whole period. The 
stories on Russian language promotion and Russian compatriots significantly spiked 
during the first part (March, April, May, and June) of 2014, whereas stories on Russia’s 
values and priorities on international relations as well as Russia’s position on various 
international relations issues spiked during the second part of the year (See Graph 15).  
Similar observations were made regarding narrative density during a given 
month. Specifically, density is well visualized through the area charts that depict a time-
series relationship. Graph 16 visualizes part-to-whole relationships helping to 
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demonstrate how each narrative category contributes to the cumulative total across all 
projected narratives investigated in this study. As evident from an area chart, in terms of 
volume or narrative dominance, Russian language and international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation narratives lead the media coverage by Russian international 
broadcasters Russia Today and RIA Novosti. Further, it appears that at any given time, 
the narrative discourse on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation was present 
in the Russian public diplomacy repertoire. At the same time, narratives on Russian 
official position on international relations issues and Russian values in foreign policy 
appeared to be gaining prominence only during a specific time period, perhaps 
indicating a time-bound need for them. 
 Figure 16. Area Chart Depicting Narrative Volume by Month in Russia Today 
and RIA Novosti (2013-2014) 
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Importantly, speakers for the narrative or sources of information in public 
diplomacy materials varied across narratives (see Table 14). However, Russian 
government officials or representatives of a government agency dominated the majority 
of narratives. Specifically, Russian government’s sources dominated narrative 
discussions on Russian compatriots and Russian Diaspora (66.4%), Russia's stances on 
international relations issues (59.2%), Russian values and priorities in foreign policy 
(46.5%), international cultural-humanitarian cooperation (43% of all news stories), and 
Russian language promotion (34.3%). 
The second most frequent source in the identified narratives was the non-
Russian government officials, such as representatives of other governments such as the 
U.S. government officials or government officials of any other country. The non-
Russian government sources preoccupied the narrative discourse on Russian values and 
priorities in foreign policy (n=24, 27.9%), Russian language promotion (n=73, 26.9%), 
Russia’s stances on international relations issues (n=20, 59.2%), international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation (n=19, 8.8%), and Russian compatriots and Russian Diaspora 
(n=10, 8.4%).  
The Russian language promotion narrative was the only one that utilized all ten 
types of information sources used in the study (see Table 14). Further, such sources as 
Russian public figures (n=58), non-Russian publics figures (n=28), non-Russian non-
governmental organizations (n=23) and other Russian sources (n=87) that were not 
provided proper attribution in the news articles were well represented across all five 
projected narratives.  
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Table 14. Cross-Tabulation Between Projected Strategic Narratives and 
Information Sources (speakers) 
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In addition to looking into general characteristics of the projected narratives and 
sources of information speaking on behalf of the narrative, it was important to explore 
whether the narratives were manifested in a positive, neutral or negative way and 
whether there is any connection between tone of the narrative and level of narrative 
salience within a news story. Overall, most news articles displayed a neutral tone 
(n=375) in the discussion of narratives. There were 218 articles that favored the 
projected narrative and 174 that disfavored them. In terms of narrative salience within 
the news article, most articles dedicated negligible (n=284) to moderate attention to the 
narratives (n=253). There were 219 articles that allocated significant attention to the 
identified projected narratives (see Table 15).        
Table 15. Tone of Articles Containing Projected Narratives in RIA Novosti and 
Russia Today (frequencies)  
 
Narrative Unfavorable 
tone 
Neutral 
tone 
Favorable 
tone 
Total 
N 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 46 89 80 215 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 25 20 21 76 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy 
and international relations 32 21 33 86 
Russian language promotion 27 216 28 271 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 44 29 46 119 
 
A correlation analysis was performed to examine the connection between the 
tone of the narrative and the level of salience of this narrative within a news story with 
identified projected narrative. The analysis showed that a more favorable tone toward 
the embedded narrative (r = .127, p ≤ 0.00) is significantly positively correlated with 
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the higher level of salience of that narrative within a news story that represents strategic 
public diplomacy efforts.  
To answer the research question 2(a) about strategic narratives that are 
embedded in Russia’s public diplomacy efforts and projected via two main English-
language international media outlets Russia Today and RIA Novosti, this section 
explored the dominating narratives, their tone, and volume over the span of 24 months 
(2013-2014). In summary, all five narratives identified during the stage of narrative 
formation appeared to be projected by Russia onto the English-speaking countries. The 
most present narrative throughout the studied period was the narrative covering issues 
related to international cultural-humanitarian cooperation (N=215). This narrative was 
mostly discussed in neutral or favorable terms.  
The most dominant narrative during the studied period was the narrative of the 
Russian language promotion (N=271). Importantly, this narrative experienced the 
greatest growth in attention between 2013 and 2014 and was mostly discussed in a 
neutral way. The third prominent narrative that was clearly projected via Russian public 
diplomacy efforts was the narrative discussing Russian compatriots and Russian 
Diasporas abroad (N=119). Notably, this narrative was discussed either in a favorable 
way (n=46) or in unfavorable way (n=44). 
The two least dominant narratives were Russian values in foreign policy (N=86) 
and Russian official stances on the international relations issues (N=76). Both of these 
narratives were presented in a polarized manner discussed either in a favorable way 
(n=33; n=31 accordingly) or in an unfavorable way (n=32; n=25 accordingly). 
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Research Question 2b: Strategic Narratives and Sources of Soft Power at the 
 Level of Projection 
To answer the research question 2b that asked what sources of soft power are 
being referenced most frequently within the projected strategic narratives of Russia, the 
researcher also looked and coded for three general soft power sources (Nye, 2004) that 
are referenced in relation to the identified narrative. As one can see from Table 16, the 
culture was the soft power source invoked most frequently (n=354) across all narratives 
embedded in the public diplomacy efforts of the Russian Federation. The second most 
frequent soft power source was policy (n=281), followed by values (n=127). 
Table 16. Frequency of Soft Power Sources in Articles Containing Projected 
Narratives in RIA Novosti and Russia Today 
 
Narrative Values Culture Policy Total N 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 19 138 56 213 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 18 2 55 75 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
 
50 0 36 86 
Russian language promotion 8 199 64 271 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 32 15 70 117 
Total: 127 354 281 762 
 
Notably, referenced sources of soft power varied significantly by the narrative. 
For example, the narrative on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation most 
frequently invoked culture (n=138) as a potential authority capable of emanating soft 
power. Within the narrative on Russia's official position regarding international 
relations issues (n=55) policy as a soft power source was most often used. Predictably, 
the narrative on Russian values and priorities in foreign policy most frequently invoked 
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values as a soft power source (n=50), while Russian language narrative almost 
exclusively utilized culture (n=199) coupled with some policy (n=64). Notably, the 
narrative covering issues of the Russian compatriots and Russian Diasporas 
predominantly referred to policy (n=70) as a soft power source (see Table 9).        
Table 17. Frequency of Soft Power Sources in Articles Containing Projected 
Narratives in RIA Novosti and Russia Today by Narratives and Narrative Type 
  
 
International level National level Issue level 
Narratives Values Culture Policy Values Culture Policy Values Culture Policy 
International cultural-
humanitarian cooperation 11 96 40 4 14 4 4 28 12 
Russia’s stance on 
international relations 
issues 
17 2 52 0 0 2 1 0 1 
Russian values and 
priorities in foreign policy 
and international relations 
49 0 35 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Russian language 
promotion 4 40 27 4 154 26 0 3 11 
Russian compatriots and 
Diasporas 26 7 50 2 3 3 4 5 16 
 
 The association between narratives and soft power sources became more 
illuminating when examined in relation to the strategic narrative type. All strategic 
narrative identified as a result of the narrative formation research could be used at the 
international, domestic or issue-level. Four out of five narratives were largely identified 
as international level narratives (see Table 17), except for the narrative of Russian 
language, which appeared to be more of a domestic-level narrative that referred 
predominantly to culture. The narrative of Russian compatriots and Russian Diasporas 
was considered an international-level narrative, presenting it from the perspective of the 
foreign policy. The narrative on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation was 
also identified as the international-level strategic narrative, appealing to culture as a 
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source to yield soft power. Another international-level strategic narrative was the 
Russian foreign policy values narrative, which balanced out policy and values as 
referenced soft power sources. Finally, Russia’s stances on international relations 
represented an international-level strategic narrative, primarily referencing policy as a 
soft power source.     
Study Three: Narrative Reception 
The third study explored the process of narrative reception. The reception of 
strategic narratives is concerned with identifying the effects of a narrative on audiences 
but also with the changes in the discursive environment of the target nations 
(Miskimmon et al., 2014). The latter can be measured via analysis of narrative 
manifestation in the media. At the level of narrative reception, this dissertation aimed to 
answer two research questions: 1) What strategic narratives of Russia, identified at the 
narrative formation stage, can be found in the discursive media environment of the 
target country and in what way do these narratives manifest themselves? 2) What 
sources of soft power are being referenced most frequently within Russia’s strategic 
narratives found in the discursive media environment of the target country?  
To answer these research questions, a content analysis of media materials was 
conducted to identify which of the projected strategic narratives and referenced soft 
power sources reached the discursive environment of the receiving country. 
Specifically, media articles from two major U.S. newspapers the New York Times and 
the Washington Post were analyzed. To recognize possible narrative life cycle and trace 
their development, the examination of the narrative reception covered the period from 
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January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015, with a one-year overlap between narrative 
reception and narrative projection.   
Table 18. Frequency of Russia’s Strategic Narratives in the Washington Post 
and the New York Times by year.  
Narrative New York Times Washington Post  
2014 2015 2014 2015 Total 
International cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation 
49 25 38 10 122 
Russia’s stance on international relations 
issues 
34 7 10 12 63 
Russian values and priorities in foreign 
policy and international relations 
44 24 30 11 109 
Russian language promotion 58 23 51 11 143 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 20 8 10 1 39 
Total 205 87 139 45 476 
 
Overall, 292 articles from the New York Times and 184 articles from the 
Washington Post were analyzed. There was a significant decrease in the number of 
articles containing the identified narratives, dropping from 344 articles in 2014 to 132 
articles in 2015 (see Table 18). For New York Times the drop in narrative interest 
constituted 57.5%, and for Washington Post the coverage decreased by 67.6%.  
Research Question 3a: Strategic Narrative Reception and Their Manifestation 
Among the identified projected narratives of Russia present in the media 
environment of the receiving country, the Russian language narrative clearly dominated 
(N=143). The second most dominant narrative was the international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation (N=122), and the third most prominent narrative covered 
stories associated with Russia’s priorities and values in foreign policy (N=109). The 
least present narrative was the narrative describing Russian compatriots (N=39), 
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preceded by the narrative on Russia’s official positions regarding international relations 
issues (N=63).   
Figure 17. Line Chart Depicting Narrative Dominance by Month in New York 
Times and Washington Post (2014-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly to narrative projection stage, not all narratives were evenly present in 
the discursive environment of the receiving country during the 24 months of the studied 
period. Specifically, graph 17 demonstrates that the narratives mostly spiked in the first 
part of 2014, flattening out by the beginning of 2015. Notably, the Russian language 
narrative and the international cultural-humanitarian cooperation narrative were most 
dominant at the time, followed by the narratives discussing Russia’s foreign policy 
values and Russia’s positions on international relations issues. The least active narrative 
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at the time was the narrative on Russian compatriots, in contrast with the stage of 
narrative projection, where this strategic narrative dominated at the same time period. 
Figure 18. Area Chart Depicting Narrative Volume by Month in New York 
Times and Washington Post (2014-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When examining narrative density during a given month, it was observed that 
the narrative on Russian language promotion was consistently present during the 
studied period (see Graph 18). This is in comparison to such narratives as Russian 
compatriots and Russia’s stances that experienced periods of upturn and downturn 
throughout the 24 months. Consistent with the narrative projection stage, at any given 
time, the narrative discourse on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation was 
present in the media coverage of New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post (WP). 
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Sources of information at the narrative reception stage varied across narratives 
(see Table 19). The international cultural-humanitarian cooperation narrative was the 
only narrative that used all ten sources of information. Each narrative, however, had a 
dominant source of information. Specifically, the narrative on Russian language 
promotion made extensive use of non-Russian government sources, with 34% (n=49) of 
all articles referencing different government officials and representatives of government 
agencies. This source of information was also frequently used in the narrative about 
Russian compatriots (n=15, 38.5%) and the narrative discussing Russia’s stances on 
international relations issues (n=19, 30.2%). Interestingly, the narrative on Russia’s 
values and priorities in foreign policy was heavily supported by such information 
sources as non-Russian experts, including scientists, researchers, and analysts (n=29, 
26.6%), closely followed by non-Russian public figures (n=28, 25.7%). Finally, the 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation was dominated by numerous non-
Russian sources without clear affiliation (n=37, 30%).  
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Table 19. Cross-Tabulation Between Strategic Narratives Reception and Information 
Sources (speakers) 
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At the same time, non-Russian government officials or representatives of a 
government agency dominated the across five narratives (n=116, 24.4%). This category 
of speakers was followed by non-Russian sources with no stated affiliation (n=92, 
19.3%). Notably, non-Russian experts (n=69, 14.5%) and non-Russian public figures, 
such as actors, activists, or businessmen (n=67, 14.1%), were similarly significant 
providers of information related to the narratives (see Table 19).  
Similar to the narrative projection stage, it was important to explore whether the 
narratives at the narrative reception stage were presented in a favorable, neutral or 
unfavorable tone and whether there was an association between such attributes of 
narrative dominance as narrative tone and level of narrative salience within a news story 
(Table 20). The overall tone of articles was somewhat unfavorable (M=1.72; SD=. 703), 
either disfavoring the strategic narratives (n=201; 42.2%) or presenting it neutrally 
(n=205; 43.1%), with occasional favorable discussion of Russia’s strategic narratives 
(n=70; 14.7%).  
Table 20. Tone of Articles Containing Narratives in the Washington Post and 
the New York Times (frequencies)  
Narrative Unfavorable 
tone 
Neutral 
tone 
Favorable 
tone 
Total 
N  
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 70 34 18 122 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 12 45 6 63 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy 
and international relations 14 77 18 109 
Russian language promotion 78 46 19 143 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 27 3 9 39 
 
The Russian foreign policy narrative was presented in the most neutral tone 
(M=2.04, SD=.543) as well Russia’s stances (M=1.9, SD=.530). All other narratives 
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were discussed in a more unfavorable way. Specifically, the mean score for the Russian 
compatriots narrative was the lowest (M=1.54, SD=.854), followed by the international 
cultural humanitarian cooperation narrative (M=1.57, SD=.738) and the Russian 
language narrative (M=1.59, SD=.715).  
Further, a correlation analysis was performed to examine the connection 
between the tone of the narrative and the level of salience of this narrative within a 
news story for the identified narrative. At the level of narrative reception, as analysis 
showed, the level of narrative salience was significantly negatively correlated with the 
tone of the narrative (r = -.103, p ≤ 0.05). In other words, the higher level of narrative 
salience within a news story was associated with a less favorable tone toward the 
narrative, embedded in the news story.  
In sum, to answer the research question 3(a) about what strategic narratives 
reached the discursive environment of the target country and how they manifested 
themselves, this section explored the dominating narratives, their tone, and volume over 
a span of 24 months (2014-2015). All five narratives identified during the stage of 
narrative formation appeared to be present in the news coverage by New York Times and 
Washington Post. The most present and dominant narrative throughout the studied 
period  (2014-2015) was the narrative covering the Russian language (N=143). This 
narrative was mostly discussed in unfavorable terms (n=78; 54.5%). Importantly, this 
narrative experienced the greatest growth in attention in the first half of 2014 (n=109) 
and suffered a significant decrease in 2015 (n=34). The least dominant narrative was the 
narrative on Russian compatriots (N=39), discussed primarily in an unfavorable way 
(n=27; 69.2%). 
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Research Question 3b: Strategic Narratives and Soft Power Sources at the  
Level of Reception 
To answer the research question 3c that asked about the sources of soft power 
being referenced most frequently within the strategic narratives that reached the media 
of the target country, the researcher also looked and coded for three general soft power 
sources (Nye, 2004) that are referenced in relation to the identified narrative. Notably, 
at the level of narrative reception, the most frequently referenced source of soft power 
was policy (n=244). Further, as evident from Table 21, values (n=126) was the second 
soft power source invoked most frequently, followed by culture (n=105).  
Table 21. Frequency of Soft Power Sources in Articles Containing Narratives in 
the Washington Post and the New York Times (frequencies)  
Narrative Values Culture Policy Total N 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 25 59 37 121 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 3 0 60 63 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
 
50 0 36 86 
Russian language promotion 19 39 85 143 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 3 7 29 30 
Total: 126 105 244 475 
 
Similarly to the narrative projection stage, referenced sources of soft power 
differed by the narrative. For example, such soft power source as policy dominated in 
the narrative on Russia’s official position in regard to international relations issues 
foreign policy (n=60), Russian language promotion (n=85), and Russian compatriots 
(n=29). Predictably, the narrative on Russian values and priorities in foreign policy 
most frequently invoked values as a soft power source (n=50), while the narrative on 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation most frequently invoked culture (n=59). 
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Further, all five narratives were identified as predominantly international level 
narratives (see Table 22).  
Table 22. Frequency of Soft Power Sources in Articles Containing Narratives in 
the Washington Post and the New York Times (frequencies)  
Type of strategic narrative 
International level National level Issue level 
Narratives Values Culture Policy Values Culture Policy Values Culture Policy 
International cultural-
humanitarian cooperation 13 28 28 6 6 5 5 25 2 
Russia’s stance on 
international relations issues 3 0 59 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Russian values and priorities 
in foreign policy and 
international relations 
76 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian language promotion 12 15 68 2 3 7 5 21 10 
Russian compatriots and 
Diasporas 2 4 26 1 0 1 0 3 2 
 
In sum, the U.S. media in discussions of Russia’s strategic narratives most 
frequently referenced policy (n=244; 51.3%) as a source of soft power, one of the 
primary soft power sources as argued by Nye (2008) and conceptualized in this 
dissertation (See Table 21 and Table 22). Notably, most of Russia’s strategic narratives 
were identified as international strategic narratives (n=368, 77.8%), yet received a 
negligible attention in the respective media articles (M=1.71, SD=.774).   
Study Four: Comparative Analysis of Narratives Across Stages 
Research Question 3c: Differences in the manifestation of strategic narratives of Russia 
at the level of narrative projection and the level of narrative reception 
The manifestation of strategic narratives of Russia, identified during the 
narrative formation analysis, differed in several ways between the level of narrative 
projection and the level of narrative reception. First, the dominance and presence of 
strategic narratives themselves somewhat fluctuated between stages.  
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To compare narrative dominance across three stages, narrative count was used to 
create a ranking of strategic narratives with 1 being most dominant and 5 being least 
dominant (see Table 23). As evident from Figure 19, the narrative presence fluctuated 
between stages narrative. First, narrative dominance changed between formation and 
projection stages, with the Russian foreign policy values narrative dominating at the 
level of formation, yet the Russian language narrative dominated at the level of 
narrative projection, and later at the level of reception. At the same time, when strategic 
narratives reached the discursive media environment of the target country more changes 
in dominance were observed. This is where the Russian compatriots narrative became 
the least dominant narrative at the level of narrative reception (see Graph 19). However, 
the dominating narratives remained unchanged: Russian language promotion and 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation dominated both at the level of reception 
and projection. 
Table 23. Strategic Narratives Dominance Ranking Across Stages 
 
 
Formation Projection Reception 
 Rank n Rank n Rank n 
International cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation 2  268 2  215 2  122 
Russia’s stances on international relations 
issues 3  145 5  76 4 63 
Russian values and priorities in FP and IR 1  273 4  68 3 109 
Russian language promotion 
 4  31 1  271 1 143 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 5  26 3  119 5 39 
 
 
 
 196 
Figure 19. Narrative Comparison (1 – most dominant; 5 – least dominant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notably, the largest difference between stages was observed for the narrative 
focusing on Russia’s stances on international relations issues, which was the least 
present narrative at the level of narrative projection and the narrative on Russian 
compatriots that was the least mentioned at the level of narrative reception (see Table 
24).   
Table 24. Comparing Narrative Dominance Between Narrative Stages 
         
Narrative Narrative 
projection 
Narrative 
reception 
Total 
International cultural-humanitarian cooperation 215 (28.0%) 122 (25.6%) 337 
Russia’s stance on international relations issues 76 (9.9%) 63 (13.2%) 139 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and 
international relations 
 
86 (11.2%) 109 (22.9%) 195 
Russian language promotion 271 (35.3%) 143 (30.0%) 414 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 119 (15.5%) 39 (8.2%) 29 
Total: 767 476 1243 
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Second, there was an observable difference between referenced soft power 
sources in the identified narratives between the narrative projection and narrative 
reception stages. Specifically, it was observed that the Russian language narrative 
almost exclusively invoked culture in its discussions (n=199, 73.4%) at the level of 
narrative projection; it was referencing predominantly policy (n=85, 59.4%) at the level 
of narrative reception. The other four narratives demonstrated consistency and 
transference in referencing soft power sources similarly at the level of narrative 
projection and the level of narrative reception (see Table 25).  
Table 25. Association Between Narratives, Narrative Stages and Sources of Soft Power 
 
 Narrative projection Narrative reception 
Narratives Values Culture Policy Values Culture Policy 
International cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation 19 138 56 25 59 37 
Russia’s stance on international 
relations issues 18 2 55 3 0 60 
Russian values and priorities in 
foreign policy and international 
relations 
50 0 36 70 0 33 
Russian language promotion 8 199 64 19 39 85 
Russian compatriots and Diasporas 32 15 70 3 7 29 
 
Third, the analysis showed that there is an association between narratives stages 
and the level of narrative salience in the examined media materials. Specifically, 
negligible attention to the narrative at the level of narrative projection (n=284, 37.6%) 
can be associated with a negligible attention to the narrative at the level of narrative 
reception (n=230, 48.8%). Analogously, it can be true for moderate attention and 
significant attention. A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant 
association between narrative stage and narrative salience, χ2 (2, n=1227) =19.283, 
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p=.000, phi = 0.13. In other words, observation of narrative salience differed between 
stage of narrative projection and narrative reception.   
Table 26. Association Between Narrative Stage and Narrative Salience 
 
 Narrative projection Narrative reception 
Narratives Negligible Moderate Significant Negligible Moderate Significant 
International cultural-
humanitarian cooperation 100 52 59 29 28 63 
Russia’s stance on international 
relations issues 7 25 43 46 14 3 
Russian values and priorities in 
foreign policy and international 
relations 
13 17 53 37 64 7 
Russian language promotion 127 116 27 105 24 12 
Russian compatriots and 
Diasporas 37 43 37 13 19 7 
 
In addition, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the overall 
narrative salience at the narrative projection and narrative reception stage. A significant 
difference in narrative salience scores at the narrative projection stage (M=1.91, 
SD=.812) and narrative reception stage (M=1.71, SD=.774) was observed (t (1225) = 
4.42, p=.000), indicating that indeed the level of narrative salience changed between the 
stages.            
Fourth, an association between narrative stages and tone of the narrative (see 
Table 27) was also observed. A Chi-square test for independence indicated a significant 
association between narrative stage and narrative tone, χ2 (2, n=1243) =63.163, p=.000, 
phi = 0.23. This indicated that the observations of the narrative tone (unfavorable, 
neutral, favorable) in fact differed for the stage of narrative projection and the stage of 
narrative reception. An independent samples t-test was also conducted to compare the 
overall tone of the narratives at the narrative projection and narrative reception stage. A 
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significant difference in the narrative tone scores at the narrative projection stage 
(M=2.06, SD=.713) and narrative reception stage (M=1.72, SD=.703) was observed  (t 
(1241) = 8.01, p=.000). In other words, the overall narrative tone was more neutral at 
the level of narrative projection, and more unfavorable at the level of narrative reception 
(see Table 26).       
Table 27. Association Between Narrative Stage and Narrative Tone 
 
 Narrative projection Narrative reception 
Narratives Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral Positive 
International cultural-
humanitarian cooperation 46 89 80 70 34 18 
Russia’s stance on international 
relations issues 25 20 31 12 45 6 
Russian values and priorities in 
foreign policy and international 
relations 
32 21 33 14 77 18 
Russian language promotion 27 216 28 78 46 19 
Russian compatriots and 
Diasporas 44 29 46 27 3 9 
 
This chapter reported the results of four studies designed and conducted to 
investigate strategic narratives of Russia with the purpose of answering the posed 
research questions and improving our understanding of soft power enactment via 
strategic narratives. The next chapter discusses these findings and presents potential 
explanations for it.    
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The primary interest of this dissertation lies in exploring the relationship 
between public diplomacy, soft power and strategic narratives to explain how and in 
what way soft power can be enacted via strategic narratives of public diplomacy. For 
this reason, the dissertation examined the strategic narratives of Russia at the level of 
their formation, projection, and reception. The previous chapter first presented the 
results of the qualitative analysis of the foundational foreign policy documents of 
Russia to identify the potentially embedded strategic narratives that can be used for 
projection. Second, the results of the content analysis of Russia's public diplomacy 
materials provided a glimpse into whether and what strategic narratives, identified at the 
level of narrative formation, were embedded in the media materials of two major 
Russia's public diplomacy outlets: Russia Today and RIA Novosti (Sputnik). Third, the 
content of two U.S. elite newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, 
was studied to examine whether any of Russia’s strategic narratives reached the 
discursive media environment of the target state. Finally, observations from the 
narrative projection and narrative reception stages were compared to identify changes in 
the narrative presentation. This chapter interprets and discusses these findings in 
relation to research questions and places such discussion in the context of reviewed 
literature. 
  In general, the results highlighted five major observations: 1) strategic 
narratives that are present at the level of narrative formation are also present at the level 
of narrative projection and narrative reception, although with varying degree of 
dominance; 2) some strategic narratives at the level of projection and reception 
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exhibited a significant growth during a similar period in the beginning of 2014, which 
coincides with a major international conflict surrounding Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea; 3) strategic narratives’ attributes, such as narrative salience within a story and 
narrative tone, differed between stages of narrative projection and narrative reception, 
with narratives being more neutral to positive at the projection and more neutral to 
negative at the reception; 4) speakers of strategic narratives also differed in several 
ways between stages, with Russian government officials dominating narrative 
projection and non-Russian government officials and public figures dominating 
narrative reception; 5) sources of soft power referenced in strategic narratives at the 
level of narrative projection were referenced in a similar manner at the level of narrative 
reception, with an exception of one narrative, indicating that attributes/sources of soft 
power attraction can fluctuate between stages. The discussion is organized around these 
findings.                  
The chapter presents the discussion of findings in six blocks. The first block 
summarizes findings of the study and discusses them in relation to the literature with a 
focus on strategic narrative development across stages and its implications for soft 
power enactment. The second block presents a conceptual model inspired by the 
literature and findings of the study. The third block discusses findings of this 
dissertation on strategic narratives and soft power within four public relations 
approaches to public diplomacy. The fourth block outlines theoretical and practical 
contributions of the study to the literature on public relations, public diplomacy, and 
soft power. The fifth block acknowledges the limitations of the study, taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results of this study. Finally, the sixth block 
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presents suggestions for future directions in research. 
Stages of Strategic Narratives 
Strategic narratives are described as an instrument for political actors to 
influence and change the discursive environment in which they operate to the benefit of 
those actors (Miskimmon et al., 2014). Strategic narratives do not arise naturally, but 
rather are constructed from the existing stories and events (Freedman, 2006). Political 
actors shape strategic narratives through public discussions and through the choice of 
language to describe and construct a policy program (Schmidt, 2002). The results of this 
dissertation support this assertion, as the strategic narratives shaped and embedded in 
the three examined Russian foreign policy documents at the level of narrative formation 
were also found at the level of narrative projection and narrative reception.  
Overall, the study of Russia’s strategic narratives across stages allowed us to 
understand the process behind strategic narratives better. First, the results revealed the 
five strategic narratives of Russia that can be deployed when necessary. These 
narratives freely exist in the social and political environment, without being 
strategically deployed. The narratives acquire dominance and their strategic nature 
when political elites attach meaning and significance to them by deciding to project 
these narratives. In the case of Russia, narratives such as Russian culture and Russian 
language have existed in the environment for some time, before being aggressively 
projected by Russia in 2014, specifically during the events in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine. Indeed, during the months of March, April, May, and June of 2014 Russia had 
been actively invoking the need to protect the Russian language against the 
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discrimination and to defend the rights of the Russian-speaking populations of Ukraine 
to practice the Russian culture and to speak the Russian language.    
The deployment of narratives is inherently strategic; when political elites attach 
significance to narratives these narratives become an instrument of influence. The 
choice of strategic narrative for deployment may be conditioned by the socio-economic 
environment of the moment, events, and even by the nature of the target state’s 
discursive media environment. This is illustrated by the spike in the overall narrative 
projection in early 2014, when the conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out.  
The narrative reception stage, as described in the literature, is not an inescapable 
destination for a strategic narrative. First, strategic narratives must be able to reach the 
discursive environment of the target state, usually comprised of prominent media 
outlets. This stage is at which strategic narratives are being diffused, not necessarily 
received or accepted. At the diffusion stage, narratives may compete against the 
narratives from other sources. In general, travelling through stages narratives may be 
susceptible to influence and structural change, and therefore strategic narratives may 
undergo significant transformation by the time they are consumed by target publics. As 
such, depending on narrative diffusion, strategic narratives then can be accepted or 
rejected by general public. As such, the diffusion stage, or the discursive media 
environment at the level of reception, facilitates the acceptance or rejection of the 
narrative. This is the stage where narrative contestation occurs and the meaning of the 
narrative can be re-interpreted. Miskimmon et al. (2014) referred to narrative 
contestation but saw it happening at the level of reception. Further discussion highlights 
these conceptualizations through findings of this study.                   
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Narrative Formation 
Overall, the results of the study revealed five major strategic narratives of 
Russia embedded in the foreign policy documents of Russia: 1) international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation, 2) Russia’s stance on international relations issues, 3) 
Russian values and priorities in foreign policy and international relations, 4) Russian 
language promotion, 5) Russian compatriots and Diasporas. These strategic narratives at 
the level of narrative formation emerged as general topical categories that essentially 
represent a framework for audiences to understand and interpret events and actions of 
Russia’s political actors, providing meaning to an unfamiliar phenomenon (Miskimmon 
et al., 2014). In other words, Russian government defined and shaped these narratives to 
explain and/or justify its actions at the international and domestic arena, which it did as 
the findings indicate.  
Understanding the strategic intent of a political actor should be central to the 
study of the narrative formation, conceptualized by previous literature (Miskimmon et 
al., 2014) and illustrated by this study. These intents can be long-term or short-term 
oriented. Short-term goals of strategic narratives can be associated with narratives 
focused on policy and related to policy outcomes. The long-term intent for strategic 
narratives is associated with positive image cultivation and fostering positive opinions 
about the advocate country (Nye, 2008). Indeed, the results of the narrative formation 
analysis demonstrated that Russia’s strategic narratives largely considered and often 
implied strategic intent, both short-term and long-term.  
For example, the narrative on international cultural-humanitarian cooperation, in 
essence, represented a policy that focused on improving the image and reputation of 
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Russia in the world by stressing the uniqueness of the Russian culture. The foreign 
policy documents see international cultural-humanitarian cooperation policy as an 
opportunity to promote the unique Russian culture and defend its history and 
worldview, if necessary. The strategic intent of this narrative was presented as a fight 
against history falsification and anti-Russian propaganda. 
Similarly, the narrative on Russian values in international relations represents a 
long-term strategic intent of Russia to reshape the world order by projecting the 
narrative that international peace and security are not possible without a reconsideration 
of the existing world order as polycentric and multipolar. The narrative on Russia's 
position in international relations embraces the policy of non-interference and a non-
alternative to political solutions to conflicts as its cornerstone position in international 
relations.  
The Russian language narrative also shares a strategic intent that can both be 
achieved in short and long term, because the Russian language in the narrative is 
presented as a tool of social and political influence but also as an instrument of socio-
political integration within the Post-Soviet space. Further, the narrative on Russian 
compatriots has a long-term intent of creating the Russian World to preserve the 
ethnocultural identity of the Russian diaspora and compatriots.  
Narrative characteristics as frames. An important consideration in the study of 
narrative formation was the understanding of how to recognize a strategic narrative 
constructed by a political actor at later stages, specifically at the level of narrative 
projection and narrative reception. Narratives, unlike frames, possess temporal and 
causal features that not just describe or label an event but put it in context, evoking a 
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particular interpretation from the audiences. However, narratives may have several 
components or characteristics that must be framed in a specific way for a strategic 
narrative to achieve its purpose (Miskimmon et al., 2014). The strategic narratives, 
embedded in the foundational foreign policy documents of Russia, were multifaceted. 
The characteristics of each narrative, represented through narrative structure, could have 
been embedded independently or together within a strategic narrative projected by 
Russian public diplomacy efforts. These features could be added or removed from a 
narrative as necessary allowing for re-interpretation of events.    
For example, the narrative that described Russian foreign policy values and 
priorities essentially consisted of two interdependent subnarratives or frames: Russia 
values international security, which can only be achieved through the formulation of a 
new world order. Similarly, many of the characteristics of the international cultural-
humanitarian cooperation could be potentially embedded in the narratives projected by 
the Russian public diplomacy efforts, broken down into several sub-narratives related to 
Russian culture, Russian history, Russian education, and tourism as well as intercultural 
dialogue.  
The subnarratives of the Russian language narrative focused on the importance 
of the Russian language as a tool for social and political influence and Eurasian 
integration, the importance of the Russian-language media abroad, and the protection of 
the Russian language against discrimination. The characteristics of the Russian 
compatriots narrative could be embedded in the narratives in the form of the discussion 
about the rights and freedoms of Russian Diasporas and Russian compatriots abroad, 
including rights of the Russian-born children adopted abroad, that comprise a Russian 
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World– a space for historically spread out people of Russia. The characteristics of the 
narrative of Russia's stances on international relations issues were the principles of non-
interference, a non-alternative to political solutions to conflicts, Russia's commitment to 
Rule of Law in international relations, and supporting the role of United Nations in 
international relations.  
These characteristics of narratives can be treated as the manifest features of the 
strategic narratives structure and be independently highlighted at the level of narrative 
projection and reception. In other words, once the narratives are identified or shaped at 
the level of narrative formation, their features could be used to highlight certain aspects 
of strategic narrative depending on the context of media environment and the strategic 
intent. For example, the narrative on Russian compatriots contained narrative 
characteristics or narrative frames that referenced Russian-born children adopted abroad 
(specifically, USA). By highlighting this aspect of the narrative at the level of 
projection, this issue was politicized to attract attention and shape perceptions of the 
United States. As such, these manifest features of strategic narratives could be used as 
frames at later stages of projection and/or reception. This notion resonates with 
Miskimmon et al.’s (2014) argument that “the various components of a narrative must 
be framed a certain way” (p. 7). It can be argued that the framing process may play a 
role in strategic narratives. However, framing must be considered in relation to strategic 
narratives, especially at the stage of projection and reception. Thinking about framing in 
the context of a narrative may not just answer the question of how media frames 
international relations issues but more importantly why it frames them the way it does. 
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Narrative Projection and Narrative Reception 
The projection and reception of a narrative occur through both mediated and 
non-mediated communication. The narrative projection stage is most closely associated 
with public diplomacy and public relations, as strategic narratives of an advocate 
country are most likely to be projected not only via such public diplomacy tools as 
international broadcasting, speeches, exchanges, etc., but also through media relations 
and public affairs functions of public relations. As an instrument of foreign policy, 
public diplomacy often echoes strategic narratives consistent with the government’s 
position. In the case of this dissertation, the analyzed Russian public diplomacy media 
outlets projected all five strategic narratives found in Russia’s foreign policy 
documents. The most dominating narrative at the stage of narrative projection was the 
Russian language promotion narrative, in contrast to the narrative formation stage, 
where the Russian foreign policy values narrative dominated. It was followed by the 
international cultural-humanitarian cooperation narrative, Russian compatriots 
narrative, and Russian values in international relations. The least available narrative was 
the narrative outlining Russia’s position on international relations issues. The difference 
in narrative dominance between the formation and projection stages can be explained by 
a number of reasons. First, the Russian government could have prioritized the narrative 
based on its strategic needs of the moment and, in general, socio-political context. 
Second, the channels through which these narratives were projected may explain the 
prioritization of the narratives. In other words, government-funded media, in this case, 
two Russia’s public diplomacy outlets, traditionally cover issues that may help the 
Russian government to project the controlled narrative about the developing events in 
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the world, support Russia’s position on the issue and present Russia in a favorable light 
in general. 
The dominant narratives changed once the strategic narratives reached the 
discursive media environment of the target country. This is where the Russian 
compatriots narrative became the least dominant narrative at the level of narrative 
reception. However, the two dominating narratives remained unchanged, both at the 
level of projection and reception: Russian language promotion and international 
cultural-humanitarian cooperation dominated both at the level of reception and 
projection. 
Based on the dominance of strategic narratives in their respective stages, it was 
observed that narratives might overlap between the stages of projection and reception. 
In other words, the attention to strategic narratives at the projection stage corresponded 
to the similar level of attention to the same strategic narratives at the reception stage. By 
way of explanation, the narrative that has been most actively projected is most likely to 
reach the discursive media environment of the target country (see Figure 20). Further, 
the difference in narrative prominence between stages of narrative formation and 
narrative projection can be explained by the strategic needs of the moment, when social, 
political and media context preconditions the amount of emphasis any strategic 
narrative and its characteristics receive at the level of projection and reception (see 
Figure 20).     
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Figure 20. Aspects of Strategic Narrative Development 
  
 
 
 
 
Although initially in this dissertation the media environment of the target 
country was conceptualized as a discursive arena for strategic narratives discussion and 
contestation before publics consume them at the level of narrative reception (Liao, 
2017; Miskimmon et al., 2014), the findings of this study call for its reconsideration. 
The study offers to treat the discursive media environment as an intermediate stage of 
strategic narrative development that does not imply narrative reception, but rather a 
narrative diffusion. As such, the diffusion stage of strategic narrative development can 
be central to understanding how narratives are being received by the target publics: are 
narratives being accepted or rejected? Importantly, the discursive media environment of 
the target country can reconfigure the way foreign policy information is being formed, 
collected and circulated, providing context for how those “audiences consume news and 
political information, how they compare sources and attribute credibility, and whether 
they discuss narratives with friends, family, or colleagues” (Miskimmon et al., p. 12).  
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George (2015) argued that media, in general, thwart the projection of strategic 
narratives due to increased availability of other narratives from many sources at the 
same time. These narratives meet within the discursive media environment, where, in 
certain cases, narrative contestation may happen. This is why understanding and 
examination of the diffusion stage is important. During the diffusion stage, through the 
use of narrative frames strategic narratives can be significantly simplified for 
consumption and/or altered by the time they make it to the media, especially if strategic 
narratives focus on legitimizing of foreign policy. The simplification of narratives at the 
level of narrative diffusion within the media discourse may lead to potential narrative 
re-structuring and re-interpretation, potentially conditioning narrative acceptance or 
rejection.  
Strategic Narratives and the Role of Events 
The importance of social, political and media context of the moment was 
highlighted by the findings of this study that demonstrated an uneven volume of 
strategic narratives present at the level of projection and reception throughout the 
studied period. The results showed that the stories on Russian language and Russian 
compatriots significantly spiked during the months of March, April, May, and June of 
2014, projected via RIA Novosti and Russia Today. Similarly to the narrative projection 
stage, the Russian language narrative during the same period was the most present in 
the discursive environment of the target country, the United States in this case. 
This period was marked by a major international event – Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and conflict in the Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine. It is reasonable to assume 
that this event and an overall political situation surrounding it created a need for 
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projection of strategic narratives that would most resonate with the discussion of events 
and provide context for interpretation of these events to the benefit of the advocate 
state. Indeed, the projected by Russia narratives of the Russian language and Russian 
compatriots strived to contextualize the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by 
politicizing the rights of Russian speakers to speak the Russian language and identify 
with Russia as their historic homeland. This further highlights the importance of the 
strategic narrative that can be deployed based on the foreign policy needs and on the 
events and the socio-political environment of the moment.  
The narrative on the Russian language has also been dominating the discursive 
media environment of the United States when both the Washington Post and the New 
York Times dedicated significant space to the narrative. Importantly, this strategic 
narrative dominated Russia’s narrative projection during the same period as it 
dominated the U.S. discursive environment, indicating a time-bound need for individual 
strategic narratives. This observation adds to Miskimmon et al.’s (2014) and 
Freedman’s (2006) argument that strategic narratives can serve as an instrument for 
political actors to influence and change the discursive environment to their benefit by 
highlighting the way strategic narratives are constructed around the existing stories and 
events. It also adds to our understanding of strategic narratives and the purpose they 
may serve for short-term goals. By deploying a strategic narrative that is conditioned on 
socio-political context, the advocate country (Russia) amplified the strategic narrative’s 
potential to affect the discursive environment of the target state (the U.S.A). The study 
also demonstrated the need to investigate the relationship between pre-existing 
narratives at the level of formation and the projected narratives tied to specific events.  
 213 
Strategic Narratives and Soft Power Sources 
The relationship between strategic narratives and soft power can be explained by 
an assumption that soft power is embedded in our lives through our culture and values, 
and in order to enact soft power, it is important to communicate about the diverse soft 
power sources. Several scholars previously addressed the soft power as a narrative-
based phenomenon (Hayden, 2012; Mattern, 2005; Roselle et al., 2014), arguing that in 
order for attraction to take place its sources cannot be kept private but must be 
continuously deployed. Hayden (2012) specifically suggested that attraction is better 
thought of as “a form of symbolic, influence-oriented communication” (p. 43) and as a 
“reaction to compelling attributes” (p. 45) of a nation, highlighting the importance of 
sources in considerations of soft power conceptualizations. In other words, soft power 
sources must be strategically communicated, which can be channeled through public 
diplomacy and public relations (Seib, 2006).  
These sources of soft power, according to Hayden (2012), lie with the rhetorical 
capacity of an actor and belong in the communication domain. In other words, how an 
advocate state, Russia in this case, communicates about these soft power sources via 
strategic narratives may determine whether soft power can be enacted. If strategic 
narratives have the ability to enact soft power, these strategic narratives must reference 
the soft power sources of the advocate state.       
The findings of this study demonstrated that the referenced sources of soft 
power varied significantly by narrative. In general, however, the use of referenced soft 
power sources between narrative stages was consistent with four narratives 
demonstrating a transference in referencing soft power sources similarly at the level of 
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narrative projection and the level of narrative reception. The most significant change 
was observed for the dominating narrative on the Russian language. Specifically, the 
results showed that the Russian language narrative almost exclusively invoked culture 
in its discussions at the level of narrative projection while predominantly referencing 
policy as a soft power source at the level of narrative reception.  
Although Nye (2008) did warn that soft power may or may not produce the 
desired policy outcome, he argued that soft power originating from different sources 
can have a different impact on different publics. The findings of this study question this 
assertion as the sources of soft power that are embedded in projected narratives may be 
received and interpreted by the target publics differently.  
The strategic narrative about the Russian language, projected through the 
Russian public diplomacy efforts (Russia Today and RIA Novosti), attempted to invoke 
the Russian culture as a source of soft power attraction; however, this strategic narrative 
reached the discursive environment of the Untied States re-interpreted, treating the 
Russian language not as part of the Russian cultural heritage but rather as part of 
Russia's foreign policy (as evident from publications in the New York Times and 
Washington Post during the analyzed period). This difference in the referenced soft 
power sources for the dominating narrative between stages can be explained by the 
influence of the social, political and media environment of the moment. It may also 
indicate the importance of the diffusion stage and the narrative contestation that occurs 
within it. Once again, future studies on strategic narratives should examine this 
connection between events, political climate, and strategic narratives. 
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Strategic Narratives and Guarantors of Soft Power 
Another potential explanation for re-interpretation of the soft power sources 
between the narrative projection and narrative reception is the use of soft power referees 
(Nye, 2008), conceptualized as information sources in this study, to deliver and validate 
the strategic narratives embedded within the news stories. 
Importantly, speakers for the narratives or sources of information in public 
diplomacy materials varied across narratives; however, Russian government officials or 
representatives of a government agency dominated the majority of the projected 
narratives. The second most frequent source of information at the level of narrative 
projection was the non-Russian government officials. At the same time, at the level of 
narrative reception, non-Russian government officials or representatives of a 
government agency dominated the majority of articles, followed by non-Russian 
sources with no stated affiliation and non-Russian experts.   
As Nye (2008) suggested, often, the referees of the soft power sources are 
independent and state media, NGOs and INGOs, governments and market players 
(depending on the source), who see value in those sources and the opportunity to 
capitalize on it. In general, the results of this study demonstrated that Russian strategic 
narratives utilized diverse referees or sources of information, although government 
sources dominated. Arguably, by projecting the sources of soft power, these referees 
have the ability to wield soft power. In a way, by accepting the legitimacy of the soft 
power source and the narrative, a referee accepts its influence over him/her. However, 
given that at least for one strategic narrative (the Russian language narrative) the 
guarantors of soft power rejected the legitimacy of the soft power source by re-
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interpreting it (from culture to policy), it can be argued that this narrative was rejected 
within the discursive environment of the target state. As such, a strategic narrative can 
be contested by other competing narratives from different sources and by the target 
publics themselves, and the outcome of this contestation may determine the acceptance 
or rejection of the narrative.  
Strategic Narratives’ Tone and Salience 
While events may influence the growth of certain narratives and their overlap 
between stages, the manner in which those strategic narratives are presented can differ 
between stages as well. This notion is reflected in Nye’s statement that argued, “what 
the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the agents” 
(2011, p. 84). Roselle et al. (2014) reported there are no analytical solutions to date to 
capture these processes. One such solution can be the tracing of strategic narratives 
from formation to projection to diffusion and reception and by looking at the 
manifestation of strategic narratives within content of media that project or receives the 
narrative.  
Specifically, the findings of this study showed that there is an association 
between narrative stages and the level of narrative salience in the examined media 
materials. Specifically, significant attention to the narrative at the level of narrative 
projection can be associated with a significant attention to the narrative at the level of 
narrative reception, and vice versa. Also, an association between narrative stages and 
tone of the narrative was also observed. Interestingly, the overall narrative tone of the 
narrative was more neutral at the level of narrative projection, and more unfavorable at 
the level of narrative reception. This is an important observation that may indicate that 
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while a strategic narrative is able to reach the discursive environment of the target state, 
its diffusion does not necessarily guarantee a positive reception that leads to the 
narrative acceptance and/or retention.  
However, it was observed at the level of narrative projection that a more 
favorable tone toward the embedded narrative is significantly positively correlated with 
the higher level of salience of that narrative within a news story that represents strategic 
public diplomacy efforts. At the level of narrative reception, however, a less favorable 
tone of the embedded narrative correlated with the higher level of narrative salience 
within a news story. In other words, unfavorable narratives tended to be more salient 
within the discursive environment of the target state. 
 While this is unsurprising, as projected strategic narratives are designed to 
benefit the advocate state, this may also indicate the impact of the event (e.g. Crimea’s 
annexation) on facilitating the narrative dominance or it may demonstrate and affect the 
rejection of the narrative within the discursive media environment of the target country. 
All the while the presence of those strategic narratives was nevertheless significant.  
Such finding of this exploratory study of strategic narratives of public 
diplomacy indicates the need to explore this phenomenon further. This once again 
demonstrates the need for reconsideration of the narrative reception stage as consisting 
of substages: 1) the projected strategic narratives reaching the discursive environment 
of the target state (being received and or discussed by the media), and 2) strategic 
narratives being accepted as legitimate by the publics. The existing literature and 
conceptualizations of strategic narratives do not take this into account.  
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Strategic Narratives and The Enactment of Soft Power 
Roselle et al. (2014) argued that strategic narratives can be regarded as “soft 
power in the 21st century” concerned with “whose story wins” (p. 71), describing 
strategic narratives as “a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage 
expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate” (p. 70). 
Using the case of Russia, this dissertation examined the strategic narrative's 
development from their formation to projection to their reception to investigate the role 
of strategic narratives in the enactment of soft power. This dissertation contends that 
soft power of an actor (advocate country) can be enacted via strategic narratives 
developed by state actors and deployed via public diplomacy means onto the target 
state.  
From this perspective, narratives are seen as consensually defined social realities 
that inform people’s understanding of their life experiences (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 
1994). Strategic narratives, those that are accepted and agreed-upon by members of the 
public, help individuals interpret common experiences. In other words, people who 
share the understanding of a narrative also share the understanding of reality and 
become a “rhetorical community, knit together by a common sense of purpose, agency, 
motivation, and action” (Garner, et al., 1998, p. 63). Therefore, strategic narratives, 
deployed to structure the consensually defined social reality, may be enacting soft 
power of an advocate country by leveraging the power of appeal to its culture, values, 
and policies via strategic narratives. 
The findings of this study indicate that the enactment of soft power by 
projecting strategic narratives of public diplomacy is not a simple linear process that 
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allows for easy consumption of strategic narratives by foreign publics. The findings of 
this dissertation, however, allow theorizing how the process of soft power enactment 
takes place to improve our overall understanding of soft power and the role of public 
diplomacy in it. 
Strategic narratives and narratives, in general, are compelling power resources 
and are designed with the purpose of anticipating and structuring publics’ responses to 
developing events. It is argued here that strategic narratives structure expectations and 
behavior of actors by deliberately constructing and reinforcing the ideas that are already 
current, as narratives offer frames for the issues and suggest responses (see Freedman, 
2006). By structuring behavior and expectations about international actors and states 
narratives exert a certain influence (Miskimmon et al., 2014). As such, it is a political 
actor's ability or in a government's ability, to construct narratives that enhance the 
appeal of a country for foreign audiences. Similarly, this is what Nye (2004) called soft 
power or the power of attraction. This dissertation argues that the construction of the 
narrative that boosts the appeal of an advocate state happens at the level of narrative 
formation.    
To be effective, strategic narratives, shaped at the level of formation, need to 
resonate with values, interests, and beliefs of the intended audiences and be based on 
existing ideas and values (Dimitriu, 2012). The need to manage perceptions and to 
appear attractive is at the core of Nye’s idea of soft power. According to Nye (2004), 
attraction “has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an 
easily observable specific action” (p. 16). As such, the perception of a country’s 
attractiveness becomes the context in which individual communication transactions take 
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place, an environment in which messages of an advocate country are being received and 
interpreted. Therefore, state and non-state actors have a vested interest in cultivating 
attractiveness, a positive perception of themselves, including through public diplomacy 
and strategic narratives. The soft power attraction can be both yielded and wielded at 
the level of narrative projection. 
Further, the perception of attractiveness is a subjective experience that differs 
across nations and times. Soft power of an advocate country in one region at any given 
time will be different at another region. For example, U.S. soft power in Europe is 
different in strength than U.S. soft power in the Arab world (Sun, 2008), just as 
Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet space (Ukraine before 2014, or Armenia 
currently, for example) is different in strength from its soft power in the United States 
(Bogomolov & Lytvynenko, 2012). The events and previous experiences with a nation 
may influence the soft power attraction. Specifically, soft power attraction can be based 
on such soft power sources as policy. This makes the case of Russia’s strategic 
narratives an example worth studying. According to Yan (2007) soft power oftentimes 
is political and less so cultural. This highlights the policy as a soft power source, the 
only soft power source within direct government control. In other words, policies and 
political decisions constitute the main source of soft power attraction that is under the 
government control entirely, and, therefore, represent a major element of strategic 
narratives projected by the advocate state.  
Importantly, this perception of attraction that soft power produces is 
codetermined between an agent and the target audience (Solomon, 2014; Watanabe & 
McConnell). In other words, advocate states choose to incorporate the attractive 
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characteristics of themselves into the strategic narratives based on the preferences of the 
target publics while the target public legitimizes this attraction by acknowledging it. 
This description explains the interdependence between the process of strategic narrative 
projection and strategic narrative reception when an agent must choose the best 
narrative to exert influence with at the level of narrative projection and the target 
audience must accept the narrative with possible re-interpretation at the level of 
narrative reception. The findings of this dissertation illustrated this point, as the ranking 
of dominating strategic narratives at the level of formation was different from the level 
of narrative projection. Specifically, the Russian political elites attached a more 
significant attention to the Russia’s foreign policy values at the level of narrative 
formation; yet, at the level of projection narrative dominance shifted toward the Russian 
language narrative. The choice of the narrative and narrative frame for projection was 
contingent upon the need of the moment, events and socio-political environment in 
general.      
The main arguments in support of the notion that strategic narratives have the 
ability to enact soft power or serve as a soft power conduit are based on the assumption 
that those strategic narratives can survive the transition from the narrative formation to 
narrative projection to narrative reception (see Figure 21). The findings of this 
dissertation demonstrated that, in fact, a strategic narrative, formed by political elites of 
the advocate country, can reach the discursive environment of the target country. The 
ability of the narrative to reach the media of the target state does not ensure the 
narrative acceptance, however. It is argued here that before the publics of the target 
state can consume strategic narratives, narratives go through an intermediate stage, 
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which is proposed in this dissertation as the diffusion stage, that reflects the ability of a 
strategic narrative to reach the discursive media environment of the target state. At the 
diffusion stage  narratives can be re-formulated and re-framed for domestic 
consumption (see Figure 21). 
The proposed diffusion stage of strategic narratives captures the previously 
unexplained concern of how strategic narratives are actually being received at the stage 
of narrative reception. The diffusion stage, justified by findings of this study, explains 
that, first, narratives must be digested by the discursive environment of the target state.  
Figure 21. Strategic Narratives of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power Enactment 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
This study looked at traditional media, but new media in the form of discussions 
on social media as well as within the comment section of news articles provide the 
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opportunity for narrative diffusion and contestation. The manner in which the narrative 
is presented within a discursive environment of the target state and how much it is 
contested may lead either to narrative reception or narrative rejection (see Figure 21). In 
addition, the discursive environment itself may force the adjustment of strategic 
narrative projection, prioritizing one narrative frame in the narrative structure over the 
other. The reception of the narrative, measured through opinion surveys, for example, 
would demonstrate the legitimacy of the narrative. The rejection of the narrative, 
however, may force the advocate state to reconsider the narrative and narrative structure 
altogether.           
Soft power and strategic narratives share a symbiotic relationship – the context 
of soft power forces strategic narratives to adjust in order to create consensus. The 
advocate states use strategic narratives to construct a shared meaning of their past, 
present, and future actions hoping to shape behaviors of their many constituencies. 
Strategic narratives need to tap into one of the soft power sources to be effective and 
serve as a catalyst for conversion. To be successful/effective, strategic narratives at the 
level of narrative formation need to have and/or originate from soft power sources (see 
Figure 21). In sum, compelling strategic narratives allow the enactment of soft power, 
creating an enabling discursive environment of soft power for individual 
communication transactions. By extension, when strategic narratives are rejected, they 
fail to enact soft power creating a discursive soft power environment that is disabling. 
Case in point, the Russian language narrative was projected within the context of an 
international event that served as a context (Crimea’s annexation), first hindering the 
diffusion of strategic narrative and then its interpretation as it was intended at 
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projection.  Here, the context or the environment in which strategic narratives operate is 
important, including foreign policy needs of the advocate state and its actions in 
international relations. 
Strategic Narratives and Public Diplomacy Approaches 
This dissertation contends that because public diplomacy is a governmental 
public relations function (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006), both public relations and public 
diplomacy play role in the projection, diffusion, and reception of strategic narratives. 
Specifically, public relations approaches to public diplomacy may prove useful at 
different levels of strategic narratives.   
When considering the role of strategic narratives in public diplomacy, the 
mediated approach to public diplomacy appears to be the most fitting and capable of 
explaining strategic narratives. As Golan and Yang (2014) postulated, the mediated 
public diplomacy emphasizes strategic management of communication content and 
coverage of international affairs with a goal of cultivating a favorable image of the 
nation. Being integral to strategic communication management, strategic narratives can 
facilitate such image cultivation.   
Similar to the description of the mediated approach functionality, strategic 
narratives attempt to cultivate shared meaning, in which Boulding’s idea of the image 
(perception) can be central. Boulding (1956) suggested that behavior of an individual 
depends on the images of reality a person holds and the meaning he or she draws from 
these images. By deploying strategic narratives, governments of the advocate states 
strive to control the discussions of the country’s policies in foreign media by 
highlighting certain narrative frames while downplaying others. Further, the results of 
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this study on the embedded soft power sources in strategic narratives of Russia 
resonated with Hayden's (2012) assertion that the cultivation of nation's image through 
the media with frequent references to cultural norms and values and dispositional 
characteristics of the nation could have an expected diplomatic benefit.  
Although Zaharna (2010) criticized the mediated approach to public diplomacy, 
arguing that it is no longer about an information battle, the battle nevertheless continues 
as findings of this dissertation indicate. Perhaps, it is too early to discard the mediated 
approach as it seems to be used extensively by Russia (it also demonstrated some 
effectiveness as this study showed): as the volume of stories containing strategic 
narratives projected onto the target publics spiked so did the volume of stories 
containing strategic narratives that reached the discursive environment of the target 
country. Further, Zaharna (2010) described the mediated approach to public diplomacy 
as the mass communication approach, where communication problems are seen as 
information problems. When placed in this context, strategic narratives can be seen as a 
solution to a communication problem that can be solved through increased information, 
particularly if one thinks about public diplomacy as a “strategic contest over 
international agenda building” (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 448). This is, of course, only 
true if one considers international broadcasting as the main channel for deployment of 
strategic narratives. However, strategic narratives can be delivered in a non-mass 
communication way as well. 
The relational approach to public diplomacy can be considered as an opportunity 
to deliver strategic narratives in a non-mass communication way. In general, strategic 
narratives do not allow for two-way communication, an important aspect of relational 
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view on both public relations and public diplomacy (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Kruckeberg & 
Vujnovic, 2005). Although social media allows engaging with the narrative in a 
relatively reciprocal manner, it is often about narrative contestation (Miskimmon et al., 
2014; Zaharna, 2016).  
Unlike in mediated public diplomacy, strategic narratives in the relational 
approach are delivered through such means as international exchanges, cultural 
diplomacy, interpersonal communication and virtual networks. Narratives in this way 
would be delivered more interpersonally than through international broadcasting, 
although strategic narratives themselves can be focused on the stories of cultural 
exchanges, culture, the value of relationship building, cooperation and mutual interest. 
The strategic narratives of Russia indeed focused on such stories, specifically within the 
narrative of international cultural-humanitarian cooperation and the Russian language. 
From the relational perspective, for both public relations and public diplomacy, 
relationships (i.e. cooperation at the level of international relations) are the ultimate goal 
and an essential element in ensuring good reputation and positive image of a country. 
The intent behind strategic narratives can similarly be the improved relationships, when 
the parties agree on the meaning of the narrative and/or are ready to accept it.  
The relational approach to public diplomacy stresses engagement over 
information dissemination (Snow, 2014). As such, it is important from the perspective 
of relational public diplomacy for target publics to engage with the narrative. Because 
the solution to communication problem under relational view is the increased 
interactions, it is important to consider delivering strategic narratives in different ways, 
through interpersonal communication and increased contacts, including through social 
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media. Although the communication problem under the relational view is the 
relationship problem (Zaharna, 2010), an improved understanding and creating shared 
meaning is equally essential to improving relationships, which can also be achieved 
through strategic narratives.  
However, the interpersonal communication may not be the most efficient 
medium for strategic narrative delivery as it is time and resource consuming (Leonard, 
2002; Zaharna, 2010). Importantly, publics in public diplomacy still receive information 
via traditional media; it is the interpretation of the information that happens through 
interpersonal communication that matters. The meaning of strategic narrative, its 
reception and retention happen in the context of a relationship. 
This consideration is important when examining narrative reception. The overall 
inter-country relationship may condition in what way strategic narratives are received 
by the audiences of the target country. In other words, the reception of strategic 
narratives depends on the relationship context but also on the discursive environment of 
the receiving country, how much the media of that country pays attention to Russia's 
strategic narratives and how fast the narrative is circulated within that environment. As 
Zaharna explained (2010), “information draws its value not by how effectively it is 
designed or delivered (a one-time occurrence), but by how fast and excessively it is 
circulated within the social context” (p. 147). In a way, the mediated approach to public 
diplomacy is more applicable to the level of strategic narrative projection, whereas 
relational approach is more applicable to focus on at the level of narrative reception.        
The mediated and relational approaches to public diplomacy are often described 
as incompatible, instead, their application could be considered in relation to different 
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stages of narrative development. The integrated approach to public diplomacy marries 
these two perspectives and introduces nation branding into the equation.  
It is argued here, that integrated approach overlaps the stages of narrative 
projection and narrative reception as it combines both information and cultural 
functions of public diplomacy. It also acknowledges both the long-term and short-term 
potential of communication and of strategic narratives. As Deibel and Roberts (1976) 
argued that "changing foreign attitudes is a process to be measured in years, and the 
only feasible goal is to create a climate of mutual understanding in which the particulars 
of future national policies can be communicated abroad in a receptive atmosphere" (p. 
15).  
Further, the integrated approach to public diplomacy introduced nation branding 
as one of the public diplomacy strategies because nation-branding initiatives can be 
more tactical in nature, linking issues and cultural attributes (Kaneva, 2011). It can be 
argued that nation branding also utilizes strategic narratives to present a country’s brand 
to the world. In fact, presenting Russia's cultural heritage to the world through a 
narrative is a way to brand a country. Also, in its narratives, Russia has also focused on 
tourism promotion and presenting Russia as a desirable tourist destination. As such, it 
can be argued, Russia has attempted to brand itself. However, brands and branding can 
also occur through meaning creation and co-creation, with meaning and values being 
culture-specific (Szondi, 2008). Therefore, in relation to the strategic narrative 
development, integrated approach can be seen as in between the narrative projection 
and narrative reception, at the level of narrative diffusion where meaning can be created 
through narrative contestation.    
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The collaborative and network approach to public diplomacy can be considered 
an extension of the relational approach, with relationships still holding a central role. 
However, the relationships are conceptualized as networks and collaborative initiatives. 
Zaharna (2010) argued that in public diplomacy more complex relational activities 
transform into the network and collaborative forms of public diplomacy.  
In general, the role of strategic narratives in this approach can be conceptualized 
as rather utilitarian. In essence, networks and collaboration initiatives can serve as 
conduits for quick and effective information sharing and strategic narrative diffusion 
within network structure. Yang and Taylor (2014) argued that the worth of individual 
political actors is contingent upon the position that the actor occupies within a network. 
Alternatively, networks themselves and the role the advocate state plays within the 
network can become strategic narratives.   
Figure 22. Strategic Narratives in Public Diplomacy Approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Strategic narratives and four public diplomacy approaches can inform each 
other’s application and conceptualizations. Specifically, it can be argued that certain 
public diplomacy approaches can be utilized during a specific stage of strategic 
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narrative deployment. For example, the mediated approach to public diplomacy can 
inform research and practice of strategic narrative projection. Similarly, integrated 
approach can shape strategy for narrative projection, yet due to its embedded relational 
function, the approach is equally applicable at the level of reception. The network and 
collaborative approach to public diplomacy can best help diffusion of the narrative, 
once the strategic narrative reached the discursive media environment of the target 
country. Finally, the assumptions of the relational approach can best inform strategies of 
strategic narrative reception due to its functional capabilities to deliver messages 
through interpersonal communication.       
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Applications  
This dissertation makes several contributions to the theory and practice of public 
diplomacy. Specifically, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of public 
diplomacy's role in soft power by testing the ability of strategic narratives of public 
diplomacy to enact soft power. The results of the study allowed developing a conceptual 
model that contributes to our understanding of the relationship between strategic 
narratives and soft power and demonstrates, to the extent possible, how the influence of 
soft power does or does not take place. The empirical part of this dissertation explored 
and described how Russia deploys strategic narratives, derived from its soft power 
sources, to answer the question of how and if soft power can be enacted via strategic 
narratives.   
First, the dissertation expands our understanding of the relationship between 
public diplomacy, soft power, and strategic narratives. This dissertation contributes to 
theory development by examining and explaining how narratives as power resources 
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operate. Through an examination of strategic narratives at different levels, this study 
demonstrated in what ways strategic narratives contribute to the enactment of soft 
power and thus provide strategies for soft power conversion into influence. The 
conceptual model offered in this dissertation further explains how public diplomacy 
projects strategic narratives and by doing so enables the soft power enactment.    
Second, the task of this dissertation was to investigate the formation, projection, 
and reception of strategic narratives used by the Russian Federation. This is the first 
study that traced the development and deployment of strategic narratives across stages, 
which constitutes an important contribution to the research literature on strategic 
narratives. In addition, this study contributes specifically to our understanding of 
Russia’s public diplomacy efforts and attempts to wield influence on global public 
opinion.  
Third, this dissertation highlights the importance of the narrative formation stage 
that has been neglected by previous studies. Therefore, the investigation of strategic 
narratives at the level of narrative formation is important and has been largely taken for 
granted in the research literature on strategic narratives (i.e. Roselle et al., 2014; 
Zaharna, 2016).  
Further, the study of narrative formation highlighted methodological limitations 
of the narrative analysis and demonstrated the need to incorporate analysis of narrative 
frames, treating narrative characteristics as frames. Studies on strategic narratives do 
not provide methodological and/or theoretical suggestions on documenting the strategic 
narrative formation and narrative operationalization in a way that can be transferable to 
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process that can take different forms. This dissertation approached the study of the 
narrative formation with an assumption that narratives emerge out of pre-existing ideas 
and may represent themes and historical references. The structure of strategic narratives 
at the level of formation may contain many different characteristics that can be treated 
as narrative frames. Some narrative frames may be emphasized more than others, 
potentially altering the narrative structure     
Fourth, this research extends the work of Miskimmon et al. (2014) on strategic 
narratives by proposing an intermediate stage between the narrative projection and 
narrative reception. This intermediate stage is conceptualized as the narrative diffusion 
stage, which demonstrates how and whether strategic narratives reach the discursive 
environment of the target state. This is where strategic narratives are being diffused, not 
necessarily received or accepted. The diffusion of the strategic narrative at this level 
often implies narrative contestation and determines whether a strategic narrative to be 
accepted or rejected. This is both a theoretical and practical contribution because it not 
only illustrates the limitations and constraints of strategic narratives and their ability to 
enact soft power but also suggests a potential measure for strategic narrative 
effectiveness.  As such, depending on the narrative diffusion, strategic narratives then 
can be accepted or rejected by the general public. In a way, the intermediate stage of 
diffusion facilitates the acceptance or rejection of the narrative.  
Fifth, the role of events and the time-bound need for strategic narratives was 
highlighted as one of the contributions of this dissertation, not only informing our 
understanding of strategic narratives but also invoking the existing literature on public 
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opinion formation, which, although not introduced in this dissertation, provides food for 
thought and indicates potential direction for future research.   
Sixth, the dissertation addresses the role and relationship between the concepts 
of public relations, public diplomacy, and soft power, thus propelling public relations 
theory development. While strategic narratives address the formation, projection, 
diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system, it is through the functional 
and technical affordances of public relations and public diplomacy that strategic 
narratives are able to enact soft power and possibly to convert soft power into influence. 
Further, the literature synthesis promotes the understanding of the relationship between 
public diplomacy and public relations by presenting public diplomacy research in the 
context of public relations scholarship, summarizing and presenting the four public 
relations approaches to public diplomacy.  
Seventh, this dissertation treats strategic narratives not as the end in itself that is 
capable of singularly explain how international affairs/relations are being formed. 
Rather, this dissertation submits that those strategic narratives, as political actors deploy 
them, shape the way we understand and interpret power. As Castells (2001) argued, 
communication changes how power works. Political actors project narratives with the 
purpose of achieving specific goals in international relations. In this sense, projected 
narratives about soft power sources may help enact soft power. This is an important 
distinction from Miskimmon's conceptualization of strategic narratives. An overall soft 
power argument here is that strategic narratives help enact soft power, although not all 
narratives are capable of producing change or wield power. Therefore, only individual 
narratives will be able to enact soft power. As such, this dissertation contributes to the 
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discussion of the strategic narratives as essential elements to understand how strategic 
narratives, when accepted by foreign publics, can shape interest and preferences 
(making others want what you want – Nye's definition of soft power) of these foreign 
publics. Additionally, while strategic narratives as conceptualized by Miskimmon et al. 
(2014) address the questions of formation, projection, and reception of ideas within the 
international system, it is through the functional affordances of public relations and 
public diplomacy that strategic narratives can enact soft power. 
Finally, by examining a specific case study of Russia’s strategic narratives’ 
formation, projection, diffusion, and reception, this dissertation builds toward a 
proposed conceptual framework that positions soft power as a discursive environment 
that can be disabling or enabling. This idea is consistent with the notion of soft power as 
an environment in which individual communication transactions take place, as the 
author of this dissertation recently argued in another study (Klyueva & Tsetsura, 2015). 
Notably, the dissertation submits that public relations and public diplomacy shape the 
discursive soft power environment via strategic narratives.  
In terms of practical applications, this dissertation offers a framework through 
which practitioners may examine Russia’s informational efforts specifically, and the 
communication influence in general. The notion of strategic narratives may provide a 
lens for policy analysis and policy formation. Many scholars and practitioners discuss 
soft power in relation to public diplomacy, often suggesting using soft power to enhance 
the achievement of political goals by nation states. However, instrumentalization and 
operationalization of soft power use on the practical level was lacking. By offering 
ways to analyze and trace strategic narratives, this dissertation adds to the discussion of 
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soft power instrumentalization. Such knowledge can be relevant for both scholars and 
practitioners.   
Future Directions in Research 
This dissertation investigated the strategic narratives of public diplomacy and 
the opportunities they provide for the enactment of soft power. The findings of this 
dissertation open new avenues for research of how soft power operates through 
communication and what role public relations and public diplomacy play in it.  
In general, this dissertation is a case study that investigated the strategic 
narratives of Russia, projected via its public diplomacy tools. While this study provides 
valuable insights, conceiving soft power as a discursive environment created via 
strategic narrative provides ample opportunity for public relations and public diplomacy 
researchers to expand the study of strategic narratives on other countries and regions to 
formulate a more rounded understanding of how soft power can be enacted via strategic 
narratives, or otherwise.   
To build the theory further and develop new conceptual models, future studies 
must pay more attention to the process of narrative formation. The existing scholarship 
will benefit from developing a more robust instrument for capturing and measuring the 
process of narrative formation. Such instrument needs to take into consideration later 
stages of narrative development, such as narrative projection and narrative reception. In 
addition, future studies must branch out and examine potential sources of strategic 
narratives beyond foreign policy documents, as utilized in this study.   
The proposed idea of narrative structure and frames as narrative characteristics 
needs to be explored further. The examination of how and to what extent structure of 
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strategic narratives changes when narratives move from projection to reception, and 
how emphasizing certain narrative frames can affect the narrative structure, will prove 
insightful for both public relations and public diplomacy scholars and practitioners.  
Another potential research area for public relations and public diplomacy 
scholars is the investigation of the diffusion stage of strategic narratives and the process 
of narrative contestation, whether in the form of narrative battles or meaning co-
creation across different media, both traditional and participatory. The diffusion stage is 
where the reception and retention of strategic narratives are defined. However, the 
meaning and interpretation of strategic narratives happen in the context of a relationship 
between actors. This can be researched from the relational perspective of relationship 
building, and public relations have the opportunity here to expand our understanding of 
strategic narratives through relational approach. This can be addressed by different 
methodological approaches, including discourse analysis, semantic network analysis, 
qualitative content analysis as well as rhetorical analysis. Further, such research may 
incorporate the examination of what sources of soft power are being utilized for soft 
power enactment and how the context and the discursive environment affect the 
projection and reception of the narrative. In doing so, careful consideration must be paid 
to uncovering social and political implications of different strategic narrative and their 
role in the evolution of social and political consciousness. 
The examination of the diffusion stage and narrative contestation invites 
research not only on narrative battles but also, as Zaharna (2016) argued, identity 
battles. Future studies on strategic narratives and public diplomacy must consider 
identity and its role in image cultivation, as previous research indicated that images of 
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nations often manifest national identities. Because the mediation and projection of the 
nation’s images, identities, and foreign policies often occur via strategic narratives of 
public diplomacy, the examination of strategic narratives and identity could be 
conceptualized as identity management through strategic narratives. Constructivist 
theories, including the social construction of reality, may inform such future studies.  
The future research will also benefit from examining the strategic narratives that 
are deployed and projected by non-state actors. This might include examining the role 
of corporations and non-profit organization in the formation of strategic narratives. In 
addition, scholars must venture out and investigate the non-mediated projection of 
strategic narrative, examining other sources and opportunities for the strategic narrative 
projection beyond international broadcasting. This includes narratives that surround 
educational and cultural exchanges, social corporate responsibility programs of the 
transnational corporations and international sporting events such as Olympic Games.   
The role of events in narrative projection and reception requires further 
examination and exploration, possibly through an incorporation of the existing 
communication theories, including theories of framing, agenda setting, and public 
opinion formation. This may provide further opportunities to study the relationship 
between the pre-existing narratives at the level of narrative formation and the projected 
narratives tied to specific events in the world that affect narrative projection. Further 
studies should investigate the association between events, political climate, and strategic 
narratives.    
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Limitations 
No study is without limitation. There are several limitations to this study that 
need to be taken into consideration when interpreting its findings. First of all, this is an 
exploratory research of strategic narratives limited to one specific country – Russia. 
While the findings of this dissertation are insightful, they are case-specific and limited 
in their ability to explain narrative projection and reception for other advocate states. 
Second, this study looked at the narrative formation from a single angle – foreign policy 
documents. However, there are more potential sources from which strategic narratives 
may originate such as presidential addresses, speeches and elite political discourse in 
general (Miskimmon et al., 2014).  
Another limitation of this study is related to the methodological choices of the 
researcher. Content analysis has several limitations. While content analysis is well 
suited for being used with other research techniques, including qualitative analysis, 
content analysis simplifies complex issues and processes to allow for counting. 
Wimmer and Dominick (2006) criticized content analysis arguing that it is reductive 
when dealing with complex texts, it disregards context and may not explain the “why” 
of the content.  
Qualitative analysis of the narrative formation is a subjective process that can be 
biased. In addition, the Russia Today sample may not have represented the full scope of 
Russia Today’s coverage. Not all related content could have been posted on the RT’s 
official website, and so all broadcasted stories relevant to the identified narratives and 
studied period may not have been included.          
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Conclusion 
This dissertation utilized a narrative approach to a communication phenomenon 
of soft power as its overarching theoretical framework and demonstrated how public 
relations and public diplomacy may facilitate the enactment of soft power via strategic 
narratives.  
Soft power is central to the understanding of international communication and 
international relations today. Although soft power received significant attention in the 
scholarly literature and is used as a buzzword for politicians and journalists, 
nevertheless the research explaining how the influence of soft power takes places and 
how one can enact soft power is rather limited. Because soft power is often used as a 
justification for public diplomacy spending and as an ad-hoc measure of its success or 
failure, this study offers a theoretical examination of public relations approaches to 
public diplomacy and explains how soft power can be enacted. The dissertation also 
suggests analytical instruments for understanding the process of soft power enactment. 
Specifically, this dissertation advocates discussing soft power enactment through 
strategic narratives. Narratives play a role in constructing political and social 
consciousness and in getting people "to want what you want" (Lucaites & Condit, 1985; 
Miskimmon et al., 2014; Nye 2008). Therefore, in this study soft power is conceived as 
a fluid and discursive environment contrasted and contested via strategic narratives and 
in which an advocate country promotes its policies and values.  
It is argued here that soft power enactment depends on whether the strategic 
narratives are able to deliver the soft power sources of attraction across stages of 
strategic narrative deployment. As such, soft power creates a discursive and fluid 
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environment that can be either enabling or disabling when strategic narratives succeed 
or fail to be accepted by the publics of the target state. This dissertation argued that 
public relations and public diplomacy help shape the soft power environment via 
strategic narratives.  
While strategic narratives address the process of formation, projection, 
diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system, it is through the functional 
and technical affordances of public relations and public diplomacy that strategic 
narratives enact soft power and wield influence. Many studies on soft power seek to 
identify whether audiences find one's country attractive, appealing, welcoming or worth 
emulating. The attractiveness of a country is treated as a status quo. Examining soft 
power through the lenses of strategic narratives delivered via public diplomacy and 
public relations strategies allows one to understand better how shared meaning and 
understanding of a policy or issue comes to be.  
As part of the communication strategy, narratives and storytelling is an 
advanced public relations technique and can be a powerful persuasion and 
communication tool. As such, public relations’ functional affordances allow narratives 
to be deployed through its practices of communication and relationship management. 
Public relations plays an important role in foreign policy by building and cultivating 
relationships, researching and scanning environments, building communities around a 
foreign policy issue, facilitating dialogue and socializing foreign policies. 
Similarly, narratives in public diplomacy are an important component of the 
communication strategy, through which messages and themes are being delivered to 
achieve legitimacy and support of foreign policy. Due to its functional affordances, 
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public diplomacy can project the a compelling narrative capable of persuasively 
explaining events and policies of the target state via its functional practices such as 
international broadcasting, exchanges, head-of-state visits, etc.  
The researcher treats public relations and public diplomacy as similar yet 
distinct communication functions that belong to non-state and state actors respectively. 
These state and nonstate actors, directly and indirectly, contribute to the soft power 
environment of a country by projecting strategic narratives. State actors fulfill this 
function via public diplomacy, nonstate actors – via public relations. Such 
conceptualization of soft power allows explaining when and how soft power can be 
enacted into influence. The argument goes that public relations and public diplomacy 
provide conversion strategies by facilitating a strategic narrative.  
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Appendix A: Coding Book 
 Variable Description Instructions/Examples 
V1 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 
type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The type of the document from 
which categorization of the 
  
 
narrative emerged 
News article, op-ed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V2 Source name What is the origin of the document Record the name of 
the publication 
V3 Year/month The year & month the document was 
published 
Record the year a 
document was 
published 
V4 Full date The date the document was published Record the date a 
document was 
published 
V5 Source 
(speaker) 
Domestic Government Sources: 
(1) Russian government 
official or government agency 
Domestic Non-Government 
Sources: 
(2) Russian scientists, researchers, analysts 
(3) Russian non-governmental 
organization, NGOs 
(4) Russian public figures, such as actors 
(5) Other Russian source 
(with no mention of business 
affiliation/occupation) 
International Sources: 
(6) Non-Russian government officials or 
government agencies 
(7) Non-Russian   
scientists/researchers/analysts 
(8) Non-Russian NGOs 
(9) Non-Russian public figures, such as 
actors 
(10) Other non-Russian sources 
(with no mention of business 
affiliation/occupation)  
Record the appropriate 
corresponding number 
of the source (speaker) 
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V6 Type of 
strategic 
narrative 
Defines the level the projected narratives 
(1) International - describes how the 
world is structured (Cold War, War 
on Terror, Rise of China). 
(2) National - describes what the story 
of the state or nation is, what values 
and goals it has (US promoting 
democracy). 
(3) Issue-level explains why a policy 
is needed, and how it will be 
effectively implemented. 
Record the 
corresponding 
number for the 
narrative 
V7 Narrative 
(textual) 
Description of an event in context Copy and paste text 
of the narrative 
V8 Level of 
salience 
Defines the level of salience of a 
particular narrative on a 3-point scale: 
(1) “negligible attention”- barely mentions 
identified narratives; 
(2) “moderate attention” - devotes some 
attention to the identified narratives; 
(3) “Significant attention” - news story 
primarily focuses on the identified 
narrative, mentions the narrative clearly, 
and devotes significant part of the story 
to the issues relevant to the narrative.   
Record the 
corresponding number 
for the level of 
salience 
V9 Sources of 
soft power 
used in the 
narrative 
Reference to either cultural values, 
elements of pop or high culture, or 
policies: 
1. Values 
2. Culture 
3. Policy 
Record which source 
of soft power is 
referenced in the 
narrative 
V10 Tone of the 
narrative 
Records tone of the narrative in the 
context of the source on a 3 point 
scale:  
(1) tone that disfavors the narrative 
through the use of negative or critical 
words; 
(2) tone that is neutral through 
providing or restating simple facts; 
(3) tone that favors the identified 
narrative through the use of positive 
and supportive words. 
Record the 
corresponding 
number for the 
narrative’s tone 
 
 
 
